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CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction 
 Over the course of a lifetime, nearly all adults will encounter at least one life-threatening 
or dangerous traumatic experience often with accompanying feelings of fear, horror, and 
hopelessness (Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003).  Yet, only 6.8% of U.S. adults will develop 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) over the course of a lifetime (National Comorbidity 
Survey, 2005).  Despite decades of research, it remains unclear why some individuals suffer 
from post trauma mental health disorders and others do not.  Studies indicate personality traits, 
such as neuroticism, may increase the risk of PTSD (Breslau, Davis, Andreski, & Peterson, 
1991) and that the type of traumatic event preceding PTSD symptoms, such as rape, may also 
increase the risk of developing PTSD (Kessler et al., 2014).  However, clinicians and researchers 
have little predictive ability to anticipate who will develop PTSD after a traumatic event.  The 
following three studies highlight one aspect of the trauma and PTSD relationship, namely how 
central a traumatic event becomes in one’s life.  Specifically, the following studies ask whether 
understanding traumatic event centrality can assist in understanding PTSD symptoms and 
whether event centrality may, indeed, be a PTSD symptom on its own.  The following studies 
also examine these questions from an applied perspective in an attempt to better understand how 
some groups that are highly traumatized, such as refugees, vary widely in their PTSD 
symptomology and whether the use of less overt mental health measures, such as event 
centrality, may be a useful measure of psychological distress in populations where poor mental 
health is highly stigmatized and infrequently disclosed. 
What is PTSD? 
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 Posttraumatic stress disorder was originally conceptualized as a mental health disease 
occurring in veterans following war exposure, specifically following war exposure in Vietnam.  
PTSD was first described in the 3rd edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) and 
included two mandatory criteria, A1 and A2, as well as behavioral, emotional, and physical 
symptoms (3rd ed., DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association, 1980). 
 A1 and A2 criteria. 
 The DSM PTSD A1 criterion requires the individual to have experienced a 
“psychologically distressing event that is outside the range of usual human experience” such as a 
serious physical threat to the self or close loved ones, or witnessing threats or harm to another 
person (p. 247, 3rd ed., DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association, 1980).  The A2 criterion 
requires the individual to report feelings of intense fear, horror, and hopelessness during or 
immediately following the traumatic event (3rd ed., DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association, 
1980).  Using the DSM-III and DSM-IV guidelines, both A1 and A2 criteria must be met for a 
PTSD diagnosis to be warranted.  The emphasis on the A1 criterion was unique among DSM 
disorders in that it required a specific, identifiable preceding traumatic event causing the PTSD 
symptoms.  This distinct etiological requirement allowed PTSD to be delineated from other 
disorders such as depression and anxiety, which share many overlapping symptoms with PTSD 
(Rosen, & Lilenfeld, 2008).  In theory, the A1 criterion requirement was sound. One could not be 
diagnosed with PTSD without some preceding traumatic event; thus, individuals with no 
traumatic event could not develop posttraumatic stress disorder.  Additionally, inclusion of the 
A2 criterion was not surprising.  Individuals who experienced a traumatic event would most 
likely report feelings of psychological distress during or immediately following the event.  The 
A1 and A2 criteria remained necessary for a PTSD diagnosis until 2013 when the DSM-5 
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dropped the A2 criterion because research indicated feelings of fear and horror immediately after 
a traumatic event did not delineate those who reported other PTSD symptoms from those who 
did not (Friedman, Resick, Bryant, &, Brewin, 2011).  As will be discussed later, other 
researchers have argued it is not the A1 criterion that matters most for PTSD symptoms but the 
individual’s response to the traumatic event (i.e., the A2 criterion) which is most strongly related 
to PTSD symptoms (Boals & Schuettler, 2011). 
 PTSD symptom clusters. 
 In addition, a PTSD diagnosis required symptoms from three symptom clusters: re-
experiencing the event (e.g., flashbacks, intrusive thoughts and emotions), avoidance/numbing 
(e.g., avoiding people and places which served as reminders of the trauma, emotional numbing 
through decreased happiness and hope for the future), and hyper-arousal (e.g., disrupted sleep, 
hyper vigilance).  A diagnosis was warranted only if these symptoms have been occurring for at 
least one month (3rd ed., DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association, 1980). 
 The specific number of required symptoms within each symptom cluster has changed 
from the DSM-III to the DSM-5.  Specifically, the DSM-III required one re-experiencing 
symptom (out of four possible symptoms), three numbing/avoidance symptoms (out of seven 
possible symptoms), and two hyper-arousal symptoms (out of six possible symptoms) (3rd ed., 
DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association, 1980).  Alterations were made for the DSM-IV to 
move a symptom that had previously been identified as a hyper-arousal symptom, i.e., 
physiological activity upon exposure to events that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the 
traumatic event, and moved this symptom into the re-experiencing symptom cluster (4th ed., 
DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  The re-experiencing and hyper-arousal 
symptom clusters remained relatively unchanged in the DSM-5, however, the 
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avoidance/numbing cluster has now been split into two clusters, including one symptom of 
avoidance (out of two possible symptoms), and two symptoms of negative alterations in 
cognitions or moods (out of seven possible symptoms) (5th ed., DSM-5, American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  Generally, however, these changes involved re-labeling or shifting existing 
PTSD symptom criteria; PTSD symptom requirements have remained largely unchanged since 
its inception as a mental health disorder. 
 Causes and special memory mechanisms for PTSD?  
 Since its conceptualization as a mental health disorder, PTSD has either implicitly or 
explicitly included special cognitive mechanisms to account for PTSD symptomology.  
Researchers have argued that memories for exceptionally stressful or traumatic events are 
somehow different from other types of memories and special memory mechanisms must account 
for the characteristics of these memories.  For example, memory for a traumatic car accident may 
be highly emotional and intense, but fragmented and incoherent when recalled. This high 
intensity and fragmentation, researchers have argued, are reflective of incomplete processing and 
special mechanisms involved in traumatic memories. Researchers often suggest these highly 
traumatic memories are either stored in a different location than “normal” memories or exist in 
the periphery of memory—just outside the bounds of purposeful, explicit recollection.  McNally 
(2003) provides a historical summary of these special mechanisms approaches, which includes 
work from Horowitz (1976) and Van der Kolk and Fisler (1995). 
 Elhers and Clark (2000) provide one example of the special mechanisms required for the 
cognitive components of PTSD, with an emphasis on the re-experiencing and avoidance 
symptoms.  Specifically, Elhers and Clark propose PTSD symptoms begin and persist because 
the individual has an incoherent and non-elaborated memory of the traumatic event.  For Elhers 
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and Clark, traumatic memories are involuntarily recalled and attempted to be avoided because 
there are too few explicit linkages between the trauma memory and the “normal” memory 
system.  Trauma memories lie in some peripheral, implicit memory area where the memories are 
under-connected or under-developed compared to everyday, or positive memories.  Essentially, 
these traumatic memories have more classically conditioned aspects than most memories and 
rely on a simpler stimulus-response model of memory.  As such, exceptionally traumatic or 
stressful memories require special cognitive mechanisms to allow for development and 
continuation of PTSD symptoms. 
 Rubin, Berntsen, and Bohni (2008) were the first to propose no special cognitive 
mechanisms were needed to understand PTSD symptomology.  Instead Rubin and colleagues 
(2008) suggested traumatic memories are not under-developed, or under-integrated into the 
memory system, but instead over-integrated and perhaps too connected.  This over integration is 
what causes the symptoms of PTSD.  Specifically PTSD symptoms of can be understood as an 
over-connection or over integration of the traumatic event such that it linked or associated with 
many other aspects of the individual’s memory system (e.g., sensory memories, thoughts about 
the future, awareness that the event may occur again leading to hyper-vigilance).  Rubin, Dennis, 
and Beckham (2011) further refine and develop this cognitive model of PTSD and describe how 
individuals with PTSD symptoms do not demonstrate particularly incoherent traumatic 
memories, but instead have highly emotional and frequently rehearsed trauma memories.  In 
their study, individuals with PTSD were actually more likely to report that the traumatic memory 
was an important part of their life story and that the trauma memory was highly centralized and 
over integrated with other aspects of their individual schema (Rubin et al., 2011).  Thus, for these 
over-integration PTSD memory models, PTSD does not occur because the memories for the 
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event are peripheral or fragmented, but instead occur because memories for the traumatic event 
are over-represented and over-integrated into the memory system.  Support for this model has 
been found in additional studies with results indicating the more an individual integrates a 
traumatic memory into his or her life-story or self-schema the greater the PTSD symptomology 
(e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Boals & Schuettler, 2011; Rubin, 2011; Rubin, Boals, & 
Berntsen, 2008).  Currently, researchers have labeled this process of over-integration of the 
trauma memory as event centralization or event centrality (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). 
What is event centrality?  
 The concept of event centrality is recognized in most cultures.  One could not imagine a 
great work by Homer or Shakespeare without a character experiencing a traumatic or stressful 
event that leads to a “turning point” in the character, and inevitably, the story.  Within 
psychology, however, event centrality has been addressed only recently.  Berntsen (2001) was 
one of the first to indirectly address event centrality and questioned whether and how central an 
event became in one’s life was dependent upon the valence, i.e., positivity or negativity, of the 
event.  For example, although some life anchoring or life changing events are ostensibly positive, 
such as marriage or the birth of a child, other life changing events are potentially traumatic, such 
as the death of a parent or close loved one.  Berntsen (2001) questioned whether intrusive or 
involuntary memories of trauma memories, e.g., flashbacks, were somehow different from other 
types of involuntary memories and questioned how event centrality might influence this 
involuntary recall.  Berntsen’s results indicated trauma memories are not especially fragmented 
or inaccessible compared to other types of positive autobiographical memories.  Indeed, 
individuals who were trauma exposed were actually more likely to mention the trauma memories 
in their diaries and less likely to mention peak positive autobiographical memories.  Berntsen 
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speculates that this trend may be due to the “unusually high intensity and consequentiality” of 
the traumatic event (p. S154, Berntsen, 2001).  She hypothesized a traumatic event that had 
consequences and repercussions for the remainder of one’s life may be more likely to be 
centralized or viewed as an important part of one’s life story.  Berntsen and Rubin (2006) 
formally labeled this trend of anchoring one’s life around a traumatic event as event 
centralization.  To measure event centralization they created the Centrality of Event Scale (CES) 
which assesses whether the event was a turning point, whether the event serves as a lens through 
which one views experiences, and whether this event is a central part of one’s life story or 
narrative identity (refer to Appendix B for the CES). 
 High event centrality has been linked to poor mental health following a traumatic 
experience with research indicating those scoring high on the CES are also more likely to report 
high PTSD symptoms (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Boelen, 2012; Bohn, 2010; Rubin, Boals, 
& Hoyle, 2014).  High event centrality has also been linked to worse physical health outcomes 
following trauma (Boals, 2010) and increasing PTSD symptoms over one year after the traumatic 
event (Boelen, 2012).  Research suggests this trend is found across different cultural and ethnic 
groups with those reporting high event centrality also reporting high levels of emotional distress 
(Zaragoza, Salgado, Shao, & Berntsen, 2014).  Similarly, high levels of event centrality are 
associated with overall maladaptive functioning (PTSD, alexithymia, stress, anxiety, and 
depression symptoms) but not positive aspects of adjustment such as resilience and positive 
affect (Bernard, Whittles, Kertz, & Burke, 2015). 
 Researchers have suggested the link between event centrality and PTSD symptoms is due 
to an over integration of the trauma memory into the person’s life story leading to frequent 
intrusive memories of the trauma and subsequent attempts at avoiding trauma related stimuli 
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(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Schuettler & Boals, 2011).  In the only meditational study to date, 
Boelen (2012) found evidence for this link with intrusiveness of the memory of the event, 
avoidance of reminders of the event, and rumination about the event all identified as mediators 
between event centrality and PTSD symptoms. Boelen notes, however, these results should be 
interpreted with caution as they are cross-sectional. As will be discussed later, researchers have 
grounded much of this causal research linking event centrality and PTSD on the a priori position 
that event centrality leads to PTSD.  Recent research has emerged, however, that may indicate 
event centrality is not a predictor of PTSD symptoms but may actually be a PTSD symptom on 
its own (Broadbridge, 2013).  Specifically, in the first study of its kind, Broadbridge found 
statistical support for the CES as a symptom cluster of PTSD, just as hyper-arousal, re-
experiencing, and avoidance are symptom clusters of PTSD.  Thus, it may be that event 
centrality is a reflection of PTSD symptomology as opposed to as a predictor of PTSD 
symptomology. 
Why study refugees? 
 Each of the following studies will address how use of an Iraqi refugee sample aids in 
understanding event centrality, trauma, and PTSD.  However, before discussing specifics of each 
study, it is important to note how many Iraqi refugees are displaced in the U.S. and the mental 
health difficulties they face upon arrival.  Between 2007 and 2013 approximately 85,000 Iraqi 
refugees arrived in the U.S. (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2013).  Iraqi refugees 
are arriving to the U.S. after being displaced from a war-torn country that has consistently been 
rated as one of the worst offenders for human security and safety worldwide (Wood, 2010) and 
are often fleeing their Iraqi homes with few personal belongings and few monetary and social 
resources (Yako & Biswas, 2014).  Upon arrival to the U.S., Iraqi refugees are often housed in 
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unsafe housing complexes, face language and acculturation difficulties, and are often subject to 
additional trauma and violence after arrival to the U.S. (Wright et al., under review; Yako & 
Biswas, 2014).  Understanding event centrality and its role in PTSD is vital for the Iraqi refugee 
population given the number of displaced Iraqi refugees arriving to the U.S., the hardships they 
face both pre and post-displacement, and the individual and societal costs of poor mental health. 
Participant Selection and General Methodology 
Participant Recruitment and Selection 
 Recruitment of participants was conducted between October 2010 and August 2011.  
Iraqi refugees were recruited via several local resettlement agencies: Arab Community Center for 
Economic and Social Services (ACCESS), Lutheran Social Services of Michigan (LSSM), 
Kurdish Human Rights Watch (KHRW), Catholic Services of Macomb (CSM), and the U.S. 
Commission on Resettlement and Immigration (USCRI).  A contact person at each agency 
informed the research team when orientation meetings were scheduled with newly-arrived 
refugees. An Arabic-speaking member of the research team was present at each orientation 
meeting and presented information about the research study orally.  Those refugees interested in 
participating provided written consent allowing researchers to contact them.  A computer-
generated random sample of 50-70% of those who were interested was selected each week, 
depending on the number of arrivals.  In total, out of 501 interested and eligible refugees, 306 
cases (61%) were randomly selected.  These individuals were contacted by a member of the 
research team and given both oral and written information about the study; 98% of them (n=298) 
chose to participate.  Recruitment criteria included being at least 18 years old, verifiable refugee 
status, and having recently arrived to the United States. 
Data Collection and Attrition Over Time 
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 Data were collected in three waves with all interviews using both self-report and clinical 
assessments via structured interview.  Interviews were conducted in Arabic by a trained 
Arabic/English bilingual psychiatrist.  Interviews were conducted in participants’ homes, 
workplaces, community organizations, or other locations in the local community, in accordance 
with the participants’ preference.  Refugees received $35 gift cards for their participation in each 
wave of data collection. 
 Interviews, on average, took place within one month of arrival to the U.S. with the 
remaining interviews taking place approximately one year apart.  Attrition over time was quite 
low.  At Baseline 298 refugees were interviewed.  At the 1st Follow-up 2% of the participants 
were lost to attrition with 291 completing the second wave of data collection.  At the 2nd Follow-
up 286 participants were interviewed with only 4% lost from the original sample. 
 Sample demographics have been provided in Table 1 with the Informed Consent Sheet 
provided to participants listed in Appendix A.  The Human Investigation Committee at Wayne 
State University approved all materials and procedures in this study.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Centrality of Event Scale: Reliability in a New Sample and Reliability Over Time 
 Berntsen and Rubin (2006) were the first to empirically validate a scale specifically 
focused on event centrality.  Using a sample of undergraduates, Berntsen and Rubin assessed 
event centrality using the Centrality of Event Scale (CES) and demonstrated good to excellent 
internal consistency for both the short (7-item) and long (20-item) versions of the CES (α = .88 - 
.94).  Additional studies have reported high internal consistency for the CES (e.g., Barton, Boals, 
& Knowles, 2013; Boelen, 2012; Rubin, Boals, & Hoyle, 2014). 
 Although the CES has been explored in veterans (Brown et al., 2010; Rubin et al., 2014; 
Staugaard et al., 2015), grieving adults (Boelen, 2009, 2012), and older adults (Bohn, 2010), 
most of the research examining the CES has been conducted using convenience samples of 
undergraduates.  To the best of our knowledge, the CES has not been explored in a refugee 
sample.  Refugees, by definition, are forced to relocate due to war, natural disaster, or fear of 
persecution and therefore are at an elevated risk of experiencing trauma and stressful events.  As 
such, the CES’s instructions to “think back to the most stressful or traumatic event in your life” 
may function differently for refugees.  When compared to a U.S. undergraduate population, 
refugees are more likely to have been exposed to a greater number of potentially traumatic 
events and the intensity of these potentially traumatic events may be higher.  By definition, all 
individuals must have a most stressful or traumatic event, but it is unknown how the CES 
functions in a population where trauma exposure is high and the individual has many possible 
candidate events competing for the most stressful or traumatic. 
 It is also unknown how the CES functions over time.  To the best of our knowledge, the 
CES has only been administered to the same group twice for one study (Staugaard et al., 2015), 
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yet the authors did not report any details of how the CES functions over time.  As such, temporal 
stability of the CES has not been examined.  Rubin and colleagues (2014) note that although 
aspects of personality are unlikely to change over time (e.g., neuroticism; Costa, Herbst, 
McCrae, & Seigler, 2000), narrative identity and the events that form this narrative identity may 
change over time.  Thus, there has been theoretical speculation that the CES may not 
demonstrate temporal stability, but no such empirical work has been conducted.  However, 
unlike other aspects of personality, assessment of event centrality is complicated by its 
dependence on a particular preceding event.  The centrality of an event may change if the event 
changes (e.g., one’s most traumatic event is replaced by something more traumatic), if narrative 
identity or the life-story changes (McAdams et al., 2006), or if other aspects of mental health 
change, such as PTSD symptomology (refer to Study 3 in the current paper; Broadbridge, 2013).  
We acknowledge these aspects may affect temporal stability of event centrality over time; 
however, for the current study only the effect of actual time, i.e., the lapse of one year, is 
considered as we examine temporal stability in the CES. 
Overview of the Current Study 
 Event centrality describes the extent to which a stressful or traumatic event has become 
an anchor point in one’s life story and colors the way the individual views experiences.  Event 
centrality, as measured by the Centrality of Event Scale (CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), has 
demonstrated high internal consistency (Barton, Boals, & Knowles, 2013; Boelen, 2012; Rubin, 
Boals, & Hoyle, 2014).  However, this high internal consistency has been established in 
predominately U.S. undergraduate populations.  As such, it is unknown how the CES functions 
in a sample of trauma-exposed refugees.  Additionally, whether event centrality is stable or 
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changes over time is unknown.  The current study examines a group of Iraqi refugees across a 
two-year period to address the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1. 
 The CES will demonstrate excellent internal consistency at both measurement points.  In 
the current study, internal consistency was considered excellent at α > .90, which is in the higher 
ranges of acceptable internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003). 
 Hypothesis 2. 
 The CES will demonstrate acceptable temporal stability across the two measurements.  In 
the current study, temporal stability was assessed using a measurement invariance approach with 
structural equation modeling (SEM). Using this method, differing aspects of measurement are 
held constant to see which properties of the scale are stable from one time period to the next 
(e.g., is the variance for this item the same across time points?) (Little, 1997; Milfont & Fisher, 
2010).  This method of testing temporal stability is more rigorous and precise than test-retest 
reliability, and, as such, perfect temporal stability is rarely completely achieved in practice 
(Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthen, 1989; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000).  Thus, for the current study, 
temporal stability was defined as adequate fit for Model 2, which would suggest the CES has the 
same number of items measured at each time point and the items are qualitatively similar across 
each time point (e.g., CES item 3 is functioning similarly at both measurement points).  
Additional details about measurement models and operational definitions for adequate fit are 
provided below in the Data Analysis section.  
Method 
Participants 
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 Data were collected from 286 Iraqi refugees in metropolitan Detroit, Michigan.  The 
sample included 155 male and 130 female participants with a mean age of 33.27 years (SD = 
11.08) at the first measurement point.  Recruitment criteria included being at least 18 years old, 
verifiable refugee status, and having recently arrived to the United States at the Baseline 
interview (M months = 1.02, SD = 1.09, range = 0.00 to 5.40). 
Measures 
 Participants completed the short form (7-item) version of the Centrality of Event Scale 
(CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  Participants rated on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) the extent to which their most traumatic or stressful experience had become an 
anchor point, colored their thoughts about experiences, and was central to their narrative identity 
with higher scores on the CES reflecting higher event centrality.  Refer to Appendix B for the 
CES and Table 2 for CES descriptive data across the two measurement waves.  As all 
participants are Iraqi refugees and native Arabic speakers, the CES was translated from English 
to Arabic and back-translated to English to confirm acceptable translation. 
Procedures 
 The CES was administered via structured interview with the two structured interviews 
conducted, on average, one year apart, referred to as 1st Follow-up and 2nd Follow-up.  
Interviews were conducted in Arabic by a trained Arabic/English bi-lingual psychiatrist.  During 
the interview, the psychiatrist read each item and participants responded orally.  Interviews were 
conducted in participants’ homes, workplaces, community organizations, or other locations in the 
local community, in accordance with the participants’ preference.  Participants received a gift 
card for each wave of participation in the study. 
Data Analysis 
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 Five participants declined to respond to any CES items or responded to only one item, 
making multiple imputation impossible.  These five individuals were dropped from the 
subsequent analyses (N=281).  Seven missing responses were identified for 2nd Follow-up 
(0.36%).  Multiple imputation was used to estimate these missing values (via IBM SPSS version 
22). 
Internal consistency (i.e., Cronbach’s α) was assessed using IBM SPSS version 22.  
Consistency ratings were considered good at α >.80 and excellent at α > .90 (George & Mallery, 
2003). 
Examination of temporal stability was conducted using structural equation modeling 
(SEM) and the program LISREL 8.8 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006).  Maximum likelihood 
estimation method was used as it has been shown to provide the most accurate fit indices and 
parameter estimates when compared to other estimation methods such as weighted least squares 
(WLS) and generalized least squares (GLS) (Olsson, Foss, Troye, & Howell, 2010).  
Traditionally, test-retest reliability addresses the extent to which two sets of scores correlate over 
time (Allen & Yen, 2002).  However, in the current study, the time between measurement points 
was approximately one year.  Such a relatively long period between assessments may lead to 
conceptual and statistical difficulty with traditional test-retest assessment using correlations.  The 
use of SEM, however, to examine temporal stability provides a more precise estimate of which 
aspects of the scale are similar or different over time (e.g., means, variances, factor loadings, 
etc.).  In SEM this type of temporal stability is referred to as measurement invariance and is 
examined using a hierarchy of steps with increasingly strict parameters (restraints) across the two 
measurement points.  Examination of the following six nested models is recommended to 
establish measurement invariance (Little, 1997; Milfont & Fisher, 2010): 
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Model 1: Form Model (All parameters to be estimated separately for each time point.) 
Model 2: Pattern Model (Factor loadings are invariant across time points.) 
Model 3: Scalar Model (Factor loadings and item means are invariant across time points.) 
Model 4: Strict Invariance Model (Factor loadings, item means, and item residuals/error 
 variances are invariant across time points.) 
Model 5: Strict Invariance Model 2: (Strict Invariance Model plus latent variable means 
 are invariant.) 
Model 6: Strict Invariance Model 3: (Strict Invariance Model plus latent variable means 
 and variances are invariant.) 
Given the complex and iterative nature of these comparisons, figures have been provided 
to demonstrate which parameters were constrained at each step.  These figures are presented in 
Appendix C.  As each model added restrictions on the parameters to be estimated, the nested 
models were compared (i.e., does Model 2 have better fit than Model 1?).  Criteria used to 
establish “better” model fit are described below. 
 SEM model fit was determined by examining both absolute and incremental fit indices.  
Absolute fit indices determine fit by comparing the reproduced covariance matrix and the 
original covariance matrix, measuring exact residuals, and comparing the residuals to chance 
estimates (Barrett, 2007).  Thus, absolute fit indices examine how well an a priori model 
established by the researcher fit the collected data.  Fit for the first absolute fit index, minimum 
fit function chi-square (χ2), is established using the associated significance test.  However, the 
chi-square test is negatively biased toward both large samples and variables with high bivariate 
correlations (Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Chen, Sousa, & West, 2005), both of which are present in 
the current sample.  As such, critics vary on how stringent the chi-square and additional 
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goodness of fit indices should be (Barrett, 2007; Hu & Bentler, 1999).  Fit for the second 
absolute fit index, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is considered adequate 
fit at < .08 and good fit at < .05 (Browne & Cudeck, 1992). Incremental fit indices determine 
model fit by comparing the reproduced model to the independence (null) model and provides an 
index of degree of discrepancy between the two models while accounting for degrees of freedom 
(Barrett, 2007).  Thus, incremental fit indices compare the model provided by the researcher to 
the “everything is independent model” (i.e., no correlation between measured variables).  Fit for 
both the incremental fit indices, Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) and Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI), is considered adequate at >.90 and above and good fit at >.95 (Browne & Cudeck, 1992). 
 When models are nested (i.e., the models include the same variables and the researcher 
only changes the pathways or relationships between the variables), comparison of fit indices 
between models is possible.  Evaluation of the goodness of fit of one model over another model 
will be established in several ways.  Ideally, chi-square would be used to establish a significant 
change in model fit as it has a significance test based on change in degrees of freedom (Steiger, 
Shapiro, & Brown, 1985).  However, chi-square is known to be affected by sample size (Chen, et 
al., 2005) and it can be overly sensitive to change when many constraints are placed on a given 
model (Little, 1997).  As such, changes in chi-square were interpreted with caution.  Decreases 
in RMSEA, NNFI, and CFI of 0.01 or more will be considered a significant change when 
comparing nested models (Chen, 2007).  Finally, overall model parsimony will be considered. 
Model parsimony refers to models that have the highest number of degrees of freedom compared 
to the null or baseline model (McDonald & Marsh, 1990). Researchers consider model 
parsimony a reflection of good fit as the more relationships that are hypothesized (i.e., the more 
arrow/relationships that are drawn in SEM), the greater the likelihood that one is capitalizing on 
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chance, over-fitting the data, or finding otherwise spurious results (Marsh, & Hau, 1996).  Thus, 
a model that constrains the most parameters (i.e., estimates the fewest relationships) is seen as 
most parsimonious. 
 Additionally, factor loadings were examined for significance to ensure each item was 
loading on its respective latent variable.  Squared multiple correlations (SMCs) for each item 
were also examined to determine the amount of variance in each latent variable associated with 
that particular item that is not due to measurement error (Jaccard & Wan, 1996) with SMCs >.30 
considered good (Albright & Park, 2009). 
  All LISREL syntax for Hypothesis 2 testing has been appended (Appendix M). 
Results 
Hypothesis 1 
 The CES will demonstrate excellent internal consistency at both measurement points.  In 
the current study, internal consistency was considered excellent at α > .90, which is in the higher 
ranges of acceptable internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003). 
 The CES demonstrated excellent internal consistency at both measurement points with 1st 
Follow-up Cronbach’s α = .93 and 2nd Follow-up α = .90. Descriptive statistics across the two 
measurement waves are presented in Table 2. 
Hypothesis 2 
 The CES will demonstrate acceptable temporal stability across the two measurements. 
 Temporal stability of the CES over time was examined using factor invariance testing in 
SEM. Specifically, the six nested models were compared and assessed for improvements in fit 
compared to less restrained models.  Visual depiction of this process is presented in Appendix C. 
Model 1: Form Model (All parameters to be estimated separately for each time point.) 
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Model 2: Pattern Model (Factor loadings are invariant across time points.) 
Model 3: Scalar Model (Factor loadings and item means are invariant across time points.) 
Model 4: Strict Invariance Model (Factor loadings, item means, and item residuals/error 
 variances are invariant across time points.) 
Model 5: Strict Invariance Model 2: (Strict Invariance Model plus latent variable means 
 are invariant.) 
Model 6: Strict Invariance Model 3: (Strict Invariance Model plus latent variable means 
 and variances are invariant.) 
 Fit indices, detailed in Table 12, indicate poor to borderline adequate fit for most of the 
indices used.  For example, Model 6: Strict Invariance Model 3 was identified as having a 
RMSEA of .23 (recommended cut-off <.08) which suggests very poor fit while the NNFI was 
.89 (recommended cut-off of >.90) which suggests borderline adequate fit.  This similar pattern 
was found for all of the models tested. However, Hu and Bentler (1995) emphasize the strength 
of model testing in SEM comes from both consideration of model fit indices and from 
comparison of models tested. As such, Hu and Bentler caution against focusing on the absolute 
cut-off values for fit indices (e.g., a CFI >.90) and instead consider how one model fits when 
compared to a competing model.  Using this recommendation, examination of fit indices and 
changes in fit indices, Tables 12 and 13, respectively, indicate Model 6: Strict Invariance Model 
3 has significantly better RMSEA fit and NNFI fit when compared to other models and does not 
have significantly worse χ2 fit than the proceeding models.  Thus, it could be argued that 
although none of the models tested had adequate fit, Model 6 was not significantly worse in fit 
than the other models.  Examination of the factor loadings in Table 14 indicates significant 
loadings for each of the items in Model 6.  Additionally, examination of the squared multiple 
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correlations (SMCs) for Model 6 in Table 14 indicates high SMCs for all of the items except for 
CES 2 (“This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the 
world.”).  When combined, these results suggest consideration of Model 6 as the best fitting 
model of the models tested as it did not demonstrate significantly worse fit than the competing 
models, demonstrated acceptable item factor loadings and SMCs, and was the most parsimonious 
(i.e., the least amount of pathways to be estimated). 
Data Screening Follow-Up 
 In order to understand possible reasons for the objectively poor fit indices, follow-up data 
screening of both measurement waves using LISREL was conducted.  Results indicate many 
“straight-line” responses for the entire CES (e.g., “Disagree” response for all seven items).  
Specifically, 140 of 281 (50%) respondents at the 1st Follow-up and 157 of 281 (55.9%) 
respondents at the 2nd Follow-up reported a consistent “Disagree” pattern with a relatively small 
number of other participants responding with other “straight-line” responses (e.g., all 
“Undecided” responses).  This response pattern was masked by consideration of individual items 
(e.g., what is the mean of CES 4?) and was not evident until the entire CES scale was considered 
as a whole.  In order to better understand the poor fit, all “straight-line” responders were 
removed from the sample and analyses were re-run.  Specifically, all participants reporting the 
same response for all items (e.g., all “Totally Disagree”, all “Undecided”, etc.) at either 
measurement period were dropped from the sample.  This resulted in removal of approximately 
66% of the sample (187 cases of 281 dropped) leaving 94 participants.  Using this sub-sample, 
both hypotheses were re-tested. 
Hypothesis 1 
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 Results for Hypothesis 1 indicated a decline in internal consistency when the straight-line 
responders were removed.  Specifically, for the 1st Follow-up Cronbach’s α declined from .93 to 
.83 and for the 2nd Follow-up the internal consistency dropped from α = .90 to α = .82.  These 
values are still within the range that is considered adequate internal consistency (i.e., α > .80; 
George & Mallery, 2003); however, they are notably lower than the internal consistency values 
that were reported when using the entire sample.  Examination of individual items indicates 
removal of CES Item 2, which was associated with poor fit in Hypothesis 2, would not 
dramatically increase the internal consistency of the scale.  A more thorough discussion of CES 
Item 2 is included in the Discussion below. 
Hypothesis 2 
 Results for Hypothesis 2 remained un-changed.  Again, fit-indices were poor to 
borderline adequate and Model 6 did not fit significantly worse than competing models, 
demonstrated acceptable factor loadings and SMCs, and was the most parsimonious.  Objectively 
poor fit in this sample that had been thoroughly data screened is concerning. However, the 
sample size of 94 is below the recommended cut-off for SEM (rule of thumb > 200 participants) 
(Kline, 2005) and at small sample sizes none of the fit indices behave adequately (Hu & Bentler, 
1995), thus the small number of participants in this sub-sample is likely responsible for the poor 
fit. Possible causes and effects of this response pattern are discussed below. 
Discussion 
 Results from Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 suggest event centrality, as measured by the 
CES, is internally consistent and may be temporally stable over a one-year period.  Specifically, 
the CES demonstrated excellent internal consistency for Hypothesis 1 with high Cronbach’s 
alphas for both measurement waves.  Although the Cronbach’s alphas declined when straight-
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line responders were dropped from the sample, the internal consistency values were still within 
the recommended range.  These results suggest each of the seven CES items are assessing the 
same construct, namely event centrality.  Results from SEM invariance testing for Hypothesis 2 
were less clear, however, with results suggesting Model 6 does not demonstrate significantly 
worse fit than the competing models and is the most parsimonious model.  Acceptance of Model 
6 suggests all aspects of the scale are similar over time including aspects such as associations 
between the items and the latent variable (i.e., factor loadings) as well as total scale score 
variability (i.e., latent construct variance).  Results from Hypothesis 2, however, should be 
interpreted with caution as none of the models tested met the recommended cut-off values for 
adequate fit. 
Model Fit and Response Patterns for the CES 
 In practice, Models 3—6 are rarely established (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthen, 1989; 
Vandenberg & Lance, 2000).  As such, that these models demonstrated poor model fit for some 
of the fit indices (e.g., RMSEA) is not necessarily surprising and it was hypothesized Models 3 – 
6 may demonstrate poor fit.  However, such a high RMSEA for the initial baseline model, Model 
1, does indicate larger concerns with the data.  Examination of individual response patterns for 
the entire scale indicated approximately 66% of the respondents were quite consistent within the 
scale and over time with “straight-line” responses for all items on the CES.  This lack of variance 
in responses leads to statistical difficulties that no amount of advanced statistical techniques can 
correct.  As described above, removal of these “straight-line” participants resulted in a sample 
size too small for effective SEM analyses (n=94). 
 This pattern of responses also raises methodological concerns.  Prior researchers have 
found the quality of the responses decline as participants grow fatigued or bored with survey 
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questions.  This phenomenon has been referred to as participant or respondent fatigue (Ben-Nun, 
2008) and has been documented across a range of populations and survey content.  Participants 
who are fatigued often decline to respond to survey items (Hoerger, 2010), misrepresent or 
inaccurately report responses in order to complete the survey (Lehnen & Reiss, 1978), or engage 
in “straight-line” responding where they respond to all the items with the same answer (Galesic 
& Bosnjak, 2009).  Specifically, prior research has found questions at the end of a questionnaire 
may be responded to differently than if they were at the beginning of the survey (Helgeson & 
Ursic 1994).  Although no absolute rule exists, researchers examining participant fatigue suggest 
surveys of no more than 20 minutes to ensure quality data (Rathod & LaBruna, 2005).  In the 
current study the CES was administered at the end of the interview following a series of 215 and 
237 questions in the 1st and 2nd Follow-ups, respectively, with surveys taking approximately two 
hours to complete.  Given the pattern of responses in the current study and length of the survey, 
it is likely many participants engaged in “straight-line” responding for the CES items and that if 
the CES had been presented at the beginning of the interview more variability in responses might 
have been found. 
CES Item 2 
 CES Item 2, “This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself 
and the world,” loaded onto the Event Centrality latent construct thus indicating CES Item 2 is a 
valid measure of event centrality.  However, examination of the squared multiple correlations for 
CES Item 2 indicates the latent variable of Event Centrality does not explain much of the 
variance in CES Item 2.  Thus, CES Item 2 is associated with the theoretical latent construct of 
Event Centrality but knowing one’s Event Centrality score would not necessarily be helpful in 
predicting the response for the individual indicator of CES Item 2.  Importantly, this trend was 
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present for both measurement waves.  However, examination of internal consistency for the CES 
when Item 2 was deleted indicated that dropping CES Item 2 would not notably improve the 
scale’s internal consistency. 
 One possible explanation for the low squared multiple correlations for CES Item 2 may 
lie in the language used for the scale.  In the current study all CES items were translated to 
Arabic and then back-translated to English to ensure accuracy of language and consistency in the 
content of the items regardless of the language.  However, translation of survey items, especially 
items related to abstract concepts such as viewing an event as a “reference point,” is difficult.  It 
is possible some aspect of CES Item 2 was lost in the translation and back-translation process.  
CES Item 2 was associated with its latent construct of Event Centrality, but it does seem to be 
underperforming compared to the six other CES items.  Any future research examining the CES 
in this sample should be cognizant of this concern.  Follow-up analyses by other CES researchers 
could examine whether CES Item 2 demonstrates similar concerns across different populations 
and different trauma exposures. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 As described above, the pattern of responses, although consistent, may reflect a 
methodology concern.  Somewhat paradoxically the major limitation from the current study, 
which was designed to examine consistency and stability, is the consistent and stable pattern of 
“straight-line” responses for approximately 66% of the respondents across the two measurement 
waves.  Without variance even advanced statistical techniques, such as structural equation 
modeling, are untenable.  Future research examining temporal stability of the CES should be 
aware of participant fatigue during long interviews and CES placement in the questionnaire. 
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 Finally, results from the present study should be interpreted with caution as the study 
methodology did not allow for comparison of CES events over time.  Refugees are a highly 
trauma exposed group and, as will be discussed in the following study, individuals who are 
highly trauma exposed are more likely to be exposed to additional traumatic experiences in the 
future.  Thus, it is possible that the most traumatic event for a participant at 1st Follow-up was no 
longer the most traumatic event at the 2nd Follow-up.  As such, examination of temporal stability 
in the current study relies on the assumption that the most traumatic or stressful event did not 
change from one year to the next.  Future research examining CES stability should ensure 
participants are referencing the same event over time by having the participants describe the 
most traumatic or stressful event to which they are referring.  Relatedly, future research should 
note if participants want to change or replace their most traumatic or stressful memory as this 
change in the most traumatic memory would be helpful in understanding the relationship 
between trauma, event centrality, and PTSD over time. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Centrality of Event Scale: Cumulative Trauma vs. Trauma Types 
 If trauma is bad, then is more trauma worse?  This question lies at the core of the dose-
response model of PTSD which posits that as an individual’s exposure to trauma increases, the 
more likely it becomes that he or she will experience adverse mental health symptoms in 
response (March, 1993; Marshall, Schell, Elliott, Berthold, & Chun, 2005; Mollica, McInnes, 
Poole, & Tor, 1998; Ogle, Rubin, & Siegler, 2014; Zoladz & Diamond, 2013).  This model is 
intuitively appealing as it follows other dose-response models found in many areas of health 
sciences and medical research.  Research examining event centrality has had little to say about 
the “dose” of the traumas experienced, which is surprising given event centrality’s relationship to 
PTSD, a mental health outcome that has been hypothesized to follow the dose-response pattern.  
If more traumas lead to more mental health problems then one could ask whether more traumas 
increase the risk of negative change in the identity of the individual.  And, if so, what form that 
negative change might take. 
 With regards to event centrality, are some traumas worse than others?  Perhaps due to the 
sensitive nature of operationalizing or scoring the severity of trauma, researchers examining 
event centrality seem to have strategically avoided answering this question directly.  Instead, as 
will be described below, at least some researchers have argued the “objective nature of 
potentially traumatic events is unrelated to mental health” (p. 802, Boals & Schuettler, 2011).  
This method seems to imply an outsider’s assessment of the severity of the trauma is irrelevant if 
the individual is sufficiently “traumatized” by an event.  As discussed below, however, recent 
research has found differing types of traumatic events have distinct effects on mental health.  
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Does this imply that differing types of traumas also have distinct effects on later event 
centralization? 
 It is these two questions: 1.) Whether and how cumulative trauma affects event 
centrality?, and 2.) Whether and how differing trauma types affect event centrality?, that are 
addressed in the current paper. 
Trauma and Event Centrality 
 Addressing trauma type and/or severity 
 Prior research examining event centrality has approached the preceding traumatic or 
stressful event in one of three ways.  In the following section, these three methods are referred to 
as the “not disclosed trauma,” “minimum necessary trauma,” and the “same trauma,” 
respectively.  
 For the first method, or the “not disclosed trauma”, no actual detailing of the trauma is 
required on the part of the participant.  Participants are asked to reflect on the most stressful or 
traumatic event in their lives but no explicit reporting of the traumatic event is required (e.g., 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; 2007; Rubin, Boals, & Hoyle, 2014).  By not requiring participants to 
describe their most stressful or traumatic memory, participants may consider the traumatic event 
without fear of disclosure or stigma.  As such, these participants may be more willing to reflect 
on the emotional aspects of the event and report without some type of cultural or social 
desirability bias because they not required to disclose their trauma to a stranger, even if the 
response is made anonymously.  However, this method of assessing trauma and event centrality 
does not allow for comparisons of event characteristics.  For example, two participants could 
report the same event centrality score with one participant recalling his most stressful event as 
the natural death of a beloved family pet while another participant recalls her most stressful 
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event as being carjacked at gunpoint as she was pumping gas in her neighborhood.  Although 
their event centrality scores may be the same, subjectively and objectively the events they 
considered their most stressful or traumatic differ. 
 Using the second method, or the “minimum necessary trauma”, participants are asked to 
consider the most stressful or traumatic event, briefly detail this event, and self-report on whether 
this event met the A1 and/or A2 criteria for a PTSD diagnosis.  Use of this method allows for 
comparison of event centrality between those individuals who may qualify for a PTSD diagnosis 
using the A1 and/or A2 criteria versus those who objectively did not experience an event that 
would meet diagnosis for PTSD.  For example, Berntsen and Rubin (2006) had participants 
respond to both the A1 and A2 criteria while Boals and colleagues (2012) had participants 
respond to only the A1 criteria, “Did you experience, witness, or confront an event that involved 
actual or threatened death or serious injury to your physical integrity or that of others?”  This 
approach ensures that although the reported events vary, the event does at least meet the basic 
DSM criteria for a traumatic event.  One limitation of this method is the variability in 
experiences qualifying as traumatic event (e.g., military combat, being robbed, hearing of an 
unexpected death of a family member or friend, experiencing a natural disaster, etc.).  As such, 
researchers using this method can be confident the traumatic event meets the A1 and/or A2 
criteria, however, differentiating how trauma type impacts event centrality may be difficult due 
to the various types of trauma exposure. 
 Lastly, using the “same trauma” approach studies examining event centrality are 
conducted where participants have all experienced the same type of traumatic event, such as 
losing a close loved one or living through a terrorist attack, and respond to the CES with this 
event in mind (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Boelen, 2009, 2012; Blix, Solberg, Heir, 2014; 
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Brown et al., 2010). By standardizing trauma type, researchers can examine other relationships 
that may be influencing the event centrality such as age, time since the traumatic event, 
unexpectedness of the event, or individual characteristics such as neuroticism.  For example, 
Boelen (2012) examined event centrality for those who had lost a close loved one.  By 
standardizing the traumatic event, Boelen was able to test variables mediating the relationship 
between event centrality and poor mental health, such as event characteristics (e.g., suddenness 
of the death of the loved one) and cognitive variables (e.g., intrusiveness of memories of the 
event).  This approach allows researchers to more precisely examine individual characteristics 
that may impact event centrality and to also examine the effect of differing event characteristics 
on event centrality.  One notable drawback of this approach, however, is that only one trauma 
type has been examined per study.  Thus, it is unknown how different trauma types are related to 
event centrality, such as how having a traumatic event occur to the self compares to having a 
traumatic event happen to a close loved one. 
 Limitations of prior event centrality research. 
 To date, no research has reported the effects of cumulative trauma on event centrality.  
Nor has a specific comparison been conducted to examine how differing trauma types affect 
event centrality.  This is surprising as prior research examining event centrality has asked 
questions which would allow for these comparisons.  Previous event centrality research has 
measured cumulative trauma using checklists of potentially traumatic events such as the 
Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire (TLEQ; Kubany et al., 2000).  However, the bulk of this 
research has only used the checklist to prompt participants to consider possible traumatic events 
they may have experienced (e.g., Barton, Boals, & Knowles, 2013; Berntsen, Rubin, & Siegler, 
2011; Boals & Schuettler, 2011; Schuettler & Boals, 2011).  For example, Barton and colleagues 
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(2013) asked participants to respond to a 13-item questionnaire asking about prior abuse, 
assaults, accidents, deaths, etc.  The authors reported these events using descriptive methods 
(e.g., 1.5% of the sample reported being physically assaulted) but made no comparisons by 
trauma type or total trauma experienced.  In other studies no information is provided about the 
number or type of traumatic events and instead the reader is left to assume the data collected 
about cumulative traumatic events or the type of events is unrelated to event centrality (Berntsen 
et al., 2011; Boals & Schuettler, 2011; Schuettler & Boals, 2011).  Rubin and colleagues (2011) 
offer a notable exception to this trend by reporting the cumulative number of traumas 
experienced and cumulative trauma’s association with other variables of interest (e.g., PTSD 
symptoms).  However, these authors do not report any information regarding the relationship 
between event centrality and cumulative trauma exposure.  Additionally, for all the 
aforementioned studies, no researchers examined the effects of specific types of trauma on event 
centrality.  Thus, data were available to compare event centrality between those who had been 
physically assaulted versus those who had experienced the violent death of a loved one; yet, 
these comparisons were not included in the reported analyses. 
 These omissions may be both theoretical and methodological.  Theoretically, event 
centrality is predicated on one event becoming over integrated and central to one’s life story.  By 
definition, a participant can only have one event currently considered most stressful or traumatic.  
All other events, regardless of how stressful or traumatic, must be considered at least slightly less 
stressful or traumatic than the most traumatic or stressful.  Thus from a purely theoretical 
analysis, the cumulative number of traumatic events experienced may not be of interest for those 
interested in the most stressful or traumatic event and event centrality thereafter.  With regards to 
methodological constraints, prior research using trauma checklists has been conducted mostly 
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using an undergraduate population.  Researchers may have been uninterested in making 
comparisons for event centrality by trauma type given the infrequency with which specific types 
of traumatic events were experienced and the large sample sizes required to make valid 
comparisons. 
Why Iraqi refugees? 
 Refugees offer a unique opportunity to explore these previous methodological and 
theoretical limitations.  First, refugees are a known trauma exposed group as, by definition, 
refugees are forced to relocate due to war, natural disaster, or fear of persecution.  Iraqi refugees 
are at such a heightened risk for pre-displacement traumatic experiences that a traumatic events 
checklist has been created specifically for this population, the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire 
Traumatic Events Component—Arabic version (HTQ; Shoeb, Weinstein, & Mollica, 2007).  
Research consistently demonstrates Iraqi refugees experience high levels of aggregate pre-
displacement trauma as measured by the HTQ, including: exposure to physical beatings, 
abduction of close loved ones, persecution due to religious practices, and lack of food and water 
(e.g., Hijazi et al., 2014; Nickerson et al., 2014).  Recent research has also emerged indicating 
the HTQ may be better conceptualized as a checklist for differing sub-types of trauma instead of 
simply an aggregate checklist. Specifically, Arnetz and colleagues (2014) found sorting the HTQ 
into five different trauma sub-types explained more variance in mental health symptoms than did 
using a cumulative measure of pre-displacement trauma exposure.  Using factor analysis, Arnetz 
and colleagues identified five distinct trauma sub-types within the HTQ questionnaire, including: 
Physical Trauma to Self, Physical Trauma to Others, Abduction of Family Member or Friend, 
Lacking Necessities, and Persecution/Coercion.  In order to examine the validity of these trauma 
sub-types, the authors predicted PTSD symptoms using two different models.  First, they used 
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cumulative trauma exposure to predict PTSD symptoms.  Results indicated cumulative trauma 
scores were associated with 7% of the variance in PTSD symptoms.  Second, they used the five 
aforementioned trauma sub-types to predict PTSD symptoms and found that Physical Trauma to 
the Self was actually a stronger predictor for PTSD symptoms than was cumulative trauma.  
Specifically, Physical Trauma to the Self associated with 8% of the variance in PTSD symptoms.  
With regards to other trauma sub-types, Lack of Necessities was also associated with significant 
variance in PTSD symptoms, however, the relationship was smaller in magnitude (i.e., 3% of the 
variance). 
Additional research supports this trend of examining specific types of trauma when 
considering mental health.  For example, Leaman and Gee (2012) found sexual torture, but not 
other types of torture such as deprivation of basic needs like food, was predictive of PTSD 
symptoms for a group of African torture survivors.  Other researchers have found that for Iraqi 
refugee adolescents, racially motivated interpersonal trauma that occurred after being displaced 
to the U.S. is predictive of PTSD symptoms above and beyond the variance in PTSD symptoms 
associated with cumulative lifetime trauma exposure (Kira, Lewandowski, Chiodo, & Ibrahim, 
2014).  Additional research indicates the type of trauma may not matter as much as the 
perpetrator of the trauma.  Goldsmith and colleagues (2012) found victims of betrayal trauma, 
i.e., when victims knew and were close to the victimizer, reported the greatest number of 
psychological symptoms when compared to those who were not close to or did not know the 
perpetrator. 
 When combined this evidence suggests examining trauma and event centrality in Iraqi 
refugees can provide insight into two research questions.  First, what is the effect of cumulative 
trauma on event centrality?  As Iraqi refugees have been exposed to a high number of potentially 
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traumatic pre-displacement events, examination of the effects of cumulative trauma will be 
possible.  Compared to average undergraduate populations with which most prior event 
centrality research has been conducted, an Iraqi refugee sample is likely to have experienced a 
greater range of potentially traumatic events.  This variance, in turn, should allow for statistical 
examination of the effects of cumulative trauma on event centrality.  Second, does the type of 
traumatic event experienced affect event centralization?  Prior PTSD research has indicated 
differing trauma types have differing relationships with mental health outcomes.  However, due 
to methodological and small sample size constraints, prior event centrality research has been 
unable to compare event centralization for differing types of trauma.  In the current sample of 
Iraqi refugees, all participants report exposure to potentially traumatic events, however, their 
specific exposure differs.  Comparison of event centralization for individuals who experienced 
differing types of trauma (e.g., physical assault compared to lack of food/water), would allow for 
an understanding of how differing types of trauma impact event centralization. 
Overview of the Current Study 
 This study examines two questions concerned with the traumatic event(s) that precede 
event centrality and integration of the traumatic event(s) into one’s life story.  First, does the total 
number of reported traumatic events that one is exposed to affect event centrality?  Previous 
theoretical understanding of event centrality has posited the centralization of the most traumatic 
or stressful event is of interest due to its associations with mental health variables such as PTSD.  
Some high-risk groups, such as Iraqi refugees, however, have been exposed to multiple 
potentially traumatic events.  Yet, we have little understanding how event centrality functions for 
an individual who has many, many stressful and/or traumatic events to sort through when 
choosing the most traumatic or stressful memory.  As such, this study examines how cumulative 
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trauma exposure is related to event centrality.  Second, does the type of traumatic event affect 
later event centralization? Research examining mental health outcomes indicate the type of 
trauma does matter.  Specifically, certain types of trauma, such as physical trauma to the self 
have strong associations with psychological distress symptoms when compared to other types of 
trauma such as persecution or coercion.  However, perhaps due to theoretical and/or 
methodological constraints, prior research has not examined whether the specific type of trauma 
experienced affected how central the event was to the person’s life.  This study seeks to fill this 
gap by using an established measure of trauma sub-types to determine whether exposure to 
certain traumatic events is associated with event centrality. 
 Hypothesis 1. 
 Cumulative trauma exposure will predict event centrality.  If event centrality follows a 
dose-response pattern as PTSD is speculated to follow, those reporting the highest pre-
displacement cumulative trauma will also report the highest event centrality scores.  This effect 
will remain after controlling for known predictors of trauma exposure, such as age (being older), 
gender (being male), and education (lower education levels). 
 Hypothesis 2.  
 Differing trauma sub-types will predict event centrality.  Specifically, using the 
established trauma sub-types of Arnetz and colleagues (2014), individuals reporting physical 
trauma to the self (e.g., physically assaulted, kidnapped, being taken hostage), will report 
significantly higher event centrality scores.  Additionally, given the findings of Arnetz and 
colleagues, it is hypothesized those reporting a lack of necessities (e.g., lack of food/clean water, 
having no access to medical care, lacking shelter) will also report significantly higher event 
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centrality scores. These effects will remain after controlling for known predictors of trauma 
exposure, such as age (being older), gender (being male), and education (lower education levels). 
Method 
Participants 
 Data were collected from 290 Iraqi refugees in metropolitan Detroit, Michigan.  The 
sample included 152 male and 129 female participants with a mean age of 33.34 years (SD = 
11.24) at the first measurement point.  Recruitment criteria included being at least 18 years old, 
verifiable refugee status, and having recently arrived to the United States at the Baseline 
interview (M months = 1.02, SD = 1.09, range = 0.00 to 5.40). 
Procedures 
 All measures were administered via structured interview with both interviews taking 
place approximately one year apart, referred to as Baseline and 1st Follow-up, respectively.  
Structured interviews were conducted in Arabic by a trained Arabic/English bi-lingual 
psychiatrist.  During the interviews the psychiatrist read the questions aloud and the participants 
responded orally.  Interviews were conducted in participants’ homes, workplaces, community 
organizations, or other locations in the local community, in accordance with the participants’ 
preference.  Participants received a gift card for their participation in each wave of study. 
Measures 
 Participants completed a demographics measure which included gender, age, and 
education. 
 Centrality of events scale.  
 At the 1st Follow-up participants completed the short form (7-item) version of the 
Centrality of Event Scale (CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  Participants rated on a scale of 1 
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(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) the extent to which their most traumatic or stressful 
experience had become an anchor point, colored their thoughts about experiences, and/or was 
central to their narrative identity with higher scores on the CES reflecting higher event centrality.  
Refer to Appendix B for the CES and Table 2 for CES descriptives at the 1st Follow-up.  As all 
participants are Iraqi refugees and native Arabic speakers, the CES was translated from English 
to Arabic and back-translated to English to confirm acceptable translation.  Cronbach’s alpha for 
the CES was 0.93. 
 Pre-displacement trauma. 
Pre-migration exposure to traumatic experiences and violence was measured at Baseline 
using the traumatic event component of the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ), Arabic 
version (Shoeb, Weinstein, & Mollica, 2007).  Each participant was asked to respond either 
“Yes” or “No” as to whether he or she had experienced 39 events such as “being beaten up,” 
“witnessing execution of civilians,” or “being kidnapped” before coming to the U.S.  The HTQ 
Arabic version is specifically designed to assess trauma and torture in an Iraqi population with 
the full questionnaire listed in Appendix D.  Descriptive information for the HTQ and its 
subscales are detailed in Table 3. 
Two scoring methods were used to assess the HTQ.  First, all pre-displacement trauma 
experiences were aggregated into a single cumulative trauma score ranging from 0 (no trauma) to 
39 (highest reported trauma).  Second, the trauma sub-types identified by Arnetz and colleagues 
(2014) were used to create five trauma sub-type scores, specifically: Physical Trauma to Self, 
Physical Trauma to Others, Abduction of Family Member or Friend, Lacking Necessities, 
Persecution/Coercion.  These five trauma sub-types were the sum of the reported number of 
traumas within each sub-type.  For example, the Physical Trauma to Others trauma sub-type is 
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composed of seven items; thus, possible scores for this variable ranged from 0 (no trauma of this 
sub-type) to 7 (highest possible trauma of this sub-type).  The itemization for each of the five 
trauma sub-types has been listed in Appendix E. 
Data Analysis 
 All data were screened for missing values.  Two different participants responded to only 
one of the seven CES items.  One participant declined to respond to any pre-displacement trauma 
questions.  These individuals were dropped for all subsequent analyses (final n =287).  No other 
missing data were identified.  All analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS version 22.  All p-
values were set to a two-value of .05. 
 For both hypotheses, hierarchal multiple regression analyses were conducted.  For 
Hypothesis 1, control variables known to be associated with exposure to traumatic events, i.e., 
age (being older), gender (being male), and education (being less educated), were entered in step 
one.  For the second step, cumulative pre-displacement trauma exposure, measured at Baseline, 
was entered into the regression analysis.  For Hypothesis 2, control variables were entered for 
step one (i.e., age, gender, and education) and then each of the five trauma sub-types were 
entered for step two of the regression analysis.  Models were assessed for overall model fit, an 
increase in model fit when cumulative trauma or the trauma sub-types are entered into the second 
step, and squared semi-partial correlations (e.g., proportion of unique variance). 
Results 
Hypothesis 1 
 Cumulative trauma exposure will predict event centrality.  If event centrality follows a 
dose-response pattern as PTSD is speculated to follow, those reporting the highest pre-
displacement cumulative trauma will also report the highest 1st Follow-up CES scores.  This 
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effect will remain after controlling for known predictors of trauma exposure, such as age (being 
older), gender (being male), and education (lower education levels). 
 Table 15 details the regression results for Hypothesis 1.  For the first step, which included 
the control variables, the overall model was significant (F(3,286) = 8.06, p <.001).  Of the 
control variables, only age was associated with increasing CES scores with those who were older 
reporting increasing CES scores.  For the second step, inclusion of cumulative trauma exposure, 
the overall model was also significant (F(4,282) = 12.73, p <.001), and demonstrated 
significantly improved prediction than step one of the model (R2 change = .07, F(1,282) = 24.72, 
p <.001).  As hypothesized, refugees with higher cumulative pre-displacement trauma exposure 
were significantly more likely to report higher CES scores. Specifically, cumulative trauma 
exposure accounted for 7% of the unique variance in CES scores. Addition of pre-displacement 
trauma to the model significantly increased the overall R2 with the final model accounting for 
15% of the variance in CES scores.  For the second step of the model, again being older was 
associated with increasing CES scores. 
Hypothesis 2 
 Differing trauma sub-types will predict event centrality.  Specifically, individuals 
reporting physical trauma to the self (e.g., physically assaulted, kidnapped, being taken hostage), 
will report significantly higher CES scores at the 1st Follow-up.  Additionally, it is hypothesized 
those reporting a lack of necessities (e.g., lack of food/clean water, having no access to medical 
care, lacking shelter) will also report significantly higher event centrality scores.  These effects 
will remain after controlling for known predictors of trauma exposure, such as age (being older), 
gender (being male), and education (lower education levels). 
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 Hypothesis 2 results are presented in Table 16.  Step one of the model, controlling for 
known predictors of trauma exposure, was significant (F(3,282) = 8.27, p <.001) with older 
adults reporting higher CES scores than younger adults.  Step two of the model, using trauma 
sub-types to predict CES scores, was also significant (F(8,277) = 18.90, p <.001) with a 
significant increase in prediction over step one of the model (R2 change = .27, F(5,277) = 23.31, 
p <.001).  The hypothesis was partially supported with refugees reporting higher instances of 
physical harm to the self also reporting higher CES scores.  This relationship accounted for 25% 
of the unique variance in CES scores.  However, no significant relationship was found between 
high reported lack of necessities and higher CES scores.  The final model, including all the 
trauma sub-types, accounted for 35% of the variance in CES scores.  Again, of the control 
variables, age remained a significant predictor with older adults reporting higher CES scores. 
Discussion 
 Results supported Hypothesis 1 and partially supported Hypothesis 2.  Specifically, those 
who reported the highest number of cumulative of pre-displacement traumas reported higher 
CES scores.  As discussed below, these results suggest event centrality and PTSD symptom 
scores follow a similar trend regarding exposure to cumulative trauma—greater trauma is 
predictive of higher symptoms.  Additionally, higher exposure to physical harm to the self was 
associated with increasing CES scores, although the other trauma sub-types did not display 
similar patterns.  Again, this suggests event centrality and PTSD symptoms share a similar 
pattern when comparing differential effects of trauma sub-types. 
Cumulative Trauma and Event Centrality 
 To date, this is the first study to examine the impact of cumulative trauma exposure on 
event centrality.  Previous research has focused exclusively on the relationship between 
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cumulative trauma exposure and PTSD symptoms with a strong positive relationship typically 
reported (e.g., Breslau et al., 1999).  However, as the results in the present study indicate, a 
positive relationship also exists between cumulative trauma exposure and event centrality.  Thus, 
at least in this one sample, PTSD and event centrality follow similar patterns after high 
cumulative trauma exposure. 
 From a theoretical perspective, it is interesting to consider how cumulative trauma 
exposure would cause higher event centrality scores for one’s most stressful or traumatic event.  
Given previous research examining trauma, event centrality, and PTSD, two distinct mechanisms 
are hypothetically responsible for this relationship. 
 First, prior research examining PTSD has noted individuals who experience one 
traumatic event are more likely to experience another traumatic event.  Sexual assault victims, 
for example are more likely to experience additional sexual assaults or re-victimization than 
individuals who have never been sexually assaulted (Arata, 2000; Smith, Davis, Fricker-Elhai, 
2004).  In a manuscript under review based on this sample of refugees, similar trends were found 
with refugees who reported high pre-displacement trauma exposure also reporting high post-
displacement trauma exposure (Wright et al., under review).  When combined, these results 
suggest a similar pattern—trauma begetting trauma.  Some researchers have proposed this 
relationship exists because of an inability or reluctance to properly assess risk leading the trauma 
victim to be exposed to a greater number of risky situations, some of which, inevitably, turn into 
traumatic or stressful events (Allen & Lauterbach, 2007; Smith et al., 2004; Stein et al., 2002).  It 
is also possible the cognitive load of PTSD symptoms is what starts the trauma begetting trauma 
cycle.  Exposure to a traumatic event may lead to PTSD symptoms, such as disturbed sleep and 
agitation, which may decrease working memory capacity and attentiveness, then leading to 
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increasing risk for an additional traumatic event (McCart et al., 2012; Park et al., 2014).  
Similarly, a traumatic event could happen (i.e., Trauma 1), with subsequent event centrality (i.e., 
CES 1) which may lead to feelings of hopelessness and a sense of identity where “bad things 
happen to me” thus leading to another traumatic event (i.e., Trauma 2), with subsequent event 
centrality (i.e., CES 2).  This cycle of trauma could lead to increasing PTSD symptoms, more 
trauma, and, eventually, higher CES scores.  Although it is impossible to tease apart this 
relationship in the current sample, future event centrality research may be able to ask specific 
questions about the traumatic events including the timing, cause and effect relationship, and 
ranking of consequentiality. 
 A second possible explanation for the positive relationship between cumulative trauma 
exposure and event centrality may be due to lack of specificity in the CES instructions.  When 
participants complete the CES they are asked to think of the most stressful or traumatic event but 
the term “event” is never clearly defined.  As addressed earlier, some event centrality researchers 
would categorize all the participants in this study as refugees and assume their CES scores were 
all comparable just as prior CES researchers examining terrorist attack victims (Blix et al., 2014) 
and soldiers have made the same assumption (Brown et al., 2010).  These researchers would be 
uninterested in the number or type of traumas experienced, as the assumption would be the CES 
score would measure the most traumatic event and that this most traumatic event would be 
related to the refugee experience. 
 However, it may be that some refugees in this sample considered the entire refugee 
experience their most traumatic memory.  As currently written, the CES instructions could allow 
an individual to look back on an entire life period and consider the consequentiality and 
centrality of this period instead of a specific event.  Indeed, it may be that individuals who 
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experienced a high number of traumatic events are more likely to see these events as connected 
and string them together as the same “event”, thus leading to higher CES scores.  A refugee who 
reported two traumatic events may have an easier time identifying his or her most traumatic 
event and responding to CES items without spillover from other experiences.  Conversely, a 
refugee reporting 12 traumatic events may have difficulty identifying the most traumatic event 
and instead lump these experiences together as “that time in my life” or “right before I fled” and 
respond to CES items with many events in mind.  This cognitive searching strategy of using 
lifetime periods (e.g., the time right before I fled) instead of a specific event (e.g., when I saw the 
woman executed) has been well documented in autobiographical memory research (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  If one’s most traumatic event is a highly stressful life period then the 
CES is accurately assessing life-story centrality, but necessarily event centrality.  Although it is 
impossible to do in the current study, clarifying the participant instructions so that an “event” is 
clearly defined would be one method of assessing these contamination concerns.  Another 
method of understanding this possible use of a life period instead of an event would be to 
examine CES scores for those with many traumas that are, at least superficially and temporally, 
unrelated (e.g., a car wreck at 18, sexual assault at 30, etc.). 
Trauma Sub-Types and Event Centrality 
 Refugees who reported high instances of physical harm to the self also reported the 
highest CES scores.  To date, this is the first study to specifically examine the impact of trauma 
sub-types on event centrality. 
 This finding extends previous research linking differences in PTSD symptoms by trauma 
sub-type (Arnetz et al., 2014) by demonstrating trauma sub-type also has an effect on event 
centrality.  Specifically, results from the current study mirror the findings of Arnetz and 
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colleagues (2014) in that the trauma-sub type of physical trauma to the self accounted for more 
variance in the outcome, in this case CES scores, than did cumulative trauma or any of the other 
trauma sub-types.  More generally, results from the current study are consistent with prior 
research reporting certain types of trauma (e.g., rape) are more likely to result in a PTSD 
diagnosis when compared to traumas like car accidents (Kessler et al., 1995). 
  Why is one specific trauma sub-type is so strongly associated with increasing CES 
scores?  When Berntsen originally conceptualized event centrality, she proposed CES scores 
may be due to the “unusually high intensity and consequentiality” of the traumatic event (p. 
S154, Berntsen, 2001).  Physical trauma to the self as defined in the current study and in Arnetz 
et al. (2014) includes physical assault, being kidnapped, and being taken hostage.  Each of these 
traumas could have long-lasting physical and psychological consequences.  Follow-up 
examination of the descriptions of the trauma reveal several of the kidnapping victims were also 
assaulted and still suffer from poor health due to the kidnapping and physical assault.  For 
example, one participant reported armed men kidnapped him as he was driving, burned him, hit 
him on the head and knee, and that he still has difficulty walking due to the knee injury.  One 
could imagine how an event such as this would become highly central to the life story.  
Additionally, the finding that physical trauma to the self was associated with higher CES scores 
is consistent with prior research examining trauma severity.  Traumas that meet the A1 and A2 
criteria for PTSD (actual or threatened death or injury and fear, hopelessness, or horror, 
respectively) are found to have higher CES scores than traumas that only meet one or neither of 
the criteria (Boals et al., 2012). 
 Yet other trauma sub-types should also be highly consequential and may also meet the 
A1 and A2 criteria.  The trauma sub type “Abduction of a family member or friend trauma” 
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includes traumas such as a violent murder of a child and abduction of a spouse.  How could 
increasing exposure to such consequential events not be associated with the increasing CES 
scores?  As mentioned previously, PTSD and trauma-type research indicates multiple factors are 
involved in understanding PTSD symptoms including whether the victim knew the perpetrator of 
the trauma (Goldsmith et al., 2012) and even a sense of higher purpose for experiencing the 
trauma (Basoglu et al., 1994; Holtz, 1998).  Thus PTSD symptoms are not simply an objective 
and easily calculated score after trauma exposure.  This same nuanced relationship may be true 
for trauma type and event centrality.  Event centrality is influenced by not just the trauma 
experienced but the cognitions and emotions before, during, and after the trauma exposure.  For 
participants in the current study, there may be cognitive and emotional aspects of the refugee role 
that are influencing their CES scores.  For example, being a refugee, by definition, forces the 
individual to leave behind community and close loved ones.  A traumatic event like the 
kidnapping of a friend may have different consequences and long-term effects if the friend, and 
that community, were thousands of miles away and were likely to never be seen or visited again.  
As such, event centrality for some of these traumatic experiences might be lower than one would 
expect due to the nature of the refugee experience.  In contrast, other traumatic events, such as 
being kidnapped or tortured, remain salient and central to the life-story regardless of the location 
or surroundings because the individual him or herself was more central to the event.  Similarly, 
non-significance for the hypothesized relationship between lack of necessities and higher event 
centrality scores, may be due to the same pattern.  Refugees who experienced a lack of shelter 
before being displaced to the U.S. may not necessarily integrate that event into his or her life 
story and, with time, this event may become less salient whereas another type of traumatic event, 
such as being tortured, may continue to be central to the self and identity. 
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Limitations and Future Directions  
 The most notable limitation of the present study is the inability to determine exactly 
which trauma refugees were referencing when considering their most stressful or traumatic 
event.  Although this limitation may have been partially mitigated by follow-up analyses, the 
methodology of the current study does not allow for precise examination of the type of trauma 
experienced.  As described in the literature review, this problem is not unique to the current 
study as no other studies examining event centrality have made comparisons between trauma 
types.  Nevertheless, future research should more thoroughly examine the impact of specific 
trauma type on subsequent event centrality.  Although this study examined refugees who 
reported many trauma exposures, the nature of separating these traumas into sub-types 
drastically reduced power and ability to make meaningful comparisons.  Future research should 
be aware of this concern and recruit many hundreds, if not many thousands of participants when 
examining the impact of specific trauma on event centrality.  Similarly, a meta-analysis of the 
available event centrality research may be feasible where different types of traumas are 
compared. 
 Additionally, the current study statistically controlled for known risk factors for trauma 
exposure, such as age, gender, and education.  However, for some of these variables statistically 
controlling for these effects may be an accepted solution, but perhaps not the only solution.  If 
one adopts a broader causal model it is possible the relationship between the control variables 
and event centrality partially works through the number or type of traumatic events experienced.  
For example, the older adults may have higher CES scores, but this trend may be working 
through the type of trauma experienced (e.g., death of a loved one versus lack of necessities).  If 
trauma plays this meditational role, then examining the relation between the trauma and event 
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centrality measures controlling for age does not make theoretical sense.  As such, future research 
could examine the possible mediating relationship between age (independent variable), 
cumulative trauma or trauma sub-type (mediator), and event centrality (dependent variable). 
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CHAPTER 4 
Centrality of Event Scale: Predicting or Reflecting Mental Health 
 Given its distinct position in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) as the only 
mental health disorder with an etiology which must be defined and described, posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) cannot help but invite discussion of cause and effect (5th ed., DSM-5, 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Recent research reflects this questioning with 
researchers asking whether PTSD symptoms are actually precursors of PTSD (DiGangi et al., 
2013), if “traditional” PTSD symptoms vary widely depending on the culture (Hinton & Lewis-
Fernandez, 2010), and if the special memory mechanisms thought to create PTSD are not so 
special after all (Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008).  When combined these studies, along with 
others, indicate researchers agree that PTSD may have a core definition, but can not exactly 
agree on what PTSD is—specifically how it begins, what individual and event factors can predict 
later PTSD symptoms, and why/how PTSD symptoms may vary in different cultural groups.  
The present study seeks to explore these concerns by addressing two questions: (1) Does event 
centrality, thought to be a predictor of PTSD, actually serve as a reflector, or symptom, of 
PTSD? (2) Can event centrality be considered a valid and reliable measure of PTSD symptoms 
in a sample of participants from a cultural group where mental illness is highly stigmatized? 
PTSD: Cause and Effect 
 With regards to the initial cause of PTSD, there is fairly consistent agreement—namely 
that a stressful or traumatic event must precede the onset of symptoms (for rare exception refer to 
Mol et al., 2005).  Yet most individuals will experience an event that would meet the A1 and A2 
criteria for PTSD diagnosis (e.g., life threatening situation and fear, hopelessness, and horror, 
respectively; Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003) although only a fraction of these individuals 
48 
 
 
clinically satisfy PTSD criteria (Bonanno, 2004).  Research indicates the relationship between 
trauma and PTSD is mediated by individual differences (e.g., resilience; Bonanno, 2004), 
characteristics of the trauma (e.g., sexual torture compared to other torture; Leaman & Gee, 
2012), and cultural / contextual elements (e.g., social support; Hall, Bonanno, Bolton, & Bass, 
2014).  Research also indicates individuals experiencing the same traumatic event may have 
vastly different psychological responses with the objective rating of the trauma often having little 
relationship with the PTSD symptoms in the individual (Boals & Schuettler, 2011; Rubin, Boals, 
& Berntsen, 2008).  However, it is beyond the scope of the present paper to challenge the 
etiological nature of PTSD.  Instead, the above description is provided to demonstrate that the 
“cause” side of the equation for PTSD is nuanced at best and mystifying at worst. 
 What does research say about the other side of the PTSD equation—namely the “effects” 
or symptoms of PTSD?  PTSD was first identified in the DSM 3rd edition and included three 
symptom clusters: (1) re-experiencing the event, (2) avoidance of reminders of the event or 
emotional numbing caused by the event, and (3) hyper-arousal or disturbed arousal (3rd ed., 
DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association, 1980).  This symptomology has remained generally 
unchanged through to the current DSM-5 (5th ed., DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 
2013) although the second cluster, which focused on avoidance and numbing, has now been split 
into two symptom clusters, avoidance and numbing, respectively.  Researchers examining PTSD 
have examined these symptom clusters using multiple methods, the bulk of which can be 
categorized into two types: a diagnostic approach and a symptom approach.  For diagnostic 
assessments, PTSD symptoms are evaluated for a threshold and once this threshold for 
symptomology has been met a PTSD diagnosis is warranted; if, however, the symptom threshold 
is not met then no PTSD diagnosis is given (5th ed., DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 
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2013).  An example of the specific symptoms and thresholds needed for diagnosis is included in 
Appendix F.  This diagnostic approach is required in clinical practice as the DSM, by definition, 
necessitates it.  For researchers, this approach is considered the “gold standard”.  However, this 
diagnostic approach requires a trained interviewer and has to be assessed individually.  As such, 
the diagnostic approach to PTSD for research purposes is relatively infrequently used.  Instead, 
most researchers employ some type of self-reported symptom checklist with items corresponding 
to the DSM criteria for a PTSD diagnosis.  An example of this is the 17-item PTSD Checklist 
(PCL) – Civilian version (Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996; Ruggiero, 
Del Ben, Scotti, Rabalais, 2003) which has been included in Appendix G.  In the PCL, individual 
items address the same symptoms evaluated during diagnostic assessments (e.g., re-experiencing, 
avoidance, numbing, hyper-arousal), but the participant self-reports these items and, most 
importantly, a total symptom score is reported regardless of the diagnosis.  Irrespective of the 
method of assessment, however, the symptomology of PTSD remains the same—those with 
PTSD should exhibit some level of re-experiencing, avoidance, numbing, and hyper-arousal. 
 However, two seminal articles recently questioned the core symptomology of PTSD.  
Specifically, researchers have asked whether PTSD is a valid construct with distinct symptoms 
(Rosen & Lilenfeld, 2008) and if perhaps some core symptoms of PTSD are actually causes of 
the syndrome (DiGangi et al., 2013). In the first meta-analysis of its kind, DiGangi and 
colleagues suggest specific PTSD “symptoms” are present prior to the originating trauma, thus 
suggesting these symptoms are not PTSD symptoms at all.  These researchers review evidence 
indicating many variables thought to be symptoms of PTSD such as hyper-arousal and avoidance 
tendencies, may actually be antecedents of PTSD.  DiGangi and colleagues report that across 
different prospective studies, individuals who exhibited hyper-arousal tendencies (e.g., startle 
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reflexes) and avoidance (e.g., avoidant coping styles) before the traumatic event were more 
likely to be diagnosed with PTSD after experiencing the traumatic event.  Although each of these 
studies were previously published, DiGangi and colleagues were the first to aggregate such a 
relatively large number of prospective studies (N=54) examining how the “cause” and “effect” 
sides of PTSD align.  Similar research has emerged examining Danish soldiers before, during, 
and after deployment with results suggesting some soldiers who “develop” PTSD symptoms 
after deployment are actually demonstrating PTSD symptoms prior to deployment (Berntsen et 
al., 2012; Berntsen & Rubin, 2014).  Given the etiological nature of PTSD, these claims may 
signal a future paradigm shift in how researchers conceptualize PTSD symptoms and who is 
likely to experience traumatic events. 
Event Centrality: Predicting PTSD? 
 Event centrality was originally conceptualized as a method of understanding how 
different types of events could become central to the identity of an individual, such as the 
centrality of a wedding versus centrality of the death of a loved one (Berntsen, 2001).  From this 
framework the Centrality of Event Scale (CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) emerged which was 
designed to assess the extent to which a negative event became central to the identity of the 
individual.  From the onset of the conceptual development of the CES, its relationship with 
PTSD symptomology was predictive.  Across differing samples and methodologies, researchers 
conceptualize the CES as a “cause” side of the PTSD and, as such, the CES has been used to 
predict or account for variance in PTSD diagnoses and / or symptoms (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin. 
2007; Boals, Hayslip, Knowles, & Banks, 2012; Boals & Schuettler, 2011; Rubin, Boals, & 
Hoyle, 2014). 
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 The use of event centrality as a predictor of PTSD is likely fourfold.  First, as discussed 
in the General Introduction, over integration of the traumatic event into the memory system is 
likely a contributing factor in development of PTSD (Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008; Rubin, 
Dennis, Beckham, 2011).  Thus, if a negative event is highly centralized then it should be 
frequently considered (i.e., re-experienced) but wished to be thought of less often (i.e., 
avoidance) and may lead to emotional and physiological changes in the person (i.e., numbing 
and hyper-arousal) (Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008).  As such, use of the CES as a predictor of 
PTSD is in line with CES’s theoretical underpinnings and the symptomology of PTSD.  The CES 
was designed to measure why some individuals have greater PTSD symptomology whereas 
others do not; thus, theoretically the CES predicts PTSD symptoms. 
 The second reason event centrality has been exclusively utilized as a predictor of PTSD is 
that event centrality, by its very nature, requires the negative event to have already occurred and, 
as such, cannot be examined prospectively.  One cannot centralize an event that has not yet taken 
place.  How CES is best conceptualized has gone unaddressed and its inability to be examined 
prospectively deserves attention. The tendency to centralize an event cannot be an individual 
characteristic or a personality trait given that it requires a preceding event that may not occur to 
everyone.  Previous researchers have noted CES is positively correlated with certain personality 
traits including rumination and neuroticism (Barton, Boals, & Knowles, 2013; Boelen, 2009; 
Rubin, Boals, & Hoyle, 2014).  Yet, researchers are moot on when and how exactly CES enters 
the “trauma = PTSD” equation.  The bulk of the literature seems to indicate trauma can lead to 
event centralization that can then lead to PTSD (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  Boelen (2012) 
offers the only study to date to explicitly examine the causal mechanisms between event 
centrality and PTSD, however, even in this study how event centrality arises or develops is not 
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discussed.  Instead, as with other research, Boelen suggests trauma leads to event centrality, 
which then, through various mediators, leads to high PTSD symptoms. Given this hypothesized 
chain of events, that event centralization settled into a position as a predictor of PTSD is not 
surprising. 
 Thirdly, and speculatively, event centrality has been considered a predictor of PTSD 
because changing the existing criteria for PTSD would be a long, difficult research agenda.  As 
mentioned previously, Rosen and Lilenfeld (2008) published a thorough and insightful criticism 
of PTSD as the DSM-IV-TR had operationalized it (4th ed., DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000).  The authors “found virtually all core assumptions and hypothesized 
mechanisms lack compelling or consistent empirical support” (p. 837, Rosen & Lilenfeld, 2008) 
and ended the review with a call for thoughtful consideration of PTSD in the DSM-5.  Their 
suggestions and criticisms were essentially unaddressed in the new edition of the DSM-5.  One 
could imagine a similar fate for researchers suggesting an entirely new symptom cluster for the 
DSM-6 PTSD criteria. 
  Finally, perhaps the strongest reason researchers view event centrality as a predictor of 
PTSD is that correlation in cross-sectional research is often seen as a good predictor for 
longitudinal and causal research.  CES is correlated with PTSD symptom scores in the .40 to .60 
range (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Ogle, Rubin, & Siegler, 2014), which is bordering on 
multicollinearity (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).  For all the studies reviewed for the present paper, 
the bivariate relationship between CES and PTSD symptomology was always significant and 
positive.  If a researcher wanted a promising variable to “predict” PTSD symptomology, event 
centrality would certainly top the list.  It is important to note, however, the distinction between a 
predictor and a concurrent characteristic.  Theoretically speaking, a true predictor is associated 
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with a variable over time such that changes in the predictor at one time point objectively and 
measurably lead to changes in the outcome at another time point.  However, a concurrent 
characteristic requires no such association over time.  Instead concurrent characteristics only 
necessitate that the variables be associated cross-sectionally.  Introductory statistics courses 
reinforce this idea with the phrase “correlation does not equal causation”.  Yet, frequently 
researchers minimize or ignore this axiom. 
Event Centrality: Reflecting PTSD?  
 As the above review indicates, researchers are still grappling with both the causes of 
PTSD and, how, exactly PTSD symptomology should be assessed.  Also, as addressed above, 
one consistent predictor for PTSD symptomology appears to be event centrality.  But, 
statistically speaking event centrality has not been validated as a true “predictor” of PTSD. Thus, 
it is possible event centrality is an additional symptom cluster, an “effect” of PTSD instead of a 
“cause”.  Yet, to date only one study has specifically tested if event centrality is an “effect” of 
PTSD (Broadbridge, 2013), even though research has consistently reported statistical support for 
the consideration of event centrality as an additional symptom cluster of PTSD.  For example, 
when examining PTSD symptom scale scores, CES scores have been correlated as high as .58 
with PTSD symptoms (Brown, Antonius, Kramer, Root, & Hirst, 2010), which is nearing test re-
test reliability for many established scales.  As described previously, this high bivariate 
correlation is not anomalous (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Ogle et al., 2014). 
 There are two exceptions to this unequivocal trend of using event centrality as a predictor 
of PTSD symptoms.  First, Boelen (2012) examined possible mediators between event centrality 
and PTSD symptoms.  In this study, Boelen found the relationship between the CES and PTSD 
symptoms is almost completely mediated through memory intrusiveness, grief 
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misinterpretations, depressive avoidance, and rumination.  Boelen’s findings are noteworthy as 
they indicate the relationship between the CES and PTSD is not perfectly causal (i.e., a change in 
CES must lead to a change in PTSD symptoms).  Broadbridge (2013), however, offers the only 
explicit study examining whether event centrality is a “cause” or “effect” of PTSD. In Study 1 of 
the dissertation, Broadbridge found support for event centrality as a symptom cluster of PTSD 
with the CES functioning much like the established PTSD symptom clusters of re-experiencing, 
numbing, avoidance, and hyper-arousal.  Specifically, support was found for a higher order 
model where PTSD symptom clusters, including event centrality, are distinct but related 
symptoms occurring because of the same mental health problem—namely PTSD.  For a visual 
depiction of a similar model refer to Figure 4.  Although Broadbridge’s methodology allowed for 
both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis of this model, the sample population included 
a non-clinical convenience sample of undergraduates.  Use of a different sample, specifically 
trauma exposed Iraqi refugees, may yield different results. 
Why examine Iraqi refugees? 
 Iraqi refugees have been exposed to many potentially traumatic events, including: torture, 
religious persecution, witnessing death and executions, lack of food and water, among other 
traumas (e.g., Hijazi et al., 2014; Nickerson et al., 2014).  As such, one would assume PTSD 
prevalence rates are exceptionally high.  However, data indicate trauma exposed refugees have 
between a 0% chance to a 99% chance of developing PTSD (Carlson, 1991; De Jong, et al., 
2000; Hashemian et al., 2006; Steel et al., 2005). These findings are further complicated by 
findings that PTSD prevalence rates have been reported at 1.1% for people living in Iraq 
(Alhasnawi et al., 2009) even though Iraq is consistently rated among the worst environments for 
human security (e.g., widespread murders, torture, disappearances, kidnappings, and executions) 
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(Wood, 2010).  What can explain this low PTSD diagnosis and symptom rate in such a highly 
traumatized population?  One explanation, which has empirical support, is that the social and 
cultural stigma that often accompanies mental health disorders appears to be intensified in 
Middle Eastern and Arab cultures (Ciftci, Jones, & Corrigan, 2012; Kulwicki, 2002).  
Participants from these cultural backgrounds frequently underreport and/or somatize symptoms 
to avoid being diagnosed with a mental health disorder (Barkho, Fakhouri, & Arnetz, 2011; 
Erickson & Al-Timmi, 2001).  This cultural shame and stigma does not just apply to the 
individuals experiencing the mental illness, but also to the family (Youssef & Deane, 2006).  As 
such, many individuals may actively avoid discussions of poor mental health and underreport 
symptoms for questions that are explicitly addressing mental health. 
 One method of addressing poor mental health in these Iraqi refugees may lie in event 
centrality.  Comparison of the PCL (Appendix G) and the CES (Appendix B), indicate the CES 
does not have clear face validity for measuring PTSD symptoms as there are no questions in the 
CES addressing mood, anxiety, poor functioning, or any of the other symptoms that many in the 
general population associate with PTSD.  This lack of face validity may be a benefit when 
measuring PTSD in a community where mental illness is so highly stigmatized.  Individuals who 
are hesitant to disclose symptoms of nightmares and flashbacks may be more likely to disclose 
that the traumatic event has influenced the way they think about the world.  Of course, 
understanding whether event centrality is a symptom of PTSD is important for all cultural 
groups.  However, for those from the Middle East and Arab cultures, knowing event centrality’s 
relationship to PTSD may be critical. 
Event Centrality as a Symptom Cluster: Criterion Validity 
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 If event centrality is a symptom cluster of PTSD it should not only demonstrate statistical 
similarity with the other PTSD symptom clusters, but also be associated with poor global 
functioning.  PTSD, as currently defined, has been associated with a heightened risk for poor 
social functioning, including increased risk for: unemployment (Possemato, McKenzie, Mc-
Devitt-Murphy, Williams, & Ouimette, 2014; Silove, Sinnerbrink, Field, Manicavasgar, & Steel, 
1997), poor social support (Hall, Bonanno, Bolton, & Bass, 2014; Possemato et al., 2014), 
additional exposure to traumatic events (Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000; Orcutt, Erickson, 
& Wolfe, 2002; Polusny, et al., 2011) and daily chronic stress (Brewin et al., 2000; Miller & 
Rasmussen, 2010; Possemato et al, 2014).  In addition, PTSD has also been associated with poor 
physical health, including increased risk for: chronic diseases (Barrett et al., 2002; Boscarino, 
2006), unhealthy body mass index (BMI; Kubzansky et al., 2014), sleep apnea (Arnetz, Templin, 
Saudi, & Jamil, 2012; Krakow, Ulibarri, Moore, & McIver, 2014), and poorer subjective health 
ratings (Barrett et al., 2002; Hoge, Terhakopian, Castro, Messer, & Engel, 2007; Schnurr & 
Spiro, 1999).  Examining event centrality’s relationship to these variables, which have 
previously been linked to PTSD, would provide further evidence of the CES as a symptom 
cluster of PTSD. 
Overview of the Current Study 
 With the exception of one study within a dissertation, previous research has focused 
exclusively on event centrality as a predictor or “cause” of PTSD.  Specifically, those who 
experience trauma and then centralize this trauma to their life story will demonstrate the highest 
PTSD symptoms.  However, it may be that the CES actually reflects PTSD.  The theoretical 
underpinnings of the CES and the very nature of PTSD may have prevented previous researchers 
from considering event centrality as a symptom.  However, for certain cultural and ethnic groups 
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where mental illness is highly stigmatized, use of the less face-valid CES as an effective and 
reliable measure of PTSD symptoms would be instrumental.  
 Hypothesis 1 
 Event centrality, as measured by the Centrality of Event Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), 
is a reflector, or symptom of PTSD, as opposed to a predictor of PTSD.  Four models were 
examined to test this hypothesis.1  Specifically:  
Model 1: Correlated Variables Model. “Predictor” (Figure 1). 
Model 2: Correlated Variables and Symptoms Model. “Predictor” (Figure 2). 
Model 3: Higher Order Model. “Reflector” (Figure 3). 
Model 4: One Factor Model. “Reflector” (Figure 4). 
Models 1 and 2 represent “Predictor” models where CES is distinct from PTSD symptoms.  
Models 3 and 4 represent “Reflector” models where CES is a symptom of PTSD.  If, as 
previously suggested by researchers, CES predicts PTSD symptoms then Models 1 and 2 should 
demonstrate the best fit.  If, however, as hypothesized in the current paper, CES is a symptom of 
PTSD then Models 3 and 4 should demonstrate better fit than Models 1 and 2. 
 Hypothesis 2. 
 If event centrality is a symptom of PTSD, then high scores on the CES should be 
associated with poor global functioning thus demonstrating criterion validity for the CES as a 
reliable and valid measure of PTSD symptomology.  In order to test this hypothesis, comparisons 
                                                
1 It is important to note these models are technically mediation models.  Specifically, pre-
displacement trauma is a pre-cursor or preceding variable for both CES and PTSD.  This trend 
applies regardless of the model.  For example, for Models 1 and 2, the theoretical model would 
be TRAUMATIC EVENT à CES à PTSD. Conversely, for Models 3 and 4, the theoretical 
model would be TRAUMATIC EVENT à PTSD/CES SYMPTOMS.  We acknowledge the role 
of pre-displacement trauma in understanding event centrality (see Study 2 of the current paper).  
However, for theoretical and statistical reasons, pre-displacement trauma exposure is not 
included in Study 3. 
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were made to determine whether those high in CES also report greater unemployment, post-
displacement trauma, daily hassles, chronic diseases, BMI, and sleep apnea, as well as lower 
levels of social support, self-rated health, and predicted self-rated health.  It was predicted those 
higher in event centrality would also report poor global functioning across this spectrum of 
variables listed above.  It is important to note, these analyses included CES scores as the final 
step in the models after controlling for age, gender, education, and PTSD symptoms.  Thus, any 
models where the CES is a significant predictor would indicate it represented unique variance 
above and beyond traditional PTSD symptoms (i.e., re-experiencing, avoidance/numbing, and 
hyper-arousal). 
Method 
Participants 
 Data were collected from 281 Iraqi refugees in metropolitan Detroit, Michigan.  The 
sample included 152 male and 129 female participants with a mean age of 34.24 years (SD = 
11.15) at the first measurement point.  Recruitment criteria included being at least 18 years old, 
verifiable refugee status, and having recently arrived to the United States (M months = 1.01, SD = 
1.09, range = 0.00 to 5.40). 
Procedures 
 All measures included were administered via structured interview with three total 
interviews conducted approximately a year apart.  Interviews are referred to throughout as 
Baseline, 1st Follow-up, and 2nd Follow-up, respectively.  Structured interviews were conducted 
in Arabic by an Arabic/English bi-lingual psychiatrist.  During the interview the psychiatrist read 
each item and participants responded orally to each question.  Interviews were conducted in 
participants’ homes, workplaces, community organizations, or other locations in the local 
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community, in accordance with the participants’ preference.  Participants received a gift card for 
their participation in each wave of the study. 
Measures 
 All participants responded to sociodemographic information at each interview.  Certain 
sociodemographic variables were assessed only once, at Baseline, including: age, gender, length 
of time in the US, and transition time to arriving in the U.S. (i.e., months in transit between 
leaving Iraq and arriving in the U.S.).  Other variables, which may change over time or were 
unable to be calculated using initial data, were assessed at each interview, including: marital 
status, education, current living situation, and employment status.  Descriptive information for 
the sample can be found in Table 1. 
 Centrality of event scale.  
 Participants completed the short form (7-item) version of the Centrality of Event Scale 
(CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  Participants rated on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) the extent to which their most traumatic or stressful experience had become an 
anchor point, colored their thoughts about experiences, and/or was central to their narrative 
identity with higher scores on the CES reflecting higher event centrality.  Cronbach’s alpha for 
the CES was .91 at 2nd Follow-up with descriptive data for each wave presented in Table 2.  CES 
items are presented in Appendix B.  Note that for the current study, only 2nd Follow-up CES 
scores are used. 
 For Hypothesis 1 testing, individual CES items from the 2nd Follow-up were used for 
analyses.  For Hypothesis 2 testing, 2nd Follow-up CES scores were summed to create a CES 
scale score. 
 Posttraumatic stress disorder.  
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 PTSD symptoms were assessed using the 17-item PTSD Checklist (PCL) – Civilian 
version (Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996; Ruggiero, Del Ben, Scotti, 
Rabalais, 2003).  The PCL items mirror the re-experiencing, avoidance/numbing, and hyper-
arousal symptoms of PTSD listed in DSM-IV-TR (4th ed., DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000).  Participants indicated on a 5-point scale how much they were bothered by 
each symptom in the past month.  Cronbach’s alpha for the total PCL score in this study was .94.  
Appendix G lists the specific PCL items with descriptive data over time presented in Table 4.  
Note that the current study only uses the 2nd Follow-up PCL scores. 
 For Hypothesis 1 testing, 2nd Follow-up individual PCL items were used for analyses. 
Symptom clusters were identified using the DSM-IV-TR, which describes three symptom clusters 
including re-experiencing, avoidance/numbing, and hyper-arousal (4th ed., DSM-IV-TR, 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  These three symptom clusters have also been 
identified by researchers in a sample of Middle Eastern trauma survivors (Bal & Jensen, 2007).  
For Hypothesis 2 testing, 2nd Follow-up PCL scores were summed to create a PCL symptom 
score. 
 Post-displacement trauma. 
 Post-displacement exposure to traumatic experiences and violence was measured at each 
structured interview. At Baseline all participants responded to the 39-item Harvard Trauma 
Questionnaire (HTQ) for any traumatic events applying since their arrival to the U.S. (Shoeb, 
Weinstein, & Mollica, 2007).  As the average refugee in this sample had only been in the U.S. 
for one month, reported post-displacement trauma exposure at Baseline was low.  Additionally, 
many HTQ items applied to trauma more likely to occur in Iraq. (e.g., “Serious physical injury 
due to combat situation or landmine”).  In order to assess exposure to potentially traumatic 
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events in the U.S., HTQ items applying to wartime trauma were replaced with items more 
relevant for a U.S. context (e.g., “Have you been in a car accident?”).  This post-displacement 
trauma questionnaire is referred to as United States Trauma Questionnaire (USTQ) and was 
assessed at 1st Follow-up (37-items) and 2nd Follow-up (39 items).  Baseline HTQ referencing 
trauma since arrival to the U.S. and the two USTQ assessments were summed to create a post-
displacement trauma score ranging from 0 to 115 with higher scores reflecting greater exposure 
to potentially traumatic events since arrival to the U.S.  Post-displacement HTQ items and USTQ 
items are presented in Appendix H.  Descriptive data at each interview are presented in Table 5. 
 Daily hassles.  
Daily hassles were measured at each interview using a ten-item checklist focused on 
chronic, daily hassles, e.g. “How often do you experience problems with your spouse?”, with the 
remaining nine questions addressing problems with money, children, parents, relatives, safety, 
transportation, language, finding employment, and problems at work.  Response alternatives 
ranged from 0 (Never/Hassle Does Not Apply) to 5 (Almost Always). Given the nature of the 
hassles, items were dichotomized with scores of 0, 1, and 2 coded as “No Hassle” and scores of 
3, 4, and 5 coded as “Hassle Present”.  Within each time point, individual items were summed 
and treated as a count variable with scores ranging from 0 (no reported hassles) to 10 (maximum 
number of hassles).  These three measurement waves were then summed to create a cumulative 
score representing overall hassles since arrival to the U.S. with scores ranging from 0 to 30.  The 
specific daily hassles assessed are detailed in Appendix I.  Descriptive information across the 
three measurement waves are presented in Table 6. 
 Social support. 
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  Social support was assessed at each interview using a 5-item questionnaire designed to 
measure the availability and use of social support.  Though not an established scale, the items 
were found to be psychometrically sound with internal consistency ranging from .77 to .83 
across the three interviews.  Appendix J details each item and Table 7 provides item descriptive 
data over time.  Social support scores were summed across the three measurement waves to 
create a cumulative social support score reflecting social support since arrival to the U.S. with 
scores ranging from 15 to 75. 
 History of unemployment. 
 At the 2nd Follow-up participants responded to the dichotomous item, “Have you worked 
since coming to the U.S.?”.  This item was used to assess a history of unemployment since 
arriving in the U.S. approximately two years prior. 
 Health measures. 
  As physical health is a multifaceted construct, multiple measures were employed to 
assess health. 
 Self-rated health and predicted health.  
 At each interview participants responded to two questions regarding their perception of 
their own health.  Specifically, were asked, “How would you rate your general health today?” 
and “How do you expect your general health to be in one year?” with response options ranging 
from 1 (Poor) to 5 (Excellent).  These items are referred to as self-rated health (SRH) and 
predicted self-rated health (PSRH) with descriptive data over time presented in Table 8.  SRH 
and PSRH were summed across each wave of measurement to create a total SRH and total PSRH 
score, respectively.  Thus, SRH and PSRH represent the participant’s rating of his or her health 
or predicted health since arriving to the U.S. 
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 Chronic diseases.  
 Physician diagnosed chronic diseases were self-reported at each interview.  Participants 
were asked to respond, “Yes” or “No” as to whether they had been diagnosed with 12 disorders.  
Items assessed at each interview are described in Appendix K.  Descriptive information over 
time has been included in Table 9.  Chronic diseases were summed across all three measurement 
waves to create a score of the cumulative number of physician diagnosed chronic diseases before 
or since arriving to the U.S. 
 Body mass index. 
 Body mass index (BMI) was assessed at each interview.  Participants did not calculate 
their respective BMI. Instead participants were asked their height and weight in whichever 
metric they felt comfortable (i.e., inches/feet, meters/centimeters, pounds, kilograms).  BMI was 
then calculated by a researcher using the appropriate formula (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), 2014).  BMIs over time as well as CDC guidelines regarding healthy BMI are 
detailed in Table 10.  BMIs were averaged across all three measurement waves to create an 
average BMI score. 
 Sleep apnea.  
 During 2nd Follow-up participants responded to six-items addressing sleep apnea 
symptoms.  Participants first responded “Yes” or “No” to the question, “Do you snore?”.  If 
participants responded “Yes” to this item, they then responded to five additional items focused 
on specific symptoms related to snoring, difficulty breathing during sleep, tiredness when 
waking, and tiredness during the day.  For participants who responded these items (n=79, 28% of 
the total sample), responses were summed to create an aggregate sleep apnea score ranging from 
5 (few symptoms) to 25 (many symptoms).  Items in this sleep apnea scale demonstrated good 
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internal consistency (α = .83).  Appendix L lists the scale items and descriptive data have been 
included in Table 11. 
Data Analysis 
 All data were screened for missing values.  Missing data from scales were imputed using 
IBM SPSS Version 22, including: seven missing values from the CES (.36 % missing), nine 
missing values from the PCL (.19% missing), and five missing values from the social support 
scale (.36% missing). Single items, count, or checklist variables were also screened for missing 
values, although given the nature of these measures, no missing values were imputed, including: 
one missing value for unemployment (.04% missing), 15 missing values for post-displacement 
trauma  (.05% missing), 126 missing values for daily hassles (1.49% missing), 14 missing values 
for chronic diseases (.42%), and 17 missing values for sleep apnea (4.30% missing).  Internal 
consistency for all scales (i.e., Cronbach’s α) was assessed using IBM SPSS Version 22.  
Consistency ratings were considered good at α >.80 and excellent at α > .90 (George & Mallery, 
2003).  Unless otherwise noted, significance was set to a two-tailed p-value of < .05. 
 Structural equation modeling: models tested and model fit. 
 Four models were assessed to determine whether event centrality was best understood as 
a “predictor” of PTSD, i.e., distinct from PTSD, or as a “reflector” of PTSD, i.e., a symptom of 
PTSD.  The following models were examined: 
Model 1: Correlated Variables Model. “Predictor” (Figure 1). 
Model 2: Correlated Variables and Symptoms Model. “Predictor” (Figure 2). 
Model 3: One Factor Model. “Reflector” (Figure 3). 
Model 4: Higher Order Model. “Reflector” (Figure 4). 
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As each model tested included adjustments on the common set of parameters to be estimated, the 
models are considered nested (Steiger, Shapiro, & Browne, 1985) thus allowing for comparisons 
among models (i.e., does Model 2 have better fit than Model 1?).  Comparison of the differing 
models was conducted using structural equation modeling (SEM) and the program LISREL 8.8 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006).  Maximum likelihood estimation method was used as it provides the 
most accurate fit indices and parameter estimates when compared to other estimation methods 
such as weighted least squares (WLS) and generalized least squares (GLS) (Olsson et al., 2010). 
 SEM model fit was determined by examining both absolute and incremental fit indices.  
Absolute fit indices determine fit by comparing the reproduced covariance matrix and the 
original covariance matrix, measuring exact residuals, and comparing the residuals to chance 
estimates (Barrett, 2007).  Thus, absolute fit indices examine how well an a priori model 
established by the researcher fit the collected data.  Fit for the first absolute fit index, minimum 
fit function chi-square (χ2), was established using the associated significance test.  However, the 
chi-square test is negatively biased toward both large samples and variables with high bivariate 
correlations (Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Chen, Sousa, & West, 2005), both of which are assumed in 
the current study.  As such, critics vary on how stringent the chi-square and additional goodness 
of fit indices should be (Barrett, 2007; Hu & Bentler, 1999).  Fit for the second absolute fit 
index, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) was considered adequate fit at < .08 
and good fit at < .05 (Browne & Cudeck, 1992).  Incremental fit indices determine model fit by 
comparing the reproduced model to the independence (null) model and provides an index of 
degree of discrepancy between the two models while accounting for degrees of freedom (Barrett, 
2007).  Thus, incremental fit indices compare the model provided by the researcher to the 
“everything is independent model” (i.e., no correlation between measured variables).  Fit for 
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both the incremental fit indices, Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) and Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI), was considered adequate at >.90 and above and good fit at >.95 (Browne & Cudeck, 
1992). 
 As all four models tested were nested, comparison of fit indices between models was 
possible (e.g., does Model 2 fit better than Model 3?).  Evaluation of the goodness of fit of one 
model over another model was established in several ways.  Ideally, chi-square would be used to 
establish a significant change in model fit as it has a significance test based on change in degrees 
of freedom (Steiger, Shapiro, & Brown, 1985).  However, chi-square is known to be affected by 
sample size (Chen, et al., 2005) and it can be overly sensitive to change when many constraints 
are place on a given model (Little, 1997).  As such, changes in chi-square were interpreted with 
caution.  Decreases in RMSEA, CFI, and NNFI of 0.01 or more were considered a significant 
change when comparing nested models (Chen, 2007).  Finally, overall model parsimony will be 
considered. Model parsimony refers to models that have the highest number of degrees of 
freedom compared to the null or baseline model (McDonald & Marsh, 1990). Researchers 
consider model parsimony a reflection of good fit as the more relationships that are hypothesized 
(i.e., the more arrow/relationships that are drawn in SEM), the greater the likelihood that one is 
capitalizing on chance, over-fitting the data, or finding otherwise spurious results (Marsh, & 
Hau, 1996).  Thus, a model that constrains the most parameters (i.e., estimates the fewest 
relationships) is seen as most parsimonious. 
 Factor loadings were examined for significance to ensure each item was loading on its 
respective latent variable.  Squared multiple correlations (SMCs) for each item were also 
examined to determine the amount of variance in each latent variable associated with that 
particular item and is not due to measurement error (Jaccard & Wan, 1996) with SMCs >.30 
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considered good (Albright & Park, 2009).  Similarly, SMCs for each of the latent variables were 
also examined as they represent the proportion of variance in the latent variable that can be 
accounted for using those particular individual items (Jaccard & Wan, 1996). 
  All LISREL syntax for Hypothesis 1 testing has been appended (Appendix N). 
 Event centrality as a symptom cluster: criterion validity.  
 In order to assess whether event centrality is associated with poor functioning, above and 
beyond traditional symptoms of PTSD, several hierarchal linear regressions and logistic 
regressions were conducted using SPSS Version 22. 
 Hierarchal linear regressions were used to examine the following continuous outcomes: 
post-displacement trauma, daily hassles since arrival to the U.S., social support, self-rated health, 
predicted self-rated health, chronic diseases, BMI, and sleep apnea.  For these analyses, data 
were entered in three steps.  For the first step control variables, specifically age, gender, and 
education, were entered.  For the second step, PTSD symptom scores were entered.  In the final 
step, event centrality (CES) was entered.  Models were assessed for overall model fit, an increase 
in model fit when variables were entered at each step, and squared semi-partial correlations, 
which allow for examination of the proportion of variance predicted independently for each 
variable in the final model. 
 Logistic regression was used for the dichotomous outcome of a history of unemployment. 
For this analysis, age, gender, and education, PTSD symptom scores were entered, and, finally, 
event centrality scores (CES) were entered.  This model was assessed for overall model fit at the 
final step (i.e., when CES scores were entered), odds ratios, and associated p-values. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1 
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 Event centrality, as measured by the Centrality of Event Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), 
is a reflector, or symptom of PTSD, as opposed to a predictor of PTSD.  Four models were 
examined to test this hypothesis.  Specifically:  
Model 1: Correlated Variables Model. “Predictor” (Figure 1). 
Model 2: Correlated Variables and Symptoms Model. “Predictor” (Figure 2). 
Model 3: One Factor Model. “Reflector” (Figure 3). 
Model 4: Higher Order Model. “Reflector” (Figure 4). 
Models 1 and 2 represent “Predictor” models where CES is distinct from PTSD symptoms. 
Models 2 and 3 represent “Reflector” models where CES is a symptom of PTSD.  If, as 
previously suggested by researchers, CES predicts PTSD symptoms then Models 1 and 2 will 
demonstrate the best fit.  If, however, as hypothesized in the current paper, CES is a symptom of 
PTSD then Models 3 and 4 will demonstrate better fit than Models 1 and 2. 
 Results indicate the overall model fit for all four models was below adequate (Table 17).  
However, Hu and Bentler (1995) emphasize the strength of model testing in SEM comes from 
both consideration of model fit indices and from comparison of models tested. As such, Hu and 
Bentler caution against focusing on the absolute cut-off values for fit indices (e.g., a CFI >.90) 
and instead consider how one model fits when compared to a competing model.  Using this 
recommendation, examination of fit indices and changes in fit indices, Tables 17 and 18, 
respectively, indicate Models 2 and Model 4 both provide the best fit of the four models 
evaluated with these two models being statistically similar in their fit indices.  With regards to 
model parsimony, Models 2 and 4 have the same degrees of freedom, however, Model 4 
represents a common factor or higher-order model where one variable, namely PTSD, explains 
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the existence of the underlying symptoms.  As such, Model 4 represents the most theoretically 
parsimonious model. 
 Examination of individual item factor loadings, presented in Table 19, indicate 
significant loadings for all indicators.  Thus, each individual item, such as PCL 16, was 
significantly associated with its respective latent variable—either PTSD or hyper-arousal, 
depending on the model tested.  Pathways between latent variables, such as the relationship 
between PTSD and re-experiencing in Model 4, were all also significant for each of the models 
tested (Table 20).  Examination of squared multiple correlations (SMCs) for each of the 
individual items in Table 21 indicate the majority of the items had an adequate amount of 
variance being explained by the respective latent construct (i.e., >.30).  Some items, however, 
such as PCL 11 and CES 2 had consistently low SMCs regardless of the model tested.  Finally, 
SMCs for the latent constructs, reported in Table 22, indicate the items are accounting for an 
adequate amount of variance in Event Centrality and a high amount of variance in Hyper-arousal 
and Avoidance/Numbing.  However, the SMC of 1.06 for Re-experiencing indicates a Heywood 
case where there is negative or near zero variance and suggests possible model misspecification 
(Heywood, 1931). 
 When combined, these results suggest that although none of the models tested had truly 
acceptable overall fit, the pattern of results indicate both Model 2 and Model 4 are the best fitting 
models for this sample.  Between these two models, however, the overall fit indices are not 
statistically different and other aspects of model fit do not indicate notable differences between 
these two competing models.  The only notable distinction between Models 2 and 4 is the 
parsimony of Model 4 where one common factor—PTSD—is seen as explaining or being 
statistically linked to each of the underlying symptoms, including: re-experiencing, 
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avoidance/numbing, hyper-arousal, and event centrality.  A simplified depiction of Model 4 with 
the latent construct factor loadings has been provided in Figure 5. 
Hypothesis 2 
 If event centrality is a symptom of PTSD, then high scores on the CES should be 
associated with poor global functioning thus demonstrating criterion validity for the CES as a 
reliable and valid measure of PTSD symptomology.  In order to test this hypothesis, comparisons 
were made to determine whether those high in CES also report greater unemployment, post-
displacement trauma, daily hassles, chronic diseases, BMI, and sleep apnea, as well as lower 
levels of social support, self-rated health, and predicted self-rated health.  It was predicted those 
higher in event centrality would also report poor global functioning across this spectrum of 
variables listed above.  It is important to note, these analyses included CES scores as the final 
step in the models after controlling for age, gender, education, and PTSD symptoms.  Thus, any 
models where the CES is a significant predictor would indicate it represented unique variance 
above and beyond traditional PTSD symptoms (i.e., re-experiencing, avoidance/numbing, and 
hyper-arousal).
 Results indicate high event centrality scores were associated with significantly worse 
self-rated health and predicted self-rated health.  Additionally, marginal significance was found 
for the association between high event centrality scores and increased daily hassles and a greater 
number of chronic diseases.  For the remaining four dependent variables no significant 
relationships for event centrality were found.  For all comparisons made, high PTSD symptoms 
were significantly associated with poor global functioning.  Table 23 details these results for the 
hierarchal linear regressions.  In order to present the results as clearly and simply as possible, 
only results for the final step of the model, when CES was entered, have been presented. 
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 Logistic regression was conducted to assess whether those with high CES scores were 
more likely to have a history of unemployment after arriving to the U.S., after statistically 
controlling for age, gender, education, and PTSD symptoms.  Inclusion of CES scores in the 
final block did not significantly increase the prediction of classification, χ2 = 0.04, df = 5, N = 
280, p =.83.  Table 24 presents the odds ratios, which suggest that the odds of having a history of 
unemployment were not significantly higher for those with high CES scores.  For clarity of 
presentation, only the final block, when CES was entered into the equation, has been listed in the 
table. 
 Given these results and the strict requirement that CES scores account for variance in the 
outcomes above and beyond established PTSD symptoms, follow-up analyses were conducted 
with the PCL removed.  These results, presented in Table 25, indicate those with high CES 
scores report significantly higher post-displacement trauma exposure, a greater number of 
chronic diseases, more sleep apnea symptoms, and worse self-rated health and predicted self-
rated health.  For the remaining three variables, i.e., daily hassles, social support, and BMI, 
higher event centrality was not significantly associated with global functioning.  As before, only 
the final step in the hierarchal regressions are presented. 
 Again, logistic regression results indicate those with high CES scores were no more 
likely to have a history of unemployment as inclusion of CES scores in the final block did not 
significantly increase the prediction of classification, χ2 = 2.49, df = 4, N = 280, p =.12.  For 
these results, presented in Table 26, only values from the final model are presented (i.e., when 
CES was entered into the equation). 
Data Screening Follow-Up 
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 As detailed in Study 1 of the current paper, a notable portion of the participants in the 
study were “straight-line responders” where items within the CES were all given the same 
response (e.g., all “Totally Disagree” responses, all “Undecided” responses, etc.). As such, in the 
current study a new dummy variable was created using 2nd Follow-Up CES items where 
“straight-line responders” (n = 160; 56.94%) were compared to those who were considered 
“valid responders” (n = 121; 43.06%). Using this variable, straight-line responders were 
compared to valid responders to see if straight-line responders differed in the variables tested in 
the current study.  Results, presented in Table 27, indicate straight-line responders differed on 
several variables of interest including exposure to pre-displacement trauma and measures of 
mental health, such as PTSD symptoms.  Additionally, straight-line responders reported 
significantly lower CES scores (M = 14.14, SD = 1.24) than valid responders (M = 21.39, SD = 
4.38; F(1,279) = 397.76, p <.001), indicating straight-line responders were much more likely to 
respond with all “Totally Disagree” or “Disagree” responses more than all symptomatic 
responses. 
 Given these differences, Hypothesis 2 analyses were re-ran using the 121 valid 
responders.  Results indicate only one difference between the analyses with the valid responders 
(n = 121) and analyses including the entire sample (N = 281).  Specifically, individuals who 
reported higher sleep apnea scores did not report significantly higher CES scores.  No other new 
patterns for the CES emerged.  Thus, although the straight-line responders do appear to differ 
from the valid responders on some variables, the overall trends and outcomes in the study do not 
change when the straight-line responders are removed. 
Discussion 
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 Results partially supported both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  Specifically for 
Hypothesis 1, comparisons of competing models indicate Model 4, a “reflector” model, does not 
fit significantly worse than any of the other three models, including the two “predictor” models.  
Although not conclusive, this finding has implications for mental health screening in populations 
hesitant to disclose mental health concerns.  Results for Hypothesis 2 also partially support 
criterion validity of CES as a measure of poor global functioning as high event centrality was 
associated with higher post-displacement trauma exposure, daily hassles, chronic diseases, sleep 
apnea symptoms, and worse self-rated health and predicted health.  These results suggest event 
centrality is not merely an abstract, identity-focused construct, but a valid indicator that can 
account for poor global functioning in a high-risk population. 
CES: Predictor vs. Reflector of PTSD 
 It was hypothesized Models 3 and 4 would fit better than both Models 1 and 2. However, 
results examining fit indices, factor loadings, and SMCs indicate Models 2 and 4 were not 
statistically dissimilar in fit.  Neither model demonstrated good fit using the a priori established 
fit indices; yet, both models were close to the recommended cut-off values and each model 
demonstrated sound measurement fit as all items loaded on their respective latent constructs.  
Additionally, examination of the item SMCs indicate that although some of the items did not 
perform as well as expected, the majority of the individual items had SMCs above the 
recommended cut-off value.  Similarly, the latent variable SCMs for Model 4 were also high.  In 
sum, none of the models tested demonstrated good fit, but Models 2 and 4 were relatively better 
and indistinguishable from each other from a statistical point of view. 
 That Models 2 and 4 were “statistically tied” is theoretically noteworthy.  With the 
exception of one study (i.e., Broadbridge, 2013), all previous event centrality and PTSD research 
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has assumed high event centrality scores caused high PTSD symptom scores.  Yet, as discussed 
previously, this assumption is purely hypothetical and previous researchers had not examined 
another possibility—that event centrality is a symptom cluster of PTSD, much like re-
experiencing or hyper-arousal.  Broadbridge (2013) tested this theory by examining three 
competing models and found that a higher order model, Model 4 in the current study, was the 
most parsimonious model and was not statistically worse than the other models tested.  Results 
from the current study extend these findings by comparing different models, specifically Models 
1, 2, and 3 in the current study were not tested by Broadbridge, and by testing these new models 
in a highly-trauma exposed refugee population.  Generally, however, results from the current 
study and Broadbridge are very similar; event centrality is not necessarily a cause of PTSD 
symptoms and there is statistical support for conceptualization of event centrality as a symptom 
cluster of PTSD. 
 Support for Model 4 has three important implications. First, with regards to theoretical 
understanding of event centrality, results from the current study and Broadbridge (2013) suggest 
event centrality is a reflection of PTSD and, as such, may be properly regarded as a PTSD 
symptom cluster.  This finding would help explain why previous event centrality researchers 
were finding very high correlations between CES and PTSD symptoms.  High event centrality 
was not causing PTSD symptoms but reflects a cognitive aspect of PTSD.  Instead of 
invalidating previous event centrality and PTSD research, these findings should be seen as 
reinforcing the importance of memory, identity, and rumination in PTSD. 
 Second, event centrality is not a symptom cluster of PTSD in the current DSM (5th ed., 
DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013); yet, results from the current study and 
Broadbridge (2013) suggest the DSM may be missing event centrality as a critical symptom 
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cluster.  Suggesting a new symptom cluster for PTSD diagnosis is, no doubt, ambitious given 
that previous reviews of PTSD symptomology have gone unaddressed (e.g., Rosen & Lilenfeld, 
2008).  Nevertheless, results from this study as well as Broadbridge’s results indicate including 
event centrality as a PTSD symptom cluster is statistically viable. 
 Third, use of event centrality as a symptom cluster of PTSD may open up opportunities 
for measuring mental health in populations where poor mental health is highly stigmatized.  As 
discussed previously, individuals from Middle Eastern backgrounds frequently underreport 
mental health symptoms (Barkho et al., 2011; Erickson & Al-Timmi, 2001) and face not only 
larger cultural stigma about their own poor mental health (Ciftci et al., 2012; Kulwicki, 2002) but 
also may cause problems for their family if they admit to mental health problems (Youssef & 
Deane, 2006).  These cultural barriers to admitting to distress may be relatively impenetrable and 
have been found in other immigrant groups, such as Asian Americans (Abe-Kim et al., 2007).  
However, results from the current study suggest use of the CES may be a means of assessing 
mental health in populations leery of discussing symptoms such as nightmares, avoidance of 
specific places, or fear of the future.  Use of the CES as a proxy for the entirety of PTSD 
symptoms is probably not ideal for most populations.  However, for the current study of Iraqi 
refugees, who report very low PTSD symptoms, the CES’s assessment of the cognitive and 
identity-focused aspects of PTSD offers an opportunity to assess poor mental health with less 
potential for underreporting due to cultural stigma. 
CES: Criterion Validity of Poor Global Functioning 
 Consideration of event centrality as a symptom cluster of PTSD would require that high 
CES scores are related to poor global functioning.  Results from the current study partially 
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support this criterion validity approach with six of the nine outcomes demonstrating that high 
event centrality is associated with worse overall health. 
 Hypothesis 2 proposed CES scores must out perform PCL scores and predict more 
variance in the outcome variables than PTSD symptoms.  This hypothesis was ambitious and 
only partially supported.  High CES scores predicted variance above and beyond PTSD for 
worse self-rated health and predicted self-rated health with marginal significance for high CES 
scores and a greater number daily hassles and chronic diseases.  To date, these are the first 
results specifically confirming high CES scores are associated with worse global functioning 
even when PTSD symptoms are included in the model.  These results are consistent with prior 
research linking high PTSD with daily hassles (Brewin et al., 2000; Miller & Rasmussen, 2010; 
Possemato et al., 2014), poor subjective health (Barrett et al., 2002; Hoge et al., 2007; Schnurr & 
Spiro, 1999), and a greater number of chronic diseases (Barrett et al., 2002; Boscarino, 2006).  
However, results from the current study extend this research by suggesting event centrality is not 
only a symptom cluster of PTSD but an important symptom cluster as CES scores were 
significant or marginally significant for four of the nine global functioning variables evaluated. 
 Removal of PTSD symptoms from the analyses was conducted to examine whether high 
event centrality was associated with poor global functioning, regardless of PTSD symptoms.  
Results again suggested those high in event centrality are more likely to experience problems in 
mental and physical health.  Specifically, two new relationships emerged indicating those higher 
in event centrality reported higher post-displacement trauma and increased sleep apnea 
symptoms.  When combined with the above results, these data indicate high event centrality is 
associated with poor global functioning for six of the nine outcomes evaluated. 
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 Of note are the consistent non-significant relationships between high event centrality and 
BMI, social support, and unemployment. One possibility is that the relationships between high 
event centrality, BMI, social support, and unemployment may simply take longer to develop. 
These refugees have only been in the U.S. for two years when these measurements were taken. 
Previous research examining PTSD and BMI, social support, and unemployment have found 
longitudinal relationships that took many years to develop (Kubzansky et al., 2014; Possemato et 
al., 2014; respectively).  Thus, it may be that these refugees would demonstrate a relationship 
between high event centrality and high BMI, low social support, and unemployment if they were 
assessed in ten years.  However, examination of Table 19 indicates increased PTSD symptoms 
are associated with a higher BMI and lower social support even though event centrality is not 
associated with these outcomes.  Thus, it may simply be that the proposed PTSD symptom 
cluster of event centrality is associated with many aspects of poor global functioning but this 
does not include BMI, social support, or unemployment. 
Limitations and Future Directions  
 Straight-line responses for approximately 57% of the 2nd Follow-Up CES scores are a 
notable limitation. Although results remained relatively unchanged when straight-line responders 
were removed, this type of responding raises serious methodological concerns. As discussed in 
Study 1 of the current paper, this type of responding also creates difficulty when estimating SEM 
models as the sample size becomes untenable for SEM once the straight-line responders are 
removed.  The current study benefited from the use of many measures of global functioning, 
such as chronic diseases and daily hassles.  However, the inclusion of these measures of global 
functioning greatly increased the survey length, which may have created the straight-line 
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response pattern.  As such, future researchers should be aware of the trade-off between inclusion 
of many variables of interest and declining quality of data (e.g., Rathod & LaBruna, 2005). 
 Additionally, future research should be cognizant that the strength of using SEM lies in 
the number of competing models tested.  In the current study four models were examined.  There 
are, however, several other models that could have been tested.  Specifically, three of the models 
tested by Broadbridge (2013) are distinct from models tested in the current study as Broadbridge 
separated the Avoidance/Numbing cluster into two clusters, Avoidance and Numbing, 
respectively.  Follow-up work in this area should compare the models proposed by Broadbridge, 
the models proposed in the current study, and additional theoretical models to understand event 
centrality’s relationship to PTSD symptom clusters. 
 For two-thirds of the outcomes evaluated for criterion validity, high event centrality was 
at least marginally associated with poor global functioning.  However, no relationships were 
found for high event centrality and BMI, social support, or unemployment. These findings merit 
further consideration as prior research has linked PTSD symptoms with poor functioning across 
these variables.  As such, future event centrality research should consider the relationships 
between high event centrality and poor global functioning in other populations other than Iraqi 
refugees, such as veterans or college students. 
 Finally, all items in the current study were self-reported with many items being 
dichotomous.  This study is notable in that it is the first study to specifically examine criterion 
validity of the CES using physical health and global functioning; however, some of the measures 
used could have been externally validated or measured with more precision.  For example, self-
reported chronic diseases could have been confirmed using medical records.  Similarly, the 
severity of any diseases was impossible to evaluate in the current data set.  Thus, an individual 
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with controlled Type II diabetes would have received the same chronic diseases score as an 
individual who is non-compliant and hospitalized frequently.  Although it is difficult to attain 
externally validated and precise data, this type of data would do much to move the event 
centrality and PTSD fields forward.  
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CHAPTER 5 
General Discussion 
 When combined, the studies presented in the current paper suggest event centrality, as 
measured by the CES, is not only an abstract, identity focused construct but may be a valid 
measure of PTSD symptoms.  Specifically, as described in Study 1, the CES is internally 
consistent and likely stable over time.  Second, the CES is affected by both cumulative trauma 
exposure and specific traumatic events, following a pattern similar to PTSD symptoms.  And, 
finally, the CES has statistical support as a possible symptom cluster of PTSD with those 
reporting high event centrality scores also reporting poor global functioning across multiple 
variables.  Although several of the outcomes could be more conclusive, such as fit indices for 
Studies 1 and 3, the preponderance of the data presented in the current paper suggest a similar 
trend—namely that the CES should be considered as a cognitive symptom cluster for PTSD.  
The implications of these findings, areas for further research, and theoretical questions are 
considered below. 
What, exactly, is the CES measuring?  
 Results from the current paper are in line with previous research by Berntsen and Rubin 
(2006) and other event centrality studies (e.g., Barton, Boals, & Knowles, 2013; Boelen, 2012; 
Rubin, Boals, & Hoyle, 2014) that suggest the CES is psychometrically sound.  Additionally, 
Studies 1 and 3 from the current paper and work by Broadbridge (2013) suggest the 7-item CES 
can be conceptualized as a single factor with all items assessing the same latent variable.  One 
should be careful, however, not to fall into the nomological fallacy where the naming of a 
construct leads the researcher to feel he or she is actually measuring that construct (Harlow, 
2014).  The CES was designed to measure the consequentiality of a traumatic event and the 
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integration of that traumatic event into one’s identity (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  Results from 
this paper and others suggest the CES is consistently and reliably measuring something; 
however, it is possible the CES is not measuring event centrality but measuring a pattern of 
cognitive aspects of PTSD symptoms.  It is possible event centrality has been an unidentified 
symptom of PTSD and the conceptualization of the CES as a “predictor” of PTSD has prevented 
researchers from identifying event centrality as a symptom cluster.  For example, McNally and 
colleagues (1995) found veterans with PTSD who wore war regalia (e.g., medals, hats, etc. with 
military affiliation) demonstrated a specific pattern of cognitive symptoms including identifying 
strongly with their past military service and being cognitively “stuck in past.”  Researchers 
looking to verify their assumption that event centrality leads to PTSD symptoms may have read 
the research by McNally and colleagues and suggested that centralizing a traumatic event 
through wearing war regalia and other behaviors was what caused the resulting PTSD symptoms.  
Alternatively, however, results from the current paper and Broadbridge (2013) suggest it may be 
that PTSD has certain cognitive aspects including difficulty with autobiographical memory, 
identity, and over-centralization of a traumatic event.  To date, results are not conclusive for 
either proposed model.  However, results from the current study would suggest both models 
should at least be considered in future research. 
 Ultimately, one could argue that the name of the construct is irrelevant so long as the 
scale consistently performs as expected and is linked to real-world outcomes, such as poor global 
functioning.  Yet, as results from the current study and Broadbridge (2013) indicate names and 
labels do matter.  Results from the current paper reinforce two aspects of construct and scale 
development.  First, a scale, such as the CES, is an imperfect measure of a construct and 
identification and labeling of a construct does not guarantee measurement of that construct.  The 
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CES is an approximation used to measure a pattern of responses that researchers agree upon is 
referred to as event centrality.  Yet, this measure is imperfect and measurement using a different 
method may yield a different understanding of event centrality.  Second, naming a construct and 
identifying it as a “predictor” or antecedent to other outcomes may result in assumptions that 
often go unnoticed in research.  Prior event centrality researchers have asked research questions 
with the a priori understanding that event centrality caused high PTSD symptoms.  Future event 
centrality researchers should be cognizant of how this assumption may affect their hypothesis 
development. 
 With regards to the CES scale, future research should take language of the items and item 
wording into consideration.  All items in the CES are coded in the same direction with higher 
scores reflecting higher event centrality.  The longer 20-item version of the CES (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2006) also follows this same pattern.  Future work examining temporal stability of the 
CES should consider some items that require reverse coding.  For example, CES item 5 could be 
changed from “This event has permanently changed my life” to “This event has not permanently 
changed my life” (italics added here for emphasis).  Similarly, Broadbridge (2013) asked 
participants to respond to a positively valenced CES item, “This event was a turning point in my 
life for the better”.  The use of several reverse coded items would serve to help screen out 
straight-line responders and also provide an opportunity to assess the positive aspects of event 
centrality (discussed below). 
Single Traumas, Multiple Traumas, and Event Centrality 
 Findings from the current studies highlight a larger issue in PTSD and event centrality 
research—namely the simultaneous acknowledgement and dismissal of the effect of cumulative 
trauma exposure.  As mentioned previously, research has consistently demonstrated increasing 
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trauma exposure is associated with increasing PTSD symptoms.  This trend has been found in 
U.S. soldiers (Clancy et al., 2006; Foy et al., 1984), refugees (Arnetz et al., 2014; Mollica, 
McInnes, Poole, & Tor, 1998) adults who experienced trauma as children (Cloitre et al., 2009), 
and a representative sample of adults from the U.S. (Breslau et al., 1999).  Researchers have 
referred to this pattern as the “dose-effect” or “dose-response” relationship between trauma 
exposure and PTSD symptoms (March, 1993; Mollica, McInnes, Poole, & Tor, 1998; Pynoos et 
al., 1993).  Yet, the current DSM-5 criteria make no mention of the effect of cumulative trauma 
when diagnosing PTSD or understanding PTSD symptoms.  Similarly, prior event centrality 
research has focused on one’s most stressful or traumatic memory.  The implied understanding 
for both PTSD diagnostic criteria and event centrality research is the assumption is that there is 
no additive or interactive effect of trauma across the lifespan.  The purpose of the current study is 
not to re-write the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for PTSD, thus the debate as to whether PTSD 
diagnosis should consider multiple traumas is beyond the scope of this study (for relevant 
reviews refer to Van der Kolk (2000) and Zoladz & Diamond (2013)).  However, results from 
the current study suggest the impact of cumulative trauma exposure on event centrality should be 
revisited.  The current theoretical understanding of event centrality is not wholly incorrect as the 
impact of one specific event may heavily influence event centrality.  Yet, results from Study 2 
suggest cumulative trauma exposure is linked to event centrality with those experiencing the 
highest cumulative trauma reporting the highest event centrality regardless of the specific details 
of the most traumatic event. 
 However, a larger question remains regarding trauma exposure and event centrality.  
How does one de-couple the two?  One cannot meaningfully respond to items on the CES 
without experiencing the traumatic or stressful event.  So, how does event centrality begin?  Or, 
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what conditions create a favorable environment for the emergence of event centrality?  This 
question has remained largely unaddressed in previous studies.  Some researchers have 
suggested that certain personality traits, such as neuroticism, are linked to higher event centrality 
scores (Barton, Boals, & Knowles, 2013; Boelen, 2009; Rubin, Boals, & Hoyle, 2014).  
However, it may be that neuroticism and event centrality are mediated through ruminative 
processes (Newby & Moulds, 2011).  Thus personality traits, such as neuroticism, may be 
causing later event centrality but only if the individual is focusing on negative rumination.  For 
example, a person who is high on neuroticism may view a traumatic event as “something bad 
that happened to me because bad things always happen to me” then this negative rumination and 
excessive cognitive focus on the trauma may result in the event becoming highly centralized.  
Yet this suggestion has been examined only cross-sectionally so it is unclear whether someone 
with a high neuroticism score at Time 1 would experience a trauma, report high negative 
rumination for the event, and then report a high CES score at Time 2 (i.e., does neuroticism 
come first?).  If, as suggested by the current paper, event centrality is a PTSD symptom cluster, 
then it may be impossible to assess trauma, event centrality, and PTSD independently.  
Nevertheless, the inability to prospectively examine event centrality does merit further attention 
by researchers. 
CES vs. PCL 
 If the CES is a valid symptom cluster of PTSD, and assessment of event centrality is 
simply measuring another set of PTSD symptoms, why use the CES at all?  Using the PCL to 
assess PTSD symptoms has been validated (Blanchard et al., 1996; Ruggiero et al., 2003), so 
why would one need to use the CES in addition to the PCL?  We suggest two possible responses. 
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 First, the CES can be used in addition to the PCL or as a substitute for the PCL.  Future 
researchers should administer both the CES and the PCL in order to better understand how the 
two measures function in different populations, across different trauma exposures, at different 
points in the lifespan, or how the measures change over time.  Results from the current study and 
from Broadbridge (2013) are not conclusive and future event centrality research should continue 
examining both the CES and the PCL.  Yet, results from the current study do suggest that when 
both measures cannot be given, for example due to time constraints or due to cultural stigma 
surrounding mental health, the CES may be a valid measure of poor mental health.  As discussed 
previously, certain cultural groups such as refugees from the Middle East or Asian Americans 
are quite reluctant to disclose mental health problems or seek treatment for poor mental health 
(Barkho et al., 2011; Abe-Kim et al., 2007).  The CES may be a valid alternative to the PCL in 
these cultural groups.  The CES does not assess all of the symptom clusters of PTSD (e.g., 
hyper-arousal) so is an imperfect measure of the spectrum of PTSD symptoms.  However, 
individuals from certain cultural groups may be more likely to truthfully respond to questions on 
the CES when compared to questions on the PCL as CES items do not overtly or obviously 
assess mental health.  Clearly more research is merited in this area; however, results from the 
current study suggest the CES may be a valid alternative to more traditional measures of poor 
mental health, especially in certain cultural groups. 
 Second, using the CES may offer a complementary understanding of how participants 
view their poor mental health.  Specifically, for both the CES and the PCL participants are asked 
to reference a specific stressful or traumatic event and respond to scale items with this memory 
in mind.  These instructions may be requesting a lot for some participants.  For example, PCL 
item 6 asks individuals to consider whether they “avoid thinking about or talking about [the] 
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stressful experience from the past or avoided having feelings related to it”. This question is 
complicated by very the nature of the symptom it is addressing.  If one is trying to avoid 
recalling an event and avoid emotions related to this event, can we expect that person to 
truthfully “go back” to the event and describe their physical and emotional reactions?  Relatedly, 
questions like this and other PCL questions addressing concerns such as disturbed sleep (PCL 
item 13) require a introspection and a linking of events that may seem unrelated to the 
participant.  This is not to say participants cannot perform this task or that the PCL is invalid, as 
previous research has established the PCL and PTSD symptoms addressed in the DSM can 
identify those with poor mental health (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1996).  However, use of the CES 
may provide a different mechanism for the participant to consider how an event has affected his 
or her behavior, cognitions, and emotions.  In many ways the CES is somewhat vague and 
amorphous and only when you consider the CES in light of a traumatic event do these items 
become useful questions.  Yet, these more open-ended questions (e.g., This event was a turning 
point in my life.; CES item 7), may offer an opportunity for the individual to consider the event 
from the present instead of in the past.  Consideration of the event from the safety of the “here 
and now” may allow for honest or reflective responses.  When an individual is asked to respond 
to “This event was a turning point in my life,” he or she can respond without thinking, “If I say 
‘yes’ that means I have some sort of problem.” In addition, the lack of specific symptoms in the 
CES does not require participants to link an event and symptoms that may seem quite separate.  
As such, event centrality may be an unusual but powerful measure of mental health.  Use of the 
CES in conjunction with traditional measures of PTSD, such as the PCL, may offer researchers 
and clinicians a more thorough understanding of how PTSD symptoms are best conceptualized 
and measured. 
87 
 
 
What Comes After Event Centrality? 
 The current paper has assumed event centrality is always a negative experience.  
However, as hypothesized by Broadbridge (2013) and others (e.g., Boals & Schuettler, 2011), 
event centrality may be positive with the individual viewing the experience as a turning point in 
his or her life for the better.  Other researchers have referred to this as posttraumatic growth 
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996).  Previous research indicates individuals who exhibit posttraumatic 
growth or a “turning point in my life for the better” mentality are the least likely to have 
enduring distress after a traumatic event (Frazier, Conlon, & Glaser, 2001). However, research 
also suggests individuals who report high levels of posttraumatic growth also frequently report 
both high event centrality scores and high PTSD scores (Boals & Schuettler, 2011).  If 
posttraumatic growth / positive event centrality was the outcome of healthy cognitive processing 
of the trauma then one would expect declining PTSD symptoms for individuals who report high 
posttraumatic growth; instead, research suggests the opposite.  Research in this area is further 
complicated by findings that propose posttraumatic growth may only reflect a belief that one has 
positively changed instead of measurable changes in mental health and psychological well-being 
(e.g., Frazier et al., 2009). The current paper remains relatively silent on positive event centrality 
and posttraumatic growth as the focus of the three studies was to examine the stability and 
validity of the CES as a measure of PTSD symptoms.  Nevertheless, future researchers should 
explore how positive and negative event centrality interact over time, especially in a group such 
as refugees where life circumstances and narrative identity may be subject to frequent changes. 
 To date, there are no studies explicitly addressing whether a decline in event centrality, 
specifically negative event centrality, leads a subsequent decline in PTSD symptoms.  A study of 
this nature would, of course, do much to aid in the understanding of the cause and effect 
88 
 
 
relationship between PTSD and event centrality.  However, related research does exist.  Clinical 
researchers have demonstrated narrative exposure therapy (NET), where the individual talks 
about the traumatic experience with the purpose of integrating the trauma into his or her larger 
life story, can decrease poor mental health symptoms.  For example, Hijazi and colleagues 
(2014) examined whether brief NET could reduce PTSD symptoms and increase posttraumatic 
growth in trauma exposed Iraqi refugees.  Results indicate refugees who completed the brief 
NET intervention reported significantly lower PTSD symptoms at the 2-month follow-up and 
also reported significantly higher posttraumatic growth and well-being at the 4-month follow-up.  
It is possible that Hijazi and colleagues (2014) and other NET researchers (e.g., Neuner, Schauer, 
Klaschik, Karunakara, & Elbert, 2004) are helping shift participants’ negative event centrality 
symptoms into focusing more on posttraumatic growth which then decreases PTSD symptoms.  
The timing, however, and causal nature of these relationships is not clear. 
Event Centrality: Expanding Our Understanding of Cognition 
 The current paper adds to the growing body of literature suggesting memories of 
traumatic events are no more likely to be fragmented or difficult to recall than memories of other 
events (e.g., Boals & Schuettler, 2011; Rubin et al., 2011).  This research is in line with the work 
of Rubin and colleagues (2008) who have suggested no special mechanisms are necessary to 
understand stressful or traumatic memories.  Instead, traumatic memories are over-integrated 
into the autobiographical memory system and symptoms of poor mental health after trauma are 
associated with this over-integration.  That research supports this basic model or 
autobiographical memory model of traumatic memories is notable as it represents as shift from 
decades of research suggesting different memory mechanisms or processes for many different 
kinds of memories (e.g., Brown and Kulik’s “Now print!” mechanism for flashbulb memories; 
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1977).  Instead, this paper and other research suggest parsimony may be favored in cognition 
with few or no special mechanisms necessary to understand memories that seem phenomenal.  
Memory “extremes”, such as traumatic memories that are vivid and intrusive, likely represent an 
exaggeration of normal cognitive processes.  As such, researchers examining memories for 
traumatic events should not just consider how stressful memories are different from other types 
of “normal” memories (e.g., everyday memories, positive memories, etc.), but also how these 
memory types are all driven by the same processes (Rubin, 2006, 2011). 
 Ultimately, this paper and other research examining event centrality, trauma, and PTSD 
suggest that it is the memory of the event, not the actual event that is responsible for poor mental 
health following trauma.  As discussed previously, the subjective evaluation the traumatic event 
(i.e., how the person recalls the traumatic event) is a better predictor for poor mental health 
following trauma than an outsider’s objective assessment of the trauma (i.e., how traumatic 
others believe the event to be) (Boals & Schuettler, 2011).   Other research suggests changing the 
memory of the traumatic event can decrease poor mental health and improve well-being (Hijazi 
et al., 2014).  Research examining episodic and autobiographical memory support the view that 
memory is a reconstructive process (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and that how one views 
identity and the past “self” is subject to change over time (McAdams et al., 2006).  When 
combined, these studies suggest that although one cannot change the traumatic event that 
occurred, it is possible to change or re-frame the memory for that traumatic event.  Memory and 
identity are interdependent and malleable.  As such, a complete understanding of mental health 
after trauma requires a cognitive component with a specific emphasis on how identity is 
associated with that traumatic memory.  Future research examining mental health after trauma 
should continue to study this intersection of memory and mental health.  A more complete 
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understanding of this relationship would aid clinicians, researchers, and, of course, the 
individuals, such as the refugees in the current study, who experienced the traumatic event. 
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Table 1. Demographics and Sample Attrition Over Time 
Sociodemographic Variables Baseline 
(n=298) 
1st Follow-up 
(n=291) 
2nd Follow-up 
(n=286) 
    
 n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Gender    
Female 137 (46) 133 (45.7)  130 (45.45)  
Male 161 (54) 158 (54.3) 155 (54.55) 
Marital Status    
Married 154 (51.7) 155 (52.0) 160 (53.7) 
Not married 144 (48.3) 136 (45.6) 126 (44.06) 
Current Living Situation    
Live with core family 201 (67.4) 257 (86.2) 242 (81.2) 
Live alone or with strangers 97 (32.6) 33 (11.1) 33 (11.5) 
Education    
High School or Less 213 (71.5) 202 (69.4) 203 (68.1) 
Greater than High School  85 (28.5) 89 (30.6) 83 (27.9) 
Religious Affiliation    
Christian 269 (90.3)   
Muslim 25 (8.4)   
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Mandia 4 (1.3)   
Employment Status    
Employed 5 (1.7) 144 (48.3) 163 (54.7) 
Unemployed 293 (98.3) 147 (49.3) 117 (39.3) 
 
 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
Age (years)  33.41 (11.29) 34.30 (11.37) 35.42 (11.28) 
Number of children 1.38 (1.79) 1.42 (1.67) 1.49 (1.72) 
Number of children <18 yrs .91(1.21) .97 (1.22) .89 (1.18) 
Time in transition (months) 28.57 (27.82) na na 
Time in the U.S. (months) 1.00 (1.08) 12.51 (1.13) 24.81 (1.54) 
 
a Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
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Table 2. Centrality of Event Scale (CES) Over Time (N = 281) 
 1st Follow-up 2st Follow-up 
 
 
  
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
p a 
I feel this event has become part of my identity. b 2.32 (.81) 2.24 (.70) .03 
This event has become a reference point for the way I 
understand myself and the world.  
2.12 (.49) 2.06 (.37) .04 
I feel that this event has become a central part of my 
life story.  
2.47 (.96) 2.46 (.90) .86 
I feel that this event has influenced the way I think and 
feel about other experiences.  
2.56 (.94) 2.53 (.92) .66 
This event has permanently changed my life. 2.64 (1.00) 2.70 (.97) .26 
I often think about the effects this event will have on 
my future. 
2.54 (.93) 2.43 (.84) .02 
This event was a turning point in my life.  2.72 (1.00) 2.83 (1.03) .01 
  
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
p c 
CES Sum Score d 17.38 (5.22) 17.26 (4.72) .01 
CES Sum Score Valid Responders Only e 22.84 (4.50) 22.10 (4.30) .02 
 
Note. Seven missing responses (0.36%) for 2nd Follow-up were estimated using multiple 
imputation in SPSS. 
a Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
b CES items scores such that higher scores indicate greater event centralization. 
c Paired samples t-test. 
d Calculated by summing the seven event centralization items within each time point. Scores 
could range from 7 to 35. Includes all participants. 
e Includes only participants who were not straight-line responders at either time point (n = 94). 
  
94 
 
 
Table 3. Harvard Trauma Questionnaire for Pre-Displacement Trauma with Specific Trauma 
Sub-Types Indicated (N = 281) 
Traumatic event n (%) 
Personal Trauma to Self  
Physically harmed (beaten, knifed, etc.) 47 (15.8) 
Kidnapped 29 (9.7) 
Taken as hostage 22 (7.4) 
Physical Trauma to Others  
Witnessed someone being physically harmed (beating, knifing, etc.) 93 (31.2) 
Witnessed murder 69 (23.2) 
Witnessed execution of civilians 40 (13.4) 
Witnessed rotting corpses 153 (51.3) 
Searched arbitrarily 86 (28.9) 
Witnessed shelling, burning, or razing of residential areas or marshlands 252 (84.6) 
Present while someone searched for people or things in your home 97 (32.6) 
Lack of Necessities  
Suffered from lack of food or clean water 50 (16.8) 
Suffered ill health without access to medical care or medicine 55 (18.5) 
Lacked shelter 17 (5.7) 
Abduction of Family Member or Friend  
Family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend taken as hostage 161 (54.0) 
Kidnapping of family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend. 169 (56.7) 
Disappearance of family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend 90 (30.2) 
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Murder or violent death of family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend 169 (56.7) 
Persecution / Coercion   
Forced to flee your country or place of settlement 269 (90.3) 
Forced to settle in a different part of the country with minimal services 241 (80.9) 
Oppressed because of ethnicity, religion, or sect. 270 (90.6) 
Someone informed on your placing you and your family at risk of injury or 
death 
121 (40.6) 
Witnessed desecration /destruction of religious shrines or places of 
religious instruction 
195 (65.4) 
Other Trauma Types  
Confined to home because of chaos and violence outside 290 (97.3) 
Witnessed or heard combat situation (explosions, artillery fire, shelling) or 
landmine 
289 (97.0) 
Property looted, confiscated, or destroyed 115 (38.6) 
Witnessed the arrest, torture, or execution of religious leaders or important 
members of tribe 
12 (4.0) 
Serious physical injury from combat situation or landmine 11 (3.7) 
Imprisoned arbitrarily 9 (3.0) 
Witnessed torture 8 (2.7) 
Expelled from your country based on ancestral origin, religion, or sect 4 (1.3) 
Forced to inform on someone placing them at risk of injury of death 2 (0.7) 
Forced to destroy someone’s property 2 (0.7) 
Forced to physically harm someone 2 (0.7) 
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Received the body of a family member and prohibited from mourning them 
and performing burial rites 
2 (0.7) 
Witnessed sexual abuse or rape 0 (0.0) 
Forced to pay for bullet used to kill family member 0 (0.0) 
Sexually abused or raped 0 (0.0) 
Coerced to have sex for survival 0 (0.0) 
  
M (SD) 
Cumulative Pre-Displacement Trauma a 12.51 (3.44) 
 
a Calculated by summing all pre-displacement trauma exposure. Scores could range from 0 to 39. 
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Table 4. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist--Civilian Version Over Time (N = 281) 
 Baseline 1st Follow-up 2nd Follow-
up  
 
  
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
p a 
Repeated memories or thoughts b  1.43 (.74) 1.63 (.82) 1.69 (.78) <.001 
Disturbing dreams  1.16 (.52) 1.12 (.42) 1.11 (.41) .13 
Acting or feeling as if re-experiencing  1.07 (.38) 1.08 (.34) 1.09 (.33) .82 
Feeling upset when reminded 1.17 (.51) 1.23 (.62) 1.30 (.59) .004 
Physical reactions 1.10 (.43) 1.07 (.30) 1.09 (.34) .52 
Avoid thinking or talking 1.11 (.49) 1.14 (.51) 1.19 (.50) .08 
Avoid activities or situations 1.05 (.42) 1.08 (.39) 1.06 (.28) .45 
Trouble remembering event 1.03 (.25) 1.01 (.15) 1.03 (.21) .46 
Loss of interest  1.12 (.44) 1.13 (.52) 1.25 (.61) <.001 
Feeling distant 1.06 (.36) 1.04 (.28) 1.11 (.39) .03 
Feeing numb 1.02 (.17) 1.02 (.16) 1.03 (.18) .85 
Feeling future cut short 1.08 (.38) 1.05 (.31) 1.10 (.38) .28 
Trouble sleeping 1.33 (.80) 1.31 (.76) 1.47 (.87) .01 
Feeling irritable  1.32 (.62) 1.22 (.57) 1.65 (.76) <.001 
Having difficulty concentrating 1.21 (.56) 1.23 (.57) 1.47 (.73) <.001 
Being alert or on guard 1.11 (.42) 1.10 (.39) 1.15 (.46) .24 
Feeling jumpy 1.20 (.54) 1.12 (.38) 1.25 (.60) .005 
  
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
PCL Sum Score c 19.50 (5.52) 19.54 (5.78) 21.03 (5.46) .05 
 
a Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
b Scores coded such that higher scores reflect greater symptom presence. 
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c Calculated by summing all 17 PCL items within each time point. Scores could range from 17 to 
85.  
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Table 5. Post-Displacement Trauma (U.S. Trauma Questionnaire) Over Time (N = 281) 
 Baseline 1st Follow-
up 
2nd 
Follow-up  
  
n (%) 
 
n (%) 
 
n (%) 
Oppressed because of ethnicity, sect, etc. 0 (0) 2 (.70) 5 (1.7) 
Present while property searched 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Searched arbitrarily  0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (.30) 
Property looted, confiscated, etc. 0 (0) 2 (.70) 13 (4.4) 
Forced to settle with minimal services 0 (0) 1 (.30) 0 (0) 
Imprisoned arbitrarily 0 (0) 1 (.30) 0 (0) 
Suffered ill health without medical care 0 (0) 1 (.30) 54 (18.1) 
Suffered from lack of food and water 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Forced to flee country 0 (0)   
Expelled from country 0 (0)   
Lacked shelter  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Witnessed desecration of religious shrines 0 (0)   
Witnessed arrest of religious leaders 0 (0)   
Witnessed execution of civilians 0 (0)   
Witnessed shelling, burning, etc.  0 (0)   
Witnessed or heard combat situation  0 (0)   
Serious injury from combat or landmine 0 (0)   
Witnessed rotting corpses 0 (0)   
Confined to home because of violence 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Witnessed someone being harmed 0 (0) 1 (.30) 0 (0) 
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Witnessed sexual abuse or rape  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Witnessed torture  0 (0)   
Witnessed murder  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Forced to inform on someone  0 (0)   
Forced to destroy someone’s property 0 (0)   
Forced to physically harm someone  0 (0)   
Murder or violent death of family member 1 (.30) 1 (.30) 1 (.30) 
Forced to pay for bullets 0 (0)   
Received body of family member 0 (0)   
Disappearance of family member 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Kidnapping of family member  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Family member taken as hostage 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Someone informed on you 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Physically harmed 0 (0) 1 (.30) 0 (0) 
Kidnapped 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Taken as hostage  0 (0)   
Heard about frightening or dangerous events 1 (.30) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Sexually abused or raped 0 (0)   
Coerced to have sex for survival 0 (0)   
Seen person in U.S. who was violent  0 (0) 2 (.70) 
Family with mental health problems   25 (8.4) 52 (17.4) 
Family with health problems   106 (35.6) 134 (45.0) 
Family with legal troubles  2 (.70) 4 (1.3) 
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Evicted or foreclosed on  1 (.30) 4 (1.3) 
Utilities turned off  2 (.70) 6 (2.0) 
Stress related to financial situation   236 (79.2) 211 (70.8) 
Worry about being deported  9 (3.0) 4 (1.30) 
Harassed by police  4 (1.3) 3 (1.0) 
Car accident  15 (5.0) 35 (11.70) 
Been imprisoned  0 (0) 2 (.70) 
Been arrested   1 (.30) 2 (.70) 
Coerced to do an illegal action for money  0 (0) 0 (0) 
Approached to do an illegal action for money  0 (0) 0 (0) 
Sexually harassed   1 (.30) 0 (0) 
Serious personal injury from assault  0 (0) 0 (0) 
Injured in another type of accident    19 (6.4) 
Core family unable to move to U. S.    135 (45.3) 
  
M (SD) 
  
Cumulative Post-Displacement Trauma a 3.85 (2.01)   
 
a Calculated by summing all post-displacement trauma exposures. Scores could range from 0 to 
115. 
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Table 6. Daily Hassles Over Time (N = 281) 
 Baseline 1st Follow-
up 
2nd Follow-
up  
 
  
n (%) 
 
n (%) 
 
n (%) 
 
Problems with your spouse b 1 (.40) 3 (1.1) 10 (3.6)  
Daily money problems 272 (96.8) 236 (84.0) 204 (72.6)  
Problems with your children  4 (1.4) 3 (1.1) 8 (2.8)  
Problems with your parents 1 (.40) 2 (.70) 3 (1.1)  
Problems with other relatives 3 (1.1) 7 (2.5) 3 (1.1)  
Problems with safety 2 (.70) 1.17 (.51) 38 (13.5)  
Problems with transportation 268 (95.4) 14 (5.0) 84 (29.9)  
Problems with language 269 (95.7) 136 (48.4) 226 (80.4)  
Problems finding a job 260 (92.5) 252 (89.7) 55 (19.6)  
Problems at work 2 (.70) 108 (38.4) 25 (8.9)  
  
M (SD) 
   
Cumulative Hassles 8.96 (2.22)    
 
a Items coded such that 0 = “Never/Hassle Does Not Apply/Low Hassles” and 1 = “Hassles 
Present/High Hassles”. 
b Calculated by summing hassles across the three measurement waves. Scores could range from 
0 to 30.  
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Table 7. Social Support Over Time (N = 281) 
  Baseline 1st Follow-
up 
2nd Follow-
up  
 
   
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
p a 
When lonely, people to talk to b  4.03 (.53) 3.77 (.73) 3.89 (.76) <.001 
No one to talk to about problems  3.96 (.55) 4.00 (.49) 3.98 (.67) .74 
Often meet/talk with family/friends   3.85 (.70) 3.58 (.86) 3.66 (.87) <.001 
Several people to spend time with  3.85 (.64) 3.75 (.74) 3.83 (.71) .19 
Person whose advice I trust  4.09 (.45) 4.08 (.34) 4.17 (.49) .01 
   
M (SD) 
   
Cumulative Social Support c  58.40 (4.74)    
 
a Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
b All items coded such that higher scores indicate higher levels of social support.  
c Calculated by summing all social support items across the three measurement waves. 
Cumulative scores could range from 15 to 75.  
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Table 8. Self-rated Health and Predicted Self-rated Health Over Time (N = 281) 
  
Baseline 
1st 
Follow-up 
2nd 
Follow-up  
 
  
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
p a 
Self-rated Health b   3.59 (.77) 3.47 (.80) 3.47 (.83) .003 
Predicted Self-rated Health c   3.60 (.78) 3.48 (.79) 3.47 (.83) .001 
   
M (SD) 
   
Cumulative Self-rated Health d  10.55 (2.12)    
Cumulative Predicted Self-rated Health e   10.56 (2.11)    
 
a Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
b Higher scores indicate better self-rated health today. 
c Higher scores indicate better predicted self-rated health in one year. 
d Calculated by summing the three self-rated health questions. Cumulative scores could range 
from 3 to 15. 
e Calculated by summing the three predicted self-rated health questions. Cumulative scores could 
range from 3 to 15. 
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Table 9. Chronic Diseases Over Time (N = 281) 
 Baseline 
 
1st Follow-up 
 
2nd Follow-up  
 
  
n (%) 
 
n (%) 
 
n (%) 
High Blood Pressure 29 (9.7) 38 (12.8) 35 (11.7) 
Heart Disease 10 (3.4) 10 (3.4) 9 (3.0) 
Headaches 30 (10.1) 24 (8.1) 22 (7.4) 
High Cholesterol 23 (7.7) 43 (14.4) 48 (16.1) 
Sleep Apnea or Narcolepsy 9 (3.0) 6 (2.0) 10 (3.4) 
Asthma 11 (3.7) 9 (3.0) 8 (2.7) 
Diabetes 14 (4.7) 35 (11.7) 21 (7.0) 
Arthritis or Rheumatism  55 (18.5) 17 (5.7) 58 (19.5) 
Muscle or Tendon Disease 28 (9.4) 65 (21.8) 79 (26.5) 
Any Skin Diseases 20 (6.7) 19 (6.4) 14 (4.7) 
Ear, Nose, and Throat Disorders 45 (15.1) 21 (7.0) 28 (9.4) 
Cancer 1 (.30) 1 (.30) 2 (.70) 
  
M (SD) 
  
Cumulative Chronic Diseases a 3.78 (4.52)   
 
a Calculated by summing all self-reported chronic diseases across the three measurement waves. 
Scores could range from 0 to 36. 
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Table 10. Body Mass Index Over Time (N = 281) 
 Baseline 
 
1st Follow-
up 
2nd Follow-
up 
 
  
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
p a  
Body Mass Index (BMI)  26.52 (4.97) 27.12 (5.21) 27.25 (4.89) .001 
  
M (SD) 
   
Average BMI b 27.00 (4.65)    
 
a Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
b Calculated by averaging the three BMI measurements.  
 
Note. Centers for Disease Control guidelines for Body Mass Index (BMI) include the following:  
 
BMI Weight Status 
Below 18.5 Underweight 
18.5 – 24.9 Normal 
25.0 – 29.9 Overweight 
30.0 and Above Obese 
 
Table from CDC: http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_bmi/ 
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 Table 11. Sleep Apnea at 2nd Follow-up (N = 281) 
 
   
n (%) 
 
 
Do you snore?     
No  201 (71.90)  
Yes  79 (28.10)  
   
M (SD) 
 
 
Snoring loudness a b  2.67 (.76)  
Snoring frequency    3.70 (1.18)  
Pauses in breathing during sleep 1.86 (1.31)  
Tired after sleeping 1.85 (1.31)  
Tired during wake time 1.69 (1.05)  
  
M (SD) 
 
Cumulative Apnea Symptoms c 11.19 (4.63)  
 
a All items are scored such that higher ratings indicate greater presence of symptoms. For 
specific items and scoring procedures refer to Appendix L.  
b Items specifically addressing snoring (i.e., snoring loudness and snoring frequency) were only 
answered by those who responded “Yes” to the first question, “Do you snore?” (n = 79). 
c Calculated by summing all sleep apnea items. Scores could range from 5 to 25. 
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Table 12. Fit Indices for CES Temporal Stability Over Time 
      
 Df χ2 RMSEA NNFI CFI 
      
Form Model a 28 636.90 .28 .83 .89 
      
Pattern Model b 35 649.11 .25 .86 .88 
      
Scalar Model c 40 683.12 .24 .87 .88 
      
Strict Invariance Model 1 d 47 760.49 .23 .87 .87 
      
Strict Invariance Model 2 e  48 760.38 .23 .89 .87 
      
Strict Invariance Model 3 f 
 
49 761.82 .23 .89 .87 
 
a All parameters freely estimated for each time point. 
b Factor loadings invariant across time points. 
c Factor loadings and item means invariant across time points. 
d Factor loadings, item means, and item residuals/error variances invariant across time points. 
e Strict Invariance Model 1 plus latent variable means are invariant. 
f Strict Invariance Model 1 plus latent variable means and variances are invariant. 
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Table 13. Comparisons of Fit Indices to Assess CES Temporal Stability Over Time 
      
 Δdf Δχ2 ΔRMSEA ΔNNFI ΔCFI 
      
Form Model a ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
      
Pattern Model b 7 12.21 .03* .03* .01* 
      
Scalar Model c 5 34.01 .01* .01* .00 
      
Strict Invariance Model 1 d 7 77.37 .01* .00 .01* 
      
Strict Invariance Model 2 e  1 0.11 .00 .02* .00 
      
Strict Invariance Model 3 f 
 
1 1.44 .00 .00 .00 
 
a All parameters freely estimated for each time point. 
b Factor loadings invariant across time points. 
c Factor loadings and item means invariant across time points.  
d Factor loadings, item means, and item residuals/error variances invariant across time points. 
e Strict Invariance Model 1 plus latent variable means are invariant. 
f Strict Invariance Model 1 plus latent variable means and variances are invariant.  
 
*p<.05 
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Table 14. Strict Invariance Model 3 Standardized Item Factor Loadings and Squared Multiple 
Correlations (SMCs) for CES Items Over Time 
     
 Factor Loading   SMC b  
     
CES 1 0.50  0.44  
     
CES 2 0.18  0.18  
     
CES 3 0.73  0.62  
     
CES 4 0.74  0.62  
     
CES 5 0.92  0.88  
     
CES 6 0.73  0.66  
     
CES 7 0.93  0.84  
     
 
Note: All factor loadings were significant at p <.05. 
 
a Factor loadings, item means, item variances, latent variable means, latent variable variances 
were held invariant across the two time points. 
b Individual item squared multiple correlations represent the portion of unique variance in the 
latent variable (e.g., CES) associated with that particular item in that specific model. 
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Table 15. Effect of Cumulative Trauma on Event Centrality 
 
 
Step 1a Step 2b  
 β c β    
  sr2 d 
Age .27*** .25*** .06 
Gender (reference = male) -.06 .02 <.001 
Education (reference =≤ high school) -.07 -.08 .006 
Cumulative Pre-Displacement Trauma e  .29*** .07 
R2 .08 .15  
R2 change  .07***  
 
a Step 1 includes all control variables. 
b Step 2 introduces cumulative pre-displacement trauma. 
c Standardized regression coefficients 
d Squared semi-partial correlation coefficient which represents the proportion of variance 
uniquely associated with the respective predictor variable for the final model (Step 2). 
e Harvard Trauma Questionnaire sum score. Range 0 to 39. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 16. Effect of Specific Trauma Type on Event Centrality 
 
 
Step 1a Step 2b  
 β c β    
  sr2 d 
Age .27*** .24*** .05 
Gender (reference = male) -.05 .05 .002 
Education (reference =≤ high school) -.07 -.06 .003 
Physical Trauma To Others e  .04 .002 
Physical Trauma To Self f  .51*** .25 
Lack of Necessities g  .05 .003 
Abduction of Family Member or Friend h  .09 .007 
Persecution / Coercion i  .06 .004 
R2 .08 .35  
R2 change  .27***  
 
a Step 1 includes all control variables. 
b Step 2 introduces cumulative pre-displacement trauma. 
c Standardized regression coefficients 
d Squared semi-partial correlation coefficient which represents the proportion of variance 
uniquely associated with the respective predictor variable. 
e Physical trauma to others scores range from 0 to 7. 
f Physical trauma to self scores range from 0 to 3. 
g Lack of necessities scores range from 0 to 3. 
h Abduction of family member or friend scores range from 0 to 4. 
i  Persecution / coercion scores range from 0 to 5.  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 17. Fit Indices for "Predictor" vs. "Reflector" Models 
      
 Df χ2 RMSEA NNFI CFI 
      
“Predictor”      
      
1. Correlated 
Variables 
251 1282.90 .128 .888 .898 
      
2. Correlated 
Variables and 
Symptoms 
248 1245.97 .127 .890 .901 
      
“Reflector”      
      
3. One Factor 252 1897.71 .183 .822 .837 
      
4. Higher Order 248 1365.65 .127 .890 .901 
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Table 18. Fit Indices Comparisons for "Predictor" vs. "Reflector" Models 
      
 Δdf Δχ2 ΔRMSEA ΔNNFI ΔCFI 
      
Model 1 vs. Model 2 3 36.93* .001 .002 .003 
      
Model 1 vs. Model 3 1 614.81* .055* .066* .060* 
      
Model 1 vs. Model 4 3 82.75* .001 .002 .003 
      
Model 2 vs. Model 3 4 651.74* .056* .068* .064* 
      
Model 2 vs. Model 4 0 119.68 .000 .000 .000 
      
Model 3 vs. Model 4 4 532.06* .056* .068* .064* 
      
 
*p<.05 or a change greater than 0.01 indicating a significant difference. 
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Table 19. Standardized Factor Loadings for Individual CES and PCL Items in "Predictor" and 
"Reflector" Models 
      
 “Predictor”  “Reflector” 
      
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
      
      
PCL 1 0.43 1.00  0.47 1.00 
      
PCL 2 0.28 0.64  0.26 0.64 
      
PCL 3 0.23 0.51  0.21 0.51 
      
PCL 4 0.45 1.03  0.46 1.03 
      
PCL 5 0.23 0.53  0.22 0.53 
      
PCL 6 0.38 1.00  0.36 1.00 
      
PCL 7 0.19 0.53  0.17 0.53 
      
PCL 8 0.10 0.28  0.09 0.28 
      
PCL 9 0.38 0.97  0.37 0.97 
      
PCL 10 0.16 0.39  0.15 0.39 
      
PCL 11 0.08 0.21  0.07 0.21 
      
PCL 12 0.15 0.41  0.16 0.41 
      
PCL 13 0.51 1.00  0.46 1.00 
      
PCL 14 0.34 0.72  0.31 0.72 
      
PCL 15 0.48 0.99  0.43 0.99 
      
PCL 16 0.35 0.78  0.31 0.78 
      
PCL 17 0.36 0.86  0.32 0.86 
      
CES 1 0.48 1.00  0.47 1.00 
      
CES 2 0.10 0.21  0.11 0.21 
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CES 3 0.74 1.56  0.63 1.56 
      
CES 4 0.76 1.59  0.67 1.59 
      
CES 5 0.86 1.81  0.62 1.81 
      
CES 6 0.69 1.45  0.61 1.45 
      
CES 7 0.88 1.85  0.68 1.85 
 
Note: All factor loadings were significant at p < .05. 
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Table 20. Standardized Factor Loadings for Latent Variables for "Predictor" and "Reflector" 
Models 
     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Corr. PTSD and Event Centrality 0.59* ---- ---- ---- 
     
PTSD and Re-experiencing ---- 0.45* ---- 0.45* 
     
PTSD and Avoidance/Numbing ---- 0.37* ---- 0.37* 
     
PTSD and Hyper-arousal ---- 0.42* ---- 0.43* 
     
PTSD and Event Centrality ---- ---- ---- 0.29* 
 
*p<.05 
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Table 21. Squared Multiple Correlations (SMCs) for PCL and CES Items in the "Predictor" and 
"Reflector" Models 
      
 “Predictor”  “Reflector” 
      
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
      
      
PCL 1 0.31 0.34  0.36 0.34 
      
PCL 2 0.48 0.49  0.40 0.49 
      
PCL 3 0.49 0.50  0.41 0.50 
      
PCL 4 0.58 0.61  0.61 0.61 
      
PCL 5 0.47 0.49  0.40 0.49 
      
PCL 6 0.59 0.61  0.52 0.61 
      
PCL 7 0.40 0.46  0.31 0.46 
      
PCL 8 0.23 0.26  0.17 0.26 
      
PCL 9 0.39 0.38  0.37 0.38 
      
PCL 10 0.16 0.15  0.14 0.15 
      
PCL 11 0.15 0.15  0.11 0.15 
      
PCL 12 0.15 0.16  0.17 0.16 
      
PCL 13 0.34 0.32  0.27 0.32 
      
PCL 14 0.19 0.21  0.16 0.21 
      
PCL 15 0.43 0.45  0.35 0.45 
      
PCL 16 0.51 0.63  0.40 0.63 
      
PCL 17 0.38 0.52  0.30 0.52 
      
CES 1 0.47 0.47  0.46 0.47 
      
CES 2 0.07 0.07  0.09 0.07 
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CES 3 0.67 0.68  0.48 0.68 
      
CES 4 0.68 0.68  0.52 0.68 
      
CES 5 0.79 0.79  0.41 0.79 
      
CES 6 0.67 0.67  0.52 0.67 
      
CES 7 0.73 0.73  0.44 0.73 
      
 
Note. Individual item squared multiple correlations represent the portion of unique variance in 
the latent variable (e.g., PTSD) associated with that particular item in that specific model. This 
number represents the reliability of that item to measure the associated latent variable (e.g., how 
well does CES item 1 measure Event Centrlaity?).  
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Table 22. Squared Multiple Correlations (SMCs) for the Latent Variables in the "Predictor" and 
"Reflector" Models 
     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Re-experiencing ---- 1.06 ---- 1.06 
     
Avoidance/Numbing ---- 0.92 ---- 0.92 
     
Hyper-arousal ---- 0.76 ---- 0.76 
     
Event Centrality ---- ---- ---- 0.37 
 
Note. Latent variable squared multiple correlations represent the portion of unique variance in 
the latent variable (e.g., Event Centrality) associated with or explained by the set of indicators 
(e.g., CES items 1 – 7). This number is similar to R2 in regression analysis.  
121 
 
 
Table 23. Criterion Validity of the Centrality of Event Scale (CES) to Assess Poor Global 
Functioning With PTSD Symptoms Included in the Models 
 
 
   
Dependent Variable Predictor Variables  
β a 
   
  sr2 b 
Post-displacement trauma c Gender (male = reference) -.07 .005 
 Age .02 .004 
 Education (< high school= ref.) -.10 <.001 
 PTSD Symptoms d  .40*** .10 
 CES Scores e .009 <.001 
    
    
    
Daily Hassles f Gender (male = reference) .08 .007 
 Age .18** .03 
 Education (< high school= ref.) -.23*** .06 
 PTSD Symptoms .28*** .06 
 CES Scores .13† .01 
    
    
    
Social Support g Gender (male = reference) -.06 .004 
 Age .07 .004 
 Education (< high school= ref.) .11 .01 
 PTSD Symptoms -.17* .02 
 CES Scores -.002 <.001 
    
    
    
Self-rated Health h Gender (male = reference) -.006 <.001 
 Age -.57*** .38 
 Education (< high school= ref.) .05 <.006 
 PTSD Symptoms -.23*** .07 
 CES Scores -.10* .01 
    
    
    
Predicted Self-rated Health i Gender (male = reference) -.004 <.001 
 Age -.58*** .39 
 Education (< high school= ref.) .06 .007 
 PTSD Symptoms -.23*** .07 
 CES Scores -.10* .01 
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Chronic Diseases j Gender (male = reference) -.02 .001 
 Age .53*** .35 
 Education (< high school= ref.) -.06 .007 
 PTSD Symptoms .32*** .12 
 CES Scores .09† .01 
    
    
    
BMI k Gender (male = reference) -.12 .01 
 Age .25*** .06 
 Education (< high school= ref.) -.02 <.001 
 PTSD Symptoms .18** .02 
 CES Scores -.04 .001 
    
    
    
Sleep Apnea l Gender (male = reference) -.26*** .08 
 Age .33*** .12 
 Education (< high school= ref.) -.03 -.002 
 PTSD Symptoms .31*** .08 
 CES Scores -.05 .003 
    
    
 
Note. Values are from the final step in the hierarchal regression models. 
a Standardized regression coefficients 
b Squared semi-partial correlation coefficient which represents the proportion of variance 
uniquely associated with the respective predictor variable. 
c Post-displacement trauma calculated by summing all post-displacement trauma exposures. 
Scores could range from 0 to 115. 
d PTSD assessed at 2nd Follow-up using the PCL-C. Theoretical range from 17 to 85 with higher 
scores reflecting greater PTSD symptoms. 
e Event centrality assessed at 2nd Follow-up using the CES. Theoretical range from 7 to 35 with 
higher scores reflecting higher event centrality. 
f Daily hassles calculated by summing hassles across the three measurement waves. Scores could 
range from 0 to 30. Higher scores reflect higher reported hassles. 
g Social support calculated by summing all social support items across the three measurement 
waves. Cumulative scores could range from 15 to 75. Higher scores reflect greater social 
support. 
h Self-rated health calculated by summing the three self-rated health questions. Cumulative 
scores could range from 3 to 15. Higher scores reflect better self-reported health. 
i Predicted self-rated health calculated by summing the three predicted self-rated health 
questions. Cumulative scores could range from 3 to 15. Higher scores reflect better predicted 
self-rated health one year from measurement. 
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j Chronic diseases calculated by summing all self-reported chronic diseases across the three 
measurement waves. Scores could range from 0 to 36.  
k BMI calculated by averaging the three BMI measurements. 
l Sleep apnea calculated by summing all sleep apnea items measured at 2nd Follow-up. Scores 
could range from 5 to 25. Higher values represent more sleep apnea symptoms. 
†p ≤ .10, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
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Table 24. Logistic Regression Predicting a History of Unemployment With Event Centrality 
Scores and PTSD Symptoms 
 OR (95% CI) 
Gender (reference = male) 4.31*** (2.35, 7.92) 
Education (reference =≤ high school) .79 (.41, 1.52) 
Age 1.08*** (1.05, 1.11) 
PTSD Symptoms a 1.07 (1.00, 1.14) 
Event Centrality b 1.01 (.94, 1.09) 
 
Note: CI = confidence interval; OR = odds ratio. 
a PTSD assessed at 2nd Follow-up using the PCL-C. Theoretical range from 17 to 85 with higher 
scores reflecting greater PTSD symptoms. 
b Event centrality assessed at 2nd Follow-up using the CES. Theoretical range from 7 to 35 with 
higher scores reflecting higher event centrality. 
* p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
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Table 25. Criterion Validity of the Centrality of Event Scales (CES) to Assess Poor Global 
Functioning 
 
 
   
Dependent Variable Predictor Variables  
β a 
   
  sr2 b 
Post-displacement trauma c Gender (male = reference) -.04 .002 
 Age .10 .01 
 Education (< high school= ref.) -.15* .02 
 CES Scores d .22*** .05 
    
    
    
Daily Hassles e Gender (male = reference) .10 .01 
 Age .23*** .06 
 Education (< high school= ref.) -.26*** .07 
 CES Scores .02 <.001 
    
    
    
Social Support f Gender (male = reference) -.07 .005 
 Age .03 <.001 
 Education (< high school= ref.) .13* .02 
 CES Scores -.09 .007 
    
    
    
Self-rated Health g Gender (male = reference) -.02 <.001 
 Age -.62*** .42 
 Education (< high school= ref.) .08† .01 
 CES Scores -.22*** .08 
    
    
    
Predicted Self-rated Health h Gender (male = reference) -.02 <.001 
 Age -.62*** .42 
 Education (< high school= ref.) .08† .01 
 CES Scores -.22*** .09 
    
    
    
Chronic Diseases i Gender (male = reference) -.002 <.001 
 Age .59*** .39 
 Education (< high school= ref.) -.09* .02 
 CES Scores .26*** .11 
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BMI j Gender (male = reference) -.11 .01 
 Age .29*** .08 
 Education (< high school= ref.) -.04 .002 
 CES Scores .05 .002 
    
    
    
Sleep Apnea k Gender (male = reference) -.24*** .07 
 Age .39*** .16 
 Education (< high school= ref.) -.07 .006 
 CES Scores .11* .01 
    
    
 
Note. Values are from the final step in the hierarchal regression models. 
a Standardized regression coefficients 
b Squared semi-partial correlation coefficient which represents the proportion of variance 
uniquely associated with the respective predictor variable. 
c Post-displacement trauma calculated by summing all post-displacement trauma exposures. 
Scores could range from 0 to 115. 
d Event centrality assessed at 2nd Follow-up using the CES. Theoretical range from 7 to 35 with 
higher scores reflecting higher event centrality. 
e Daily hassles calculated by summing hassles across the three measurement waves. Scores could 
range from 0 to 30. Higher scores reflect a higher number of daily hassles. 
f Social support calculated by summing all social support items across the three measurement 
waves. Cumulative scores could range from 15 to 75. Higher scores reflect more social support. 
g Self-rated health calculated by summing the three self-rated health questions. Cumulative 
scores could range from 3 to 15. Higher scores reflect higher self-reported health. 
h Predicted self-rated health calculated by summing the three predicted self-rated health 
questions. Cumulative scores could range from 3 to 15. 
i Chronic diseases calculated by summing all self-reported chronic diseases across the three 
measurement waves. Scores could range from 0 to 36. Higher scores reflect higher predicted 
self-reported health. 
j BMI calculated by averaging the three BMI measurements. 
k Sleep apnea calculated by summing all sleep apnea items measured at 2nd Follow-up. Scores 
could range from 5 to 25. Higher scores represent more sleep apnea symptoms. 
†p ≤ .10, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
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Table 26. Logistic Regression Predicting a History of Unemployment with Event Centrality 
Scores 
 OR (95% CI) 
Gender (reference = male) 4.42*** (2.42, 8.09) 
Education (reference =≤ high school) .72 (.38, 1.38) 
Age 1.09*** (1.06, 1.12) 
Event Centrality a 1.05 (.99, 1.12) 
 
Note: CI = confidence interval; OR = odds ratio. 
a Event centrality assessed at 2nd Follow-up using the CES. Theoretical range from 7 to 35 with 
higher scores reflecting higher event centrality. 
* p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
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Table 27. 2nd Follow-Up CES Straight-Line Responders Compared to Valid Responders (N = 
281). 
 
 
Straight-Line 
(n=160) 
Valid  
(n=121) 
 
p 
 n (%) n (%)  
Gender   .40 
Female 70 (43.75)  59 (48.76)   
Male 90 (56.25) 62 (51.24)  
Education   .85 
High School or Less 112 (70.00) 86 (71.07)  
Greater than High School  48 (30.00) 35 (28.93)  
Employment Status a   .01 
Employed 117 (73.13) 71 (58.67)  
Unemployed 42 (26.25) 50 (41.33)  
 M (SD) M (SD)  
Age (years)  30.70 (10.28) 36.60 (11.41) <.001 
Pre-displacement trauma b 11.57 (3.40) 13.72 (3.13) <.001 
Post-displacement trauma c 3.54 (1.84) 4.25 (2.15) .01 
Daily Hassles d 8.84 (2.14) 9.12 (2.32) .30 
Social Support e 58.63 (4.40) 58.09 (5.15) .35 
Self-rated health f 11.15 (1.68) 9.78 (2.38) <.001 
Predicted self-rated health g 11.15 (1.66) 9.79 (2.38) <.001 
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Chronic diseases h 2.48 (3.43) 5.50 (5.19) <.001 
BMI i 26.41 (4.42) 27.77 (4.83) .01 
Sleep apnea j  4.68 (3.61) 6.49 (5.14) .01 
PTSD symptoms k 18.96 (2.73) 23.76 (6.82) <.001 
CES Scores l 14.14 (1.24) 21.39 (4.40) <.001 
 
Note. Dichotomous variables were compared using χ2 tests. Continuous variables were compared 
using t-tests. 
a Employment status assessed at 2nd Follow-Up. 
b Harvard Trauma Questionnaire sum score. Range 0 to 39. Assessed at Baseline. 
c Post-displacement trauma calculated by summing all post-displacement trauma exposures. 
Scores could range from 0 to 115. 
d Daily hassles calculated by summing hassles across the three measurement waves. Scores could 
range from 0 to 30. Higher scores reflect more daily hassles. 
e Social support calculated by summing all social support items across the three measurement 
waves. Cumulative scores could range from 15 to 75. Higher scores reflect greater social 
support. 
f Self-rated health calculated by summing the three self-rated health questions. Cumulative 
scores could range from 3 to 15. Higher scores reflect higher self-reported health. 
g Predicted self-rated health calculated by summing the three predicted self-rated health 
questions. Cumulative scores could range from 3 to 15. Higher scores reflect higher predicted 
self-reported health. 
h Chronic diseases calculated by summing all self-reported chronic diseases across the three 
measurement waves. Scores could range from 0 to 36. 
i BMI calculated by averaging the three BMI measurements. 
j Sleep apnea calculated by summing all sleep apnea items measured at 2nd Follow-up. Scores 
could range from 5 to 25. Higher scores reflect more sleep apnea symptoms. 
k PTSD assessed at 2nd Follow-up using the PCL-C. Theoretical range from 17 to 85 with higher 
scores reflecting greater PTSD symptoms. 
l Event centrality assessed at 2nd Follow-up using the CES. Theoretical range from 7 to 35 with 
higher scores reflecting higher event centrality. 
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Figure 1. Correlated variables model with PTSD and CES as distinct variables. 
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Figure 2. Correlated variables and symptoms model with PTSD as three distinct symptom 
clusters and CES as a separate and distinct variable. 
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Figure 3. One factor model with PTSD as a homogeneous factor and CES considered a non-
distinct symptom of PTSD. 
!!
PCL1 PCL2
 
P 
PCL3  PCL4 PCL5 PCL6 PCL7 PCL8 PCL9 PCL10 PCL11 PCL12 PCL13 PCL14 PCL15 PCL16 CES1 CES2 CES3 CES4 PCL17 CES5 CES6 CES7 
PTSD 
133 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Higher order model with CES as a symptom of PTSD. 
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Figure 5. Model 4. Higher order "Reflector" model with factor loadings. 
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APPENDIX A 
Research Informed Consent 
 
Title of Study: Mental Health in Iraqi Refugees: Importance of post-displacement social stressors 
and institutional resources 
 
Principal Investigator (PI): Bengt B. Arnetz, MD, PhD 
Family Medicine and Public Health Sciences 
(313) 577-6858 
Purpose of the Study 
In this research study, we plan to: 
v Study the effects that resettlement has on Iraqi refugees in the Metropolitan Detroit area as 
compared to immigrants from non-war/non-conflict exposed Middle East countries.  
v Evaluate how institutional support and the services provided to refugees after arrival in the 
United States impact their health. 
v Evaluate long term mental health and social integration of refugees and immigrants within a 
three-year time span, and on a regular basis after these initial three years. 
v Examine the relationship between the ability to adapt to life in Michigan and making use of 
the government-provided services (such as job and language training). 
 
Study Procedures 
v If you agree to take part in this research study, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire 
that contains demographic questions, and questions that inquire about your mental and 
behavioral functioning, trauma exposure, and social adjustment in the USA. 
v The researcher will initially contact you one year and 2 years later and ask you to fill an identical 
questionnaire. You are free to choose the time and the place for the meetings. In subsequent years, 
the researchers might continue to contact you on a regular basis, most likely every year or 
every second year, to ask about your interest in continuing to be part of the study. 
v Filling the questionnaire takes 60-90 minutes.  
v Wayne State University will keep the questionnaire in a locked cabinet where it will be 
inaccessible except for research purposes supervised by the principle investigator. Each 
questionnaire will be assigned an identification number rather than using the name of the 
participant. The master list linking your name and ID number will be kept in a locked cabinet 
in a secure office. If you decide that you do not want to participate in this third round of 
interviews, that is in today’s interview, or you do not want to be part in the subsequent 
follow-up requests, the list will be destroyed at the end of data collection.  
 
Benefits 
There are no direct benefits for you; however, information from this study may benefit other 
people now or in the future. 
 
Risks 
By taking part in this study, you may experience emotional risks. Feelings of sadness or anxiety 
are possible and could be experienced by some people when discussing sensitive topics related to 
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their past experiences. Participants will be provided with referral information for ACCESS 
behavioral health outpatient facilities as well as Wayne State University’s Psychology clinic, and 
other local community mental health facilities.  
 
Study Costs  
Participation in this study will be of no cost to you. 
 
Compensation  
Each participant will receive a gift certificate to a local store in the amount of $35.00 after each 
completed survey. At time three, today, you will be receiving a gift certificate to a local store in 
the amount of $70.00. Participants will receive a total of $140.00 worth of gift certificates if they 
complete all three testing sessions. If you decide to participate in future studies, the exact 
reimbursement will be adjusted for inflation; however, the reimbursement for interviews 
occurring during the next 5 years will be $35.00 per interview. 
 
Research Related Injuries 
Research related injuries are extremely unlikely; however, in the event that this research related 
activity results in an injury, treatment will be made available including first aid, emergency 
treatment, and follow-up care as needed. No reimbursement, compensation, or free medical care 
is offered by Wayne State If you think that you have suffered a research related injury, contact 
the PI right away at (313) 577-2644 
 
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal 
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose not to take part in this study. 
If you decide to take part in the study you can later change your mind and withdraw from the 
study. You are free to only answer questions that you want to answer. You are free to withdraw 
from participation in this study at any time. Your decisions will not change any present or future 
relationship with Wayne State University or its affiliates, or other services you are entitled to 
receive. The PI may stop your participation in this study without your consent. The PI will make 
the decision and let you know if it is not possible for you to continue. The decision that is made 
is to protect your health and safety, or because you did not follow the instructions to take part in 
the study. While taking part in this study you will be told of any important new findings that may 
change your willingness to continue to take part in the research. 
 
Questions 
If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact Dr. Bengt 
Arnetz or one of his research team members at the following phone number (313) 577-2644. If 
you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, the Chair of the 
Human Investigation Committee can be contacted at (313) 577-1628. If you are unable to contact 
the research staff, or if you want to talk to someone other than the research staff, you may also 
call (313) 577-1628 to ask questions or voice concerns or complaints. 	  
 
Consent to Participate in The Study 
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With my signature on this consent I acknowledge that I have read the contents of this document 
(or was read to me by someone I trust) and that I have received answers to all my inquiries. 
 
 
___________________________________________ _______________  ____________________ 
Signature of participant   Date 
 
 
___________________________________________ _______________  ____________________ 
Signature of researcher   Date 
 
 
___________________________________________ _______________  ____________________ 
File Number of the Questionnaire   Date of the Interview 
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APPENDIX B 
Centrality of Event Scale 
 
Please think back upon the most stressful or traumatic event in your life and answer the 
following questions: 
 
1 I feel that this event has become 
a part of my identity. 
[1] 
Totally 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Totally 
Agree 
2 This event has become a 
reference point for the way I 
understand myself and the 
world. 
[1] 
Totally 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Totally 
Agree 
3 I feel that this event has become 
a central part of my life story. 
[1] 
Totally 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Totally 
Agree 
4 I feel that this event has 
influenced the way I think and 
feel about other experiences. 
[1] 
Totally 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Totally 
Agree 
5 This event has permanently 
changed my life. 
[1] 
Totally 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Totally 
Agree 
6 I often think about the effects 
this event will have on my 
future. 
[1] 
Totally 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Totally 
Agree 
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7 This event was a turning point 
in my life. 
[1] 
Totally 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Totally 
Agree 
 
 
  
140 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
Measurement Invariance Models for Testing Temporal Stability 
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APPENDIX D 
Pre-displacement Trauma 
 
Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ) 
Please circle “YES” or “NO” for each question to indicate whether or not you have experienced 
any of the following events before coming to the U.S. 
 
1 Oppressed because of ethnicity, religion, or sect [1]Yes [2]No 
2 Present while someone searched for people or things in 
your home 
[1]Yes [2]No 
3 Searched arbitrarily [1]Yes [2]No 
4 Property looted, confiscated, or destroyed [1]Yes [2]No 
5 Forced to settle in a different part of the country with 
minimal services 
[1]Yes [2]No 
6 Imprisoned arbitrarily [1]Yes [2]No 
7 Suffered ill health without access to medical care or 
medicine 
[1]Yes [2]No 
8 Suffered from lack of food or clean water [1]Yes [2]No 
9 Forced to flee your country or place of  settlement [1]Yes [2]No 
10 Expelled from your country based on ancestral origin, 
religion, or sect 
[1]Yes [2]No 
11 Lacked shelter  [1]Yes [2]No 
12 Witnessed the desecration or destruction of religious 
shrines or places of religious instruction 
[1]Yes [2]No 
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13 Witnessed the arrest, torture, or execution of religious 
leaders or important members of tribe 
[1]Yes [2]No 
14 Witnessed execution of civilians [1]Yes [2]No 
15 Witnessed shelling, burning, or razing of residential 
areas or marshlands 
[1]Yes [2]No 
16 Witnessed or heard combat situation (explosions, 
artillery fire, shelling) or landmine 
[1]Yes [2]No 
17 Serious physical injury from combat situation or 
landmine 
[1]Yes [2]No 
18 Witnessed rotting corpses [1]Yes [2]No 
19 Confined to home because of chaos and violence 
outside 
[1]Yes [2]No 
20 Witnessed someone being physically harmed (beating, 
knifing etc.) 
[1]Yes [2]No 
21 Witnessed sexual abuse or rape [1]Yes [2]No 
22 Witnessed torture [1]Yes [2]No 
23 Witnessed murder [1]Yes [2]No 
24 Forced to inform on someone placing them at risk of 
injury or death 
[1]Yes [2]No 
25 Forced to destroy someone’s property [1]Yes [2]No 
26 Forced to physically harm someone (beating, knifing, 
etc.) 
[1]Yes [2]No 
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27 Murder of violent death of family member (child, 
spouse) or friend 
[1]Yes [2]No 
28 Forced to pay for bullet used to kill family member [1]Yes [2]No 
29 Received the body of a family member and prohibited 
from mourning them and performing burial rites 
[1]Yes [2]No 
30 Disappearance of family member (child, spouse etc.) or 
friend 
[1]Yes [2]No 
31 Kidnapping of family member (child, spouse, etc.) or 
friend 
[1]Yes [2]No 
32 Family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend taken as 
hostage 
[1]Yes [2]No 
33 Someone informed on you placing you and your family 
at risk of injury or death 
[1]Yes [2]No 
34 Physically harmed (beaten, knifed, etc.) [1]Yes [2]No 
35 Kidnapped [1]Yes [2]No 
36 Taken as hostage [1]Yes [2]No 
37 Heard about frightening, dangerous events that 
occurred to someone else but that you did not 
experience yourself 
[1]Yes [2]No 
38 Sexually abused or raped [1]Yes [2]No 
39 Coerced to have sex for survival [1]Yes [2]No 
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APPENDIX E 
Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ) Trauma Subtypes 
 
Personal Trauma to Self 
1 Physically harmed (beaten, knifed, etc.) 
2 Kidnapped 
3 Taken as hostage 
 
Physical Trauma to Others 
4 Witnessed someone being physically harmed (beating, knifing etc.) 
5 Witnessed murder 
6 Witnessed execution of civilians 
7 Witnessed rotting corpses 
8 Searched arbitrarily 
9 Witnessed shelling, burning, or razing of residential areas or marshlands 
10 Present while someone searched for people or things in your home 
 
Lack of Necessities  
11 Suffered from lack of food or clean water 
12 Suffered ill health without access to medical care or medicine 
13 Lacked shelter  
 
Abduction of Family Member or Friend 
14 Family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend taken as hostage 
15 Kidnapping of family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend 
16 Disappearance of family member (child, spouse etc.) or friend 
17 Murder of violent death of family member (child, spouse) or friend 
 
Persecution / Coercion  
18 Forced to flee your country or place of settlement 
19 Forced to settle in a different part of the country with minimal services 
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20 Oppressed because of ethnicity, religion, or sect 
21 Someone informed on you placing you and your family at risk of injury or death 
22 Witnessed the desecration or destruction of religious shrines or places of religious 
instruction 
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APPENDIX F 
Structured Clinical Interview for PTSD Diagnosis 
 
P O S T T R A U M A T I C  S T R E S S  D I S O R D E R  
S o m e t i m e s  t h i n g s  h a p p e n  t o  p e o p l e  t h a t  a r e  e x t r e m e l y  u p s e t t i n g -
- t h i n g s  l i k e  b e i n g  i n  a  l i f e  t h r e a t e n i n g  s i t u a t i o n  l i k e  a  m a j o r  
d i s a s t e r ,  v e r y  s e r i o u s  a c c i d e n t  o r  f i r e ;  b e i n g  p h y s i c a l l y  
a s s a u l t e d  o r  r a p e d ;  s e e i n g  a n o t h e r  p e r s o n  k i l l e d  o r  d e a d ,  o r  
b a d l y  h u r t ,  o r  h e a r i n g  a b o u t  s o m e t h i n g  h o r r i b l e  t h a t  h a s  
h a p p e n e d  t o  s o m e o n e  y o u  a r e  c l o s e  t o .  A t  a n y  t i m e  d u r i n g  y o u r  
l i f e ,  h a v e  a n y  o f  t h e s e  k i n d s  o f  t h i n g s  h a p p e n e d  t o  y o u ?  
L I S T  O N L Y  T R A U M A T I C  E X P E R I E N C E S  C O R R E S P O N D I N G  I N  
S E V E R I T Y  T O  C R I T E R I O N  A ( 1 ) ,  i . e . ,  t h e  p e r s o n  e x p e r i e n c e d ,  
w i t n e s s e d ,  o r  w a s  c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  a n  e v e n t  o r  e v e n t s  t h a t  
i n v o l v e d  a c t u a l  o r  t h r e a t e n e d  d e a t h  o r  s e r i o u s  i n j u r y ,  o r  a  t h r e a t  
t o  t h e  p h y s i c a l  i n t e g r i t y  o f  s e l f  o r  o t h e r s  
B r i e f  T r a u m a t i c  E v e n t  
 D e s c r i p t i o n                                    D a t e ( M o n t h / Y r )         A g e  
F 1 0 3 a _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
F 1 0 3 b _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
F 1 0 3 c _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
F 1 0 3 d _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
F 1 0 3 e _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
F 1 0 3 f _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
IF ANY EVENTS LISTED: Sometimes traumatic experiences like (TRAUMAS LISTED ABOVE) 
keep coming back in nightmares, flashbacks, or thoughts that you can't get rid of. Has that ever happened 
to you? 
IF NO: What about being very upset when you were in a situation that reminded you of 
one of these terrible things? 
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IF NO TO BOTH OF ABOVE, CHECK HERE ______________ and stop the questionnaire 
 
Current PTSD  
FOR FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOCUS ON TRAUMATIC EVENT(S) MENTIONED 
IN SCREENING QUESTION ABOVE. 
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following were 
present: 
? = inadequate information         1 =absent or false         2 =sub-threshold         3=threshold 
or true 
1 
(1) The person experienced, witnessed, or was 
confronted with an event or events that 
involved actual or threatened death or serious 
injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of 
self or others. 
If person Scores 1 stop the interview 
? 1 2 3 
2 
(2) The person's response involved intense 
fear, helplessness or horror. 
IF UNCLEAR: How did you react when 
(TRAUMA) happened? (Were you very afraid 
or did you feel helpless or horrified?) 
If person Scores 1 stop the interview 
? 1 2 3 
 
B. The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in one (or more) of the following ways: 
3 
(1) Did you think about the (TRAUMA) when you 
didn't want to or did thoughts about the 
(TRAUMA) come to you suddenly when you didn't 
want them to? 
? 1 2 3 
4  (2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event ? 1 2 3 
5 
(3) Did you find yourself acting or feeling as 
if you were back in the situation? ? 1 2 3 
6 
(4) Do you get very upset when something 
reminded you of the (TRAUMA)? ? 1 2 3 
7 
(5) Did you feel physical symptoms--like 
breaking out in a sweat, breathing heavily or 
irregularly, or your heart pounding or racing, 
when something reminded you of 
(TRAUMA)? 
? 1 2 3 
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Did any of the 5 symptoms in B score 3? 
If no, code 1 and GO TO *Past PTSD.  
If yes code 3 and go to C. 
1 3 
 
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general 
responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following: 
8 (1) Have you made a special effort to avoid thinking or talking about what happened? ? 1 2 3 
9 (2) Have you stayed away from things or people that reminded you of the (TRAUMA)? ? 1 2 3 
10 (3) Have you been unable to remember some important part of what happened? ? 1 2 3 
11 
(4) Have you been less interested in doing 
things that used to be important to you, like 
seeing friends, reading books or watching TV? 
? 1 2 3 
12 (5) Have you felt distant or cut off from others? ? 1 2 3 
13 
(6) Have you felt "numb" or like you no longer 
had strong feelings about anything or loving 
feelings for anyone? 
? 1 2 3 
14 
(7) Did you notice a change in the way you 
think about or plan for the future? (Like you 
didn't think you would ever have a career, get 
married, or have children?) 
? 1 2 3 
    
 
Are at least three "C" Symptoms coded "3."? 
IF no, code 1 and GO TO *Past PTSD 
If yes code 3 and go to D 
1 3 
 
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma) as indicated by two 
(or more) of the following: 
15 
(1) Have you had trouble sleeping? (Such as falling 
asleep or staying asleep?) ? 1 2 3 
16 
(2) Have you been unusually irritable? What about 
outbursts of anger? ? 1 2 3 
17 (3) Have you had trouble concentrating? ? 1 2 3 
151 
 
 
18 (4) Have you been watchful or on guard even when there was no reason to be? ? 1 2 3 
19 (5) Have you been jumpy or easily startled, like by sudden noises? ? 1 2 3 
    
 
Are at least two "D" Symptoms coded "3."? 
IF no, code 1 and GO TO *Past PTSD 
If yes code 3 and go to E 
1 3 
      
20 
E. About how long did these problems last? 
If less than a month code 1 and GO TO *Past 
PTSD 
If more than a month code 3 and go to F 
? 1 2 3 
21 
F. The disturbance causes clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational, 
or other important areas of functioning. 
? 1 2 3 
    
    
 
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
CRITERIA  (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), AND (F) 
ARE CODED "3." 
No?   GO TO Past PTSD assessment 
Yes?  The diagnosis is Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder PTSD (do not assess past PTSD) 
1 3 
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APPENDIX G 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist-Civilian Version (PCL-C) 
 
Please select the box which best corresponds to how much you have been bothered by each listed 
problem in the last month. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
1 Repeated, disturbing memories, 
thoughts, or images of a stressful 
experience from the past 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
2 Repeated disturbing dreams of a 
stressful experience from the past 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
3 Suddenly acting or feeling as if a 
stressful experience were happening 
again 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
4 Feeling very upset when something 
reminded you of a stressful 
experience from the past 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
5 Having physical reactions (heart 
pounding, trouble breathing, 
sweating) when something reminded 
you of a stressful experience from the 
past 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
6 Avoid thinking about or talking 
about a stressful experience from the 
past or avoid having feelings related 
to it 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
7 Avoid activities or situations because 
they remind you of a stressful 
experience from the past? 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
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8 Trouble remembering important parts 
of a stressful experience from the 
past 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
9  Loss of interest in things you used to 
enjoy 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
10 Feeling distant or cut off from other 
people 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
11 Feeling emotionally numb or being 
unable to have loving feelings for 
those close to you  
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
12 Feeling as if your future will 
somehow be cut short 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
13 Trouble falling asleep or staying 
asleep 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
14 Feeling irritable or having angry 
outbursts 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
15  Having difficulty concentrating Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
16  Being super alert or watchful or on 
guard 
Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
17 Feeling jumpy or easily startled Not at 
all  
A 
little 
bit     
Moderately  Quite 
a bit    
Extremely    
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APPENDIX H 
Post-displacement Trauma 
 
U.S. Trauma Questionnaire (USTQ) at Baseline 
Please circle “YES” or “NO” for each question to indicate whether or not you have experienced 
any of the following events since you have arrived in the U.S. 
 
1 Oppressed because of ethnicity, religion, or sect [1]Yes [2]No 
2 Present while someone searched for people or things in your home [1]Yes [2]No 
3 Searched arbitrarily [1]Yes [2]No 
4 Property looted, confiscated, or destroyed [1]Yes [2]No 
5 Forced to settle in a different part of the country with minimal 
services 
[1]Yes [2]No 
6 Imprisoned arbitrarily [1]Yes [2]No 
7 Suffered ill health without access to medical care or medicine [1]Yes [2]No 
8 Suffered from lack of food or clean water [1]Yes [2]No 
9 Forced to flee your country or place of settlement [1]Yes [2]No 
10 Expelled from your country based on ancestral origin, religion, or 
sect 
[1]Yes [2]No 
11 Lacked shelter  [1]Yes [2]No 
12 Witnessed the desecration or destruction of religious shrines or 
places of religious instruction 
[1]Yes [2]No 
13 Witnessed the arrest, torture, or execution of religious leaders or 
important members of tribe 
[1]Yes [2]No 
14 Witnessed execution of civilians [1]Yes [2]No 
15 Witnessed shelling, burning, or razing of residential areas or 
marshlands 
[1]Yes [2]No 
16 Witnessed or heard combat situation (explosions, artillery fire, 
shelling) or landmine 
[1]Yes [2]No 
17 Serious physical injury from combat situation or landmine [1]Yes [2]No 
18 Witnessed rotting corpses [1]Yes [2]No 
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19 Confined to home because of chaos and violence outside [1]Yes [2]No 
20 Witnessed someone being physically harmed (beating, knifing 
etc.) 
[1]Yes [2]No 
21 Witnessed sexual abuse or rape [1]Yes [2]No 
22 Witnessed torture [1]Yes [2]No 
23 Witnessed murder [1]Yes [2]No 
24 Forced to inform on someone placing them at risk of injury or 
death 
[1]Yes [2]No 
25 Forced to destroy someone’s property [1]Yes [2]No 
26 Forced to physically harm someone (beating, knifing, etc.) [1]Yes [2]No 
27 Murder of violent death of family member (child, spouse) or 
friend 
[1]Yes [2]No 
28 Forced to pay for bullet used to kill family member [1]Yes [2]No 
29 Received the body of a family member and prohibited from 
mourning them and performing burial rites 
[1]Yes [2]No 
30 Disappearance of family member (child, spouse etc.) or friend [1]Yes [2]No 
31 Kidnapping of family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend [1]Yes [2]No 
32 Family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend taken as hostage [1]Yes [2]No 
33 Someone informed on you placing you and your family at risk of 
injury or death 
[1]Yes [2]No 
34 Physically harmed (beaten, knifed, etc.) [1]Yes [2]No 
35 Kidnapped [1]Yes [2]No 
36 Taken as hostage [1]Yes [2]No 
37 Heard about frightening, dangerous events that occurred to 
someone else but that you did not experience yourself 
[1]Yes [2]No 
38 Sexually abused or raped [1]Yes [2]No 
39 Coerced to have sex for survival [1]Yes [2]No 
 
USTQ at 1st Follow-Up 
Please circle “YES” or “NO” for each question to indicate whether or not you have experienced 
any of the following events since the last interview. 
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1 Oppressed because of ethnicity, religion, or sect [1]Yes [2]No 
2 Present while someone searched for people or things in your home [1]Yes [2]No 
3 Searched arbitrarily [1]Yes [2]No 
4 Property looted, confiscated, or destroyed [1]Yes [2]No 
5 Forced to settle in a different part of the country with minimal 
services 
[1]Yes [2]No 
6 Imprisoned arbitrarily [1]Yes [2]No 
7 Suffered poor health without access to medical care or medicine [1]Yes [2]No 
8 Suffered from lack of food and/or clean water [1]Yes [2]N 
9 Lacked shelter [1]Yes [2]No 
10 Serious physical injury from personal assault [1]Yes [2]No 
11 Confined to home because of chaos and violence outside [1]Yes [2]No 
12 Witnessed someone being physically harmed (beating, knifing 
etc.) 
[1]Yes [2]No 
13 Witnessed sexual abuse or rape [1]Yes [2]No 
14 Witnessed murder [1]Yes [2]No 
15 Murder or violent death of family member (child, spouse) or 
friend 
[1]Yes [2]No 
16 Disappearance of family member (child, spouse etc.) or friend [1]Yes [2]No 
17 Kidnapping of family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend [1]Yes [2]No 
18 Family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend taken as hostage [1]Yes [2]No 
19 Someone informed on you placing you and your family at risk of 
injury or death 
[1]Yes [2]No 
20 Physically harmed (beaten, knifed, etc.) [1]Yes [2]No 
21 Kidnapped [1]Yes [2]No 
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22 Heard about frightening, dangerous events that occurred to 
someone else but that you did not experience yourself 
[1]Yes [2]No 
23 Sexually harassed [1]Yes [2]No 
24 Approached to do an illegal action for money [1]Yes [2]No 
25 Coerced to do an illegal action for money [1]Yes [2]No 
26 Have you been arrested? [1]Yes [2]No 
27 Have you been imprisoned? [1]Yes [2]No 
28 Have you been in a car accident? [1]Yes [2]No 
29 Have you been harassed by police? [1]Yes [2]No 
30 Have you worried about being deported? [1]Yes [2]No 
31 Have you experienced stress related to your financial situation? [1]Yes [2]No 
32 Has your electricity, gas or water been turned off? [1]Yes [2]No 
33 Have you been evicted or had your house foreclosed? [1]Yes [2]No 
34 Has someone in your direct family (e.g., parents, siblings, spouse, 
children) had legal troubles (arrested, imprisoned)? 
[1]Yes [2]No 
35 Has someone in your direct family (e.g., parents, siblings, spouse, 
children) had serious health problems? 
[1]Yes [2]No 
36 Has someone in your direct family (e.g., parents, siblings, spouse, 
children) had mental health problems? 
[1]Yes [2]No 
37 Have you seen a person in the U.S. that was, directly or indirectly, 
a perpetrator of threats or violence against you or your 
family in your old country? 
[1]Yes [2]No 
 
 
USTQ at 2nd Follow-Up 
Please circle “YES” or “NO” for each question to indicate whether or not you have experienced 
any of the following events since the last interview. 
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1 Oppressed because of ethnicity, religion, or sect [1]Yes [2]No 
2 Present while someone searched for people or things in your home [1]Yes [2]No 
3 Searched arbitrarily [1]Yes [2]No 
4 Property looted, confiscated, or destroyed [1]Yes [2]No 
5 Forced to settle in a different part of the country with minimal 
services 
[1]Yes [2]No 
6 Imprisoned arbitrarily [1]Yes [2]No 
7 Suffered poor health without access to medical care or medicine [1]Yes [2]No 
8 Suffered from lack of food and/or clean water [1]Yes [2]No 
9 Lacked shelter  [1]Yes [2]No 
10 Serious physical injury from personal assault [1]Yes [2]No 
11 Confined to home because of chaos and violence outside [1]Yes [2]No 
12 Witnessed someone being physically harmed (beating, knifing 
etc.) 
[1]Yes [2]No 
13 Witnessed sexual abuse or rape [1]Yes [2]No 
14 Witnessed murder [1]Yes [2]No 
15 Murder or violent death of family member (child, spouse) or 
friend 
[1]Yes [2]No 
16 Disappearance of family member (child, spouse etc.) or friend [1]Yes [2]No 
17 Kidnapping of family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend [1]Yes [2]No 
18 Family member (child, spouse, etc.) or friend taken as hostage [1]Yes [2]No 
19 Someone informed on you placing you and your family at risk of 
injury or death 
[1]Yes [2]No 
20 Physically harmed (beaten, knifed, etc.) [1]Yes [2]No 
21 Kidnapped [1]Yes [2]No 
22 Heard about frightening, dangerous events that occurred to 
someone else but that you did not experience yourself 
[1]Yes [2]No 
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23 Sexually harassed [1]Yes [2]No 
24 Approached to do an illegal action for money [1]Yes [2]No 
25 Coerced to do an illegal action for money [1]Yes [2]No 
26 Have you been arrested? [1]Yes [2]No 
27 Have you been imprisoned? [1]Yes [2]No 
28 Have you been in a car accident? [1]Yes [2]No 
29 Have you been injured in another type of accident? [1]Yes [2]No 
30 Have you been harassed by police? [1]Yes [2]No 
31 Have you worried about being deported? [1]Yes [2]No 
32 Core family members were unable to join me in the U.S. [1]Yes [2]No 
33 Have you experienced stress related to your financial situation? [1]Yes [2]No 
34 Has your electricity, gas or water been turned off? [1]Yes [2]No 
35 Have you been evicted or had your house foreclosed?   [1]Yes [2]No 
36 Has someone in your direct family (e.g., parents, siblings, spouse, 
children) had legal troubles (arrested, imprisoned)? 
[1]Yes [2]No 
37 Has someone in your direct family (e.g., parents, siblings, spouse, 
children) had serious health problems? 
[1]Yes [2]No 
38 Has someone in your direct family (e.g., parents, siblings, spouse, 
children) had mental health problems? 
[1]Yes [2]No 
39 Have you seen a person in the U.S. that was, directly or indirectly, 
a perpetrator of threats or violence against you or your 
family in your old country? 
[1]Yes [2]No 
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APPENDIX I 
Daily Hassles 
 
Please circle one response for each problem, indicating the frequency with which you experience 
the following problems: 
 
How often do you experience the 
following... 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
1 Problems with your spouse 
Almost 
Never  
Rarely Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
2 Daily money problems 
Almost 
Never  
Rarely Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
3 Problems with your children 
Almost 
Never  
Rarely Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
4 Problems with your parents 
Almost 
Never  
Rarely Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
5 Problems with other relatives 
Almost 
Never  
Rarely Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
6 Problems with safety  
Almost 
Never  
Rarely Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
7 Problems with transportation  
Almost 
Never  
Rarely Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
8 Problems with language 
Almost 
Never  
Rarely Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
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9 Problems finding a job 
Almost 
Never  
Rarely Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
10 Problems at work (skip if n/a) 
Almost 
Never  
Rarely Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
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APPENDIX J 
Social Support 
 
1 When I feel lonely, there are 
several people I can talk to.  
[1] 
Strongly 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Strongly 
Agree 
2 There is no one that I feel 
comfortable talking to about 
intimate personal problems. 
(REVERSE) 
[1] 
Strongly 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Strongly 
Agree 
3 I often meet or talk with family 
or friends.  
[1] 
Strongly 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Strongly 
Agree 
4 There are several different 
people I enjoy spending time 
with.  
[1] 
Strongly 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 There is at least one person I 
know whose advice I really trust.  
[1] 
Strongly 
Disagree 
[2] 
Disagree 
[3] 
Undecided 
[4] 
Agree 
[5] 
Strongly 
Agree 
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APPENDIX K 
Chronic Diseases 
 
Please circle one response for each item, indicating whether or not you have any of the following 
physician diagnosed disorders: 
 
1 High Blood pressure [1]  Yes [2] No 
2 Heart Disease (any type) [1]  Yes [2] No 
3 Headaches [1]  Yes [2] No 
4 High Cholesterol [1]  Yes [2] No 
5 Sleep apnea or narcolepsy [1]  Yes [2] No 
6 Asthma [1]  Yes [2] No 
7 Diabetes [1]  Yes [2] No 
8 Arthritis or rheumatism [1]  Yes [2] No 
9 Any disease of the muscles or tendons [1]  Yes [2] No 
10 Any skin problems [1]  Yes [2] No 
11  Ear, nose, and throat disorders [1]  Yes [2] No 
12 Cancer (of any type) [1]  Yes [2] No  
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APPENDIX L 
Sleep Apnea 
 
Please check the most appropriate answer for the following questions. 
 
1 Do you snore?  (if no, skip remaining questions) 
2 Snoring loudness 
[1] As loud as breathing    [2] As loud as talking   
  [3] Louder than talking    [4] Very loud 
3 Snoring frequency 
[1] Almost never   [2] 1-2 times per month   [3] 1-2 times per week  
  [4] 3-4 times per week   [5] Almost everyday 
4 When you sleep, do you ever have pauses in your breathing?      
 [1] Never    [2] Almost never     [3] 1-2 times per month            [4] 1-2 times per week               
[5] 3-4 times per week            [6] Almost everyday 
5 Are you tired after sleeping? 
[1] Almost never   [2] 1-2 times per month   [3] 1-2 times per week   
 [4] 3-4 times per week   [5] Almost everyday 
6 Are you tired during wake time? 
[1] Almost never   [2] 1-2 times per month   [3] 1-2 times per week   
 [4] 3-4 times per week   [5] Almost everyday 
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APPENDIX M 
LISREL Syntax Study 1 Hypothesis 2 
	  
Title:	  Model	  1	  Study	  1 
Group	  1:	  CES1	  
Observed	  variables:	  CES1	  CES2	  CES3	  CES4	  CES5	  CES6	  CES7	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime2CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Latent	  variables:	  CES	  
Equation:	  CES1	  CES2	  CES3	  CES4	  CES5	  CES6	  CES7=	  CES	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES1	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES2	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES3	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES4	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES5	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES6	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES7	  free	  
Group	  2:	  CES2	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime3CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Equation:	  	  CES1	  CES2	  CES3	  CES4	  CES5	  CES6	  CES7	  =	  CES	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES1	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES2	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES3	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES4	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES5	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES6	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES7	  free	  
Lisrel	  Output:	  nd=3	  all	  
Path	  Diagram	  
End	  of	  Problem 
	  
	  
Title:	  Model	  2	  Study	  1	  
Group	  1:	  CES1	  
Observed	  variables:	  CES1	  CES2	  CES3	  CES4	  CES5	  CES6	  CES7	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime2CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Latent	  variables:	  CES	  
Equation:	  CES1	  CES2	  CES3	  CES4	  CES5	  CES6	  CES7=	  CES	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES1	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES2	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES3	  free	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Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES4	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES5	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES6	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES7	  free	  
Group	  2:	  CES2	  
Observed	  variables:	  CES1	  CES2	  CES3	  CES4	  CES5	  CES6	  CES7	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime3CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES1	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES2	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES3	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES4	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES5	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES6	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES7	  free	  
Lisrel	  Output:	  nd=3	  all	  
Path	  Diagram	  
End	  of	  Problem 
	  
	  
Title:	  Model	  3	  Study	  1	  
Group	  1:	  CES	  
Observed	  variables:	  CES1	  CES2	  CES3	  CES4	  CES5	  CES6	  CES7	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime2CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Means	  
2.32	  2.12	  2.47	  2.56	  2.64	  2.54	  2.72	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Latent	  variables:	  CES	  
Relationships:	  
CES1	  =	  CONST	  +	  1*CES	  
CES2	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES3	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES4	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES5	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES6	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES7	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES1	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES2	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES3	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES4	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES5	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES6	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES7	  free	  
Set	  the	  variance	  of	  CES	  free	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Group	  2:	  CES	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime3CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Means	  
2.25	  2.06	  2.46	  2.53	  2.70	  2.43	  2.83	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Relationships:	  
CES	  =	  CONST	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES1	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES2	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES3	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES4	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES5	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES6	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES7	  free	  
Set	  the	  variance	  of	  CES	  free	  
Lisrel	  Output:	  nd=3	  all	  
Path	  Diagram	  
End	  of	  Problem 
	  
	  
Title:	  Model	  4	  Study	  1	  
Group	  1:	  CES	  
Observed	  variables:	  CES1	  CES2	  CES3	  CES4	  CES5	  CES6	  CES7	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime2CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Means	  
2.32	  2.12	  2.47	  2.56	  2.64	  2.54	  2.72	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Latent	  variables:	  CES	  
Relationships:	  
CES1	  =	  CONST	  +	  1*CES	  
CES2	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES3	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES4	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES5	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES6	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES7	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES1	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES2	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES3	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES4	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES5	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES6	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES7	  free	  
Set	  the	  variance	  of	  CES	  free	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Group	  2:	  CES	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime3CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Means	  
2.25	  2.06	  2.46	  2.53	  2.70	  2.43	  2.83	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Relationships:	  
CES	  =	  CONST	  
Set	  the	  variance	  of	  CES	  free	  
Lisrel	  Output:	  nd=3	  all	  
Path	  Diagram	  
End	  of	  Problem 
	  
	  
Title:	  Model	  5	  Study	  1	  
Group	  1:	  CES	  
Observed	  variables:	  CES1	  CES2	  CES3	  CES4	  CES5	  CES6	  CES7	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime2CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Means	  
2.32	  2.12	  2.47	  2.56	  2.64	  2.54	  2.72	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Latent	  variables:	  CES	  
Relationships:	  
CES1	  =	  CONST	  +	  1*CES	  
CES2	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES3	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES4	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES5	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES6	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES7	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES1	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES2	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES3	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES4	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES5	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES6	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES7	  free	  
Set	  the	  variance	  of	  CES	  free	  
Group	  2:	  CES	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime3CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Means	  
2.25	  2.06	  2.46	  2.53	  2.70	  2.43	  2.83	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Set	  the	  variance	  of	  CES	  free	  
Lisrel	  Output:	  nd=3	  all	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Path	  Diagram	  
End	  of	  Problem 
	  
	  
Title:	  Model	  6	  Study	  1	  
Group	  1:	  CES	  
Observed	  variables:	  CES1	  CES2	  CES3	  CES4	  CES5	  CES6	  CES7	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime2CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Means	  
2.32	  2.12	  2.47	  2.56	  2.64	  2.54	  2.72	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Latent	  variables:	  CES	  
Relationships:	  
CES1	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES2	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES3	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES4	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES5	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES6	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
CES7	  =	  CONST	  +	  CES	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES1	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES2	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES3	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES4	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES5	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES6	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES7	  free	  
	  
	  
Group	  2:	  CES	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  CESTime3CovariancesRegular.txt	  
Means	  
2.25	  2.06	  2.46	  2.53	  2.70	  2.43	  2.83	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Lisrel	  Output:	  nd=3	  all	  
Path	  Diagram	  
End	  of	  Problem 
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APPENDIX N 
LISREL Syntax Study 3 Hypothesis 1 
	  
Title:	  Model	  1	  Study	  3	  
Observed	  variables:	  PCL21	  PCL22	  PCL23	  PCL24	  PCL25	  PCL26	  PCL27	  PCL28	  PCL29	  PCL210	  PCL211	  
PCL212	  PCL213	  PCL214	  PCL215	  PCL216	  PCL217	  CES21	  CES22	  CES23	  CES24	  CES25	  CES26	  CES27	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  Study3Hypothesis1RegularCovarianceMatrix.txt	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Latent	  variables:	  PTSD2	  CES2	  
Equation:	  CES21	  CES22	  CES23	  CES24	  CES25	  CES26	  CES27=	  CES2	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES21	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES22	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES23	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES24	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES25	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES26	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES27	  free	  
Set	  the	  variance	  of	  CES2	  free	  
Equation:	  PCL21	  PCL22	  PCL23	  PCL24	  PCL25	  PCL26	  PCL27	  PCL28	  PCL29	  PCL210	  PCL211	  PCL212	  
PCL213	  PCL214	  PCL215	  PCL216	  PCL217	  	  	  =	  PTSD2	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL21	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL22	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL23	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL24	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL25	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL26	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL27	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL28	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL29	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL210	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL211	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL212	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL213	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL214	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL215	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL216	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL217	  free	  
Set	  the	  variance	  of	  PTSD2	  free	  
Lisrel	  Output:	  nd=3	  all	  
Path	  Diagram	  
End	  of	  Problem 
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Title:	  Model	  2	  Study	  3	  
Observed	  variables:	  PCL21	  PCL22	  PCL23	  PCL24	  PCL25	  PCL26	  PCL27	  PCL28	  PCL29	  PCL210	  PCL211	  
PCL212	  PCL213	  PCL214	  PCL215	  PCL216	  PCL217	  CES21	  CES22	  CES23	  CES24	  CES25	  CES26	  CES27	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  Study3Hypothesis1RegularCovarianceMatrix.txt	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Latent	  variables:	  PTSD2	  CES2	  REEXP	  AVOID	  HYPER	  
Equation:	  CES21	  =	  1*CES2	  
Equation:	  CES22	  CES23	  CES24	  CES25	  CES26	  CES27=	  CES2	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES21	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES22	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES23	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES24	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES25	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES26	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES27	  free	  
Equation:	  PCL21	  =	  1*REEXP	  
Equation:	  PCL22	  PCL23	  PCL24	  PCL25	  =	  REEXP	  
Equation:	  PCL26	  =	  1*AVOID	  
Equation:	  PCL27	  PCL28	  PCL29	  PCL210	  PCL211	  PCL212	  =	  AVOID	  
Equation:	  PCL213	  =	  1*HYPER	  
Equation:	  PCL214	  PCL215	  PCL216	  PCL217	  	  =	  	  HYPER	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL21	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL22	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL23	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL24	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL25	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL26	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL27	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL28	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL29	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL210	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL211	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL212	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL213	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL214	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL215	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL216	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL217	  free	  
Equation:	  REEXP	  AVOID	  HYPER	  =	  PTSD2	  
Let	  the	  Errors	  between	  PTSD2	  and	  CES2	  Correlate	  
Lisrel	  Output:	  nd=3	  all	  
Path	  Diagram	  
End	  of	  Problem 
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Title:	  Model	  3	  Study	  3	  
Observed	  variables:	  PCL21	  PCL22	  PCL23	  PCL24	  PCL25	  PCL26	  PCL27	  PCL28	  PCL29	  PCL210	  PCL211	  
PCL212	  PCL213	  PCL214	  PCL215	  PCL216	  PCL217	  CES21	  CES22	  CES23	  CES24	  CES25	  CES26	  CES27	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  Study3Hypothesis1RegularCovarianceMatrix.txt	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	  
Latent	  variables:	  TOTALPTSD	  
Equation:	  CES21	  CES22	  CES23	  CES24	  CES25	  CES26	  CES27	  PCL21	  PCL22	  PCL23	  PCL24	  PCL25	  
PCL26	  PCL27	  PCL28	  PCL29	  PCL210	  PCL211	  PCL212	  PCL213	  PCL214	  PCL215	  PCL216	  PCL217	  	  =	  
TOTALPTSD	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES21	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES22	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES23	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES24	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES25	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES26	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES27	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL21	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL22	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL23	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL24	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL25	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL26	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL27	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL28	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL29	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL210	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL211	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL212	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL213	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL214	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL215	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL216	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL217	  free	  
Lisrel	  Output:	  nd=3	  all	  
Path	  Diagram	  
End	  of	  Problem 
 
 
Title:	  Model	  4	  Study	  2	  
Observed	  variables:	  PCL21	  PCL22	  PCL23	  PCL24	  PCL25	  PCL26	  PCL27	  PCL28	  PCL29	  PCL210	  PCL211	  
PCL212	  PCL213	  PCL214	  PCL215	  PCL216	  PCL217	  CES21	  CES22	  CES23	  CES24	  CES25	  CES26	  CES27	  
Covariance	  Matrix	  from	  file	  Study3Hypothesis1RegularCovarianceMatrix.txt	  
Sample	  size	  =	  281	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Latent	  variables:	  PTSD2	  CES2	  REEXP	  AVOID	  HYPER	  
Equation:	  CES21	  =	  1*CES2	  
Equation:	  CES22	  CES23	  CES24	  CES25	  CES26	  CES27=	  CES2	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES21	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES22	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES23	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES24	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES25	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES26	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  CES27	  free	  
Equation:	  PCL21	  =	  1*REEXP	  
Equation:	  PCL22	  PCL23	  PCL24	  PCL25	  =	  REEXP	  
Equation:	  PCL26	  =	  1*AVOID	  
Equation:	  PCL27	  PCL28	  PCL29	  PCL210	  PCL211	  PCL212	  =	  AVOID	  
Equation:	  PCL213	  =	  1*HYPER	  
Equation:	  PCL214	  PCL215	  PCL216	  PCL217	  	  =	  	  HYPER	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL21	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL22	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL23	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL24	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL25	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL26	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL27	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL28	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL29	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL210	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL211	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL212	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL213	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL214	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL215	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL216	  free	  
Set	  the	  error	  variance	  of	  PCL217	  free	  
Equation:	  REEXP	  AVOID	  HYPER	  CES2=	  PTSD2	  
Lisrel	  Output:	  nd=3	  all	  AD=OFF	  
Path	  Diagram	  
End	  of	  Problem	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In order to better understand posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms and PTSD’s 
etiology, researchers have begun examining whether PTSD symptoms are related to the 
centrality of the traumatic event (i.e., whether the trauma is central to the individual’s life story 
and changes the way he or she views the world).  The current study examines the following 
questions: (1) Is event centrality stable over time? (2) What is the effect of cumulative trauma on 
event centrality? Additionally, do different types of trauma have different associations with event 
centrality? and (3) Given its relationship with PTSD, should event centrality be considered a 
reliable and valid symptom of PTSD, instead of a predictor of PTSD? 
These questions were addressed using a sample of 298 newly-arrived Iraqi refugees 
across three waves of measurement.  Results from Study 1 indicate event centrality, as measured 
by the Centrality of Event Scale (CES), is both internally consistent and likely temporally stable 
over time.  Study 2 results suggest CES and PTSD symptoms function similarly with regards to 
trauma exposure.  Specifically, high cumulative trauma exposure is associated with higher CES 
scores and the specific trauma of Physical Trauma to the Self is associated with higher CES 
scores than other trauma types.  Study 3 provides statistical support for the use of the CES as a 
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symptom cluster of PTSD and criterion validity analyses indicate that individuals with high CES 
scores report poor overall global functioning across a spectrum of outcomes. 
Overall, these results indicate event centrality is a critical component to understanding 
the cognitive aspects of PTSD and point toward the nuanced nature of identity, trauma, memory, 
and mental health.  Additionally, these results suggest the CES may be a valid method of 
assessing poor mental health in a population unlikely to disclose mental health concerns. 
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